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Group-oriented communication has grown considerably with the wide use of broadcast-
ing and multicasting of media content. In most group-oriented applications, access to
the communicated content must be restricted to authorised users. These applications
include news feeds, Pay-TV and private teleconferencing systems.
A commonly used solution for controlling access in a group communication is to
encrypt the content using a group key (session key). The group key is only known to
the users in the authorised group. A group is called dynamic if the set of authorised
group members changes in each session. The group key must be updated in each
session to ensure only authorised users of the session can access the content. A group
key distribution scheme provides algorithms to establish and maintain the group key.
The challenge is to design secure and efficient group key distribution schemes. Se-
curity means that the collusion of unauthorised users cannot obtain the group key.
Efficiency is measured in terms of the required secure storage, communication band-
width and computation effort to update the group key. Diverse group applications
pose new challenges and designing group key distribution schemes that are tailored to
specific group communication scenarios is of high importance.
In this thesis, we propose methods of constructing secure and efficient group key
distribution schemes with several properties of high interest. We consider group key
distribution schemes for completely decentralised environments, and propose secure
and efficient constructions for group key distribution schemes where group manage-
ment operations can be performed by either any group member or a collaboration of
several group members. Both these settings have many applications in modern group
communication systems. We show correctness of the proposed constructions, prove
their security and assess their performance.
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The traditional model of communication is point-to-point and involves two parties
communicating over a unicast channel. Protecting information transmitted over the
channel has become critical as networks in general are open to attack. The most
widely known security service for networks is confidentiality (secrecy). Confidentiality
ensures that the message flowing between the sender and the receiver is unintelligible to
outsiders. Encryption is the cryptographic operation required to provide secrecy. En-
cryption takes a message (plaintext) and transforms it into a cryptogram (ciphertext)
using a secret cryptographic key (encryption key). Decryption is the reverse opera-
tion to encryption. The receiver who holds the correct secret key (decryption key)
can recover the message from the cryptogram. An illustration is given in Figure 1.1
where the sender encrypts a message m using the encryption key Ke. The sender sends
the cryptogram c = EKe(m), where EK() is the encryption algorithm and K is the
encryption key. The receiver uses the corresponding decryption key Kd to decrypt the
cryptogram c to obtain the message m = DKd(c), where D() is the corresponding de-
cryption algorithm. In computationally secure systems, it is computationally infeasible
for the adversary to recover the plaintext m from the ciphertext c without knowing the
decryption key Kd.
There are two categories of algorithms: symmetric-key and asymmetric-key algo-
rithms. Symmetric-key algorithms are algorithms in which the encryption key Ke can
be easily determined from the decryption key Kd and vice versa. (In most symmetric-
key algorithms, Ke = Kd.) This setting requires the sender and the receiver to agree
on a key before they can communicate securely, and so one of the major issues in this
setting is to find an efficient method to establish the key. This problem is referred to
as the key distribution problem. The security of a symmetric-key algorithm relies on
1







E (   )m
Encryption Plaintext m
K d
D (  )c
Figure 1.1: Two-party communication using encryption to provide message secrecy
the secrecy of the key, and revealing the key allows anyone to decrypt the ciphertexts.
There are two types of symmetric-key algorithms: stream ciphers and block ciphers.
Stream ciphers operate on a single symbol at a time while block ciphers operate on
a group of symbols at a time. Most well-known symmetric-key algorithms, such as
AES [65] and DES [33], are block cipher algorithms.
In asymmetric-key algorithms, the key Ke used for encryption is different from
the key Kd used for decryption, and it is computationally infeasible to calculate Kd
from Ke. The encryption key Ke can be made public while the decryption key Kd
remains secret. Anyone can use Ke to encrypt a message which is decryptable by a
person with the corresponding decryption key Kd. In this setting, the encryption key
is often called the public key, and the decryption key is called the private key. There
are several public-key encryption algorithms currently available, for examples RSA [74]
and ElGamal [30].
Other communication security services are authenticity and non-repudiation. Au-
thenticity may be considered for source or messages. Source authenticity, also called
data origin authenticity, enables the receivers of messages to determine the true iden-
tity of the sender and guards messages against impersonation, substitution or spoofing.
Message authenticity, also called message integrity, allows receivers to verify whether
the received messages have been tampered with, and ensures that any modification
of the received stream such as changing the order of transmitted messages, or delet-
ing parts of messages are detected. Non-repudiation protects against the sender of a
message claiming that he has not sent the message.
A common way to provide authenticity in symmetric-key systems is to use mes-
sage authentication codes (MACs). MAC algorithms take a message and a secret key,
and produce a fixed-size message digest (MAC). It must be infeasible to produce a
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valid MAC without the knowledge of the secret key. If the originator and the re-
ceiver share the secret key, the receiver can calculate the same MAC and verify if it
matches the MAC accompanying the message. If they are identical, the receiver can
be certain about both the integrity of the message and the sender’s identity. Enabling
authenticity in public-key systems is by using digital signatures. A signature scheme
consists of two algorithms: a signing algorithm and a verification algorithm. The sign-
ing algorithm produces a signature for a message using a private key such that it is
computationally infeasible for anyone without access to the private key, to produce the
signature. The verification algorithm uses the corresponding public key and is used to
verify authenticity of a signed message. If the output of the verification algorithm is
true, the verifier can be sure about both the integrity and the origin of the message.
MACs are shared key primitives and cannot make distinction between the parties
that share the key, and so do not provide non-repudiation. This is because sender and
receiver can both generate a MAC using the shared key. Digital signatures, however,
allow the distinction to be made and so can provide non-repudiation.
1.2 Group Communication and Group Key Distri-
bution
Group communication has grown rapidly with the development of diverse group appli-
cations. Group applications include Pay-TV, multiparty teleconferencing, online video
games and distance education. Data distribution applications such as news feeds, stock
quotes, distributed databases, chat rooms, shared white boards and software updates
have recently found wide popularity.
In traditional point-to-point communication only two users communicate. However
in group communication the group size may vary from tens or hundreds in teleconfer-
encing, to thousands in distance education systems and up to hundreds of thousands
in Pay-TV systems. Communication in the group can originate from a single sender,
or can be from several users communicating with one another. Communicating a mes-
sage through a unicast channel requires the sender to send an individual copy of the
message to each member of the group, while using broadcast or multicast channel,
the sender can send the message to a group of users at the same time. In broadcast
communication, the message reaches all users in the system and in multicast systems,
multicast-enabled routers forward the message to all users who have subscribed to a
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multicast group, hence reducing the number of message copies that traverse the net-
work. Multicast communication can target the message to a specific group and results
in a more efficient usage of bandwidth. Hence multicasting is the preferred mode of
communication for most group communication services. The sender is not necessarily
a group member and can simply direct the message to the group address.
The transmission medium in group communication is open and unauthorised users
(adversaries) can eavesdrop the communication and learn the content of the transmitted
message. In many group applications access to the content must be restricted to
authorised users. Examples include Pay-TV and Pay-per-View systems where only
subscribers of particular channels and programs, respectively, are allowed to receive
the broadcast content. Similarly in distance education systems it is needed to ensure
that only enrolled students can access lectures, and in private teleconferences such
as board meeting and scientific discussions access to exchanged information must be
restricted to participants. Other examples are access to online databases for banks and
travel agencies, news feeds and stock quotes, and Pay-per-Use multiparty games.
The straightforward solution to restrict access is by using public-key encryption.
The sender can send a copy of the message to each authorised user, encrypted using the
user’s public key. This will have high communication cost if the size of the authorised
group is large, and so is not suitable for secure group communication in large groups.
A commonly used technique to control access is to use a symmetric-key encryption
algorithm to encrypt the content and then establish a shared group key (or a session
key) among members of the authorised group that is unknown to outsiders.1 An illus-
tration is given in Figure 1.2 where user U7 sends an encrypted message EGK(m) to
users U1, · · · , U6 such that only receivers that possess the group key GK can recover
the message m.
For a secure encryption algorithm secrecy of the communication relies on the secu-
rity of the group key. So the problem of securing group communication is equivalent
to the problem of securely establishing a group key, that is, securely establishing a
group key among members of an authorised group. This is a more challenging problem
than securing point-to-point communication (one-to-one) because it involves multiple
receivers and must take into account the dynamic nature of the group.
The change in the authorised group is by using the following basic events illustrated
in Figure 1.3. It is assumed that the group has users U1, U2, · · · , U7.
1If the sender is a trusted authority TA (also named center, group controller or group manager in
literature), it also needs to know the common key.





























Figure 1.2: Secure group communication using symmetric-key encryption to provide
message secrecy
Subgroup Secure communication is for a subset of users. The subgroup members
establish a group key which is unknown to users outside the subgroup. Other users
can be viewed as if they are revoked from the group, and the revocation is temporary.
Figure 1.3 shows a subgroup of U1, U2, U3 users. This scenario occurs for example,
in Pay-TV system where different channels have different subsets of subscribers and
subsets vary from time to time, or in a virtual meeting of multiple organisations where
members of each organisation may want to have secret discussion before making a
decision.
Join New users join the group and so the group membership changes by the additional
members. Secure communication in the enlarged group is made possible by forming a
new group key known by all members of the new group. The new users can participate
in future events but are not allowed to learn any communication in the system prior to
their admission. Figure 1.3 shows users U8 and U9 join the group. This event happens
in applications where the number of customers or clients grows. For example, new
subscribers in Pay-TV system should be able to access the content, but only after
subscription.
Evict Users are evicted from the group. Secure communication in the new group
is by establishing a new group key among authorised users. The evicted users are
revoked and will not be able to participate in future events. Figure 1.3 shows users















































Figure 1.3: Events in dynamic group communication
U6 and U7 permanently leaving the group. Scenarios reflecting this event include, Pay-
TV systems where subscribers that contribute to the making of pirate copies of the
content or pirate decoders must be completely expelled from the system, in battlefields
where compromised/corrupted devices must be excluded from the system, and finally
in virtual education systems where graduated students should not be in the system.
Refresh In many cases, there is a need to change a group key without revoking or
adding users. Figure 1.3 shows users U1, U2, · · · , U7 sharing a new group key. This
event is needed when the usage of a group key has a time limit, or is limited by the
amount of data encrypted using the key. This requires a group key refreshing function.
Scenarios that require this event include, when a group member accidentally reveals
the group key and an immediate key update for the same group is needed, and granting
a temporary membership to a potential user before his join to the group, and giving
him the group key. The user’s access can later be ended by simply changing the group
key without changing group membership.
Dynamic group communication requires the group key to be updated each time
an event occurs, to ensure only authorised users can access the content. A group key
distribution scheme provides algorithms to establish and maintain the group key in
dynamic environments, and consists of the following algorithms.
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1. An algorithm to initialise the system whereby parameters are chosen, and secret
information (a set of keys) is generated and distributed to users in the initial
group. Each user securely stores the individual secret information that will be
used to participate in future group operations.
2. An algorithm to securely and efficiently update the group key for each event. For
user admission, this includes a method of giving individual secret information (a
set of keys) to new users to allow them to participate in group operations. For
user eviction, this includes a method of disabling individual secret information (a
set of keys) belonging to evicted users that will prevent them from participating
in group operations after their evictions.
A group key distribution scheme is said to have c-resilience if up to c colluders are
unable to find the group key. It is desirable to provide security for an arbitrary size
groups against large collusions.
Efficiency of group key distribution schemes is determined by several parameters
as follows: (i) communication overhead, which is the length of the message transmit-
ted in key update, (ii) storage overhead, which is the size of secure memory required
by users to store their secret information, and (iii) computation overhead, which is
the computing effort required by a user to determine the group key. Minimizing the
overheads is crucial. The message transmission should consume low bandwidth and
take the advantage of efficient broadcast or multicast channel to scale well for large
groups. The required secure storage and computing effort should be low to accom-
modate devices that have limited secure storage, such as smartcards (used in Pay-TV
system), and limited computing power. Minimizing the overheads also provides faster
group key update that is required in real-time applications, such as Pay-TV, private
teleconferencing, and military command and control in which group operations must
not be disrupted. Fast key update is also important for group applications in ad hoc
environment where connections among devices typically last for a short time period.
Group key distribution systems usually have tradeoff among various overheads.
1.2.1 Benchmarks of Group Key Distribution Schemes
Group applications are diverse and group key distribution must be tuned for the ap-
plications. Solutions can be generally divided into two classes: centralised and decen-
tralised.
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Centralised Setting
There is a single trusted entity that decides and manages the system, including system
setup and key update. This setting is mostly suitable for one-to-many group appli-
cations such as file distribution where there is a single sender and a large number of
receivers. The sender could act as the group manager, or a trusted third party can be
used to control access in the group.
The trusted entity is typically a top-end machine with abundant resources. The
recipients are typically low-end heterogeneous machines with constrained resources.
Accordingly, group key distribution solutions should have optimum efficiency at the
recipient side, while overheads of the trusted entity must remain feasible.
An important concern of this model is potential performance bottleneck. Possible
drawbacks include (i) a single point of failure where the entity could be unavailable
or unreachable (because of congestion or overload), and (ii) a single point of attack
where compromising the trusted entity means divulging all the system secrets. These
drawbacks will bring the entire system down.
Decentralised Setting
The system management role is distributed to several trusted entities and security
task may be performed by a single entity, or a collaboration of a subset of the trusted
entities. This setting is suitable for many-to-many group applications with multiple
senders. For instance, in interactive applications such as virtual conferencing and
collaboration work, any group member may wish to securely send data to a subgroup
of his choice.
This setting alleviates the problems of the centralised setting and provides a suitable
solution for ad hoc wireless networks wherein no entity can be assumed to be present
all the time. Decentralised models allow ad hoc systems to provide continuous security
for mobile users despite rapidly changing network topology.
In this setting nodes often have roughly similar resources. Group key distribution
systems in this setting tend to be more complex compared to those of centralised
setting, and it is important that the solution be sufficiently efficient for the involved
entities.
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1.2.2 Other Security Objectives for Group Communication
The main security goal in group communication is controlling access and ensuring
that only authorised users can access the content. Access control requires secrecy
of communication. Communication secrecy in dynamic environments is obtained by
establishing a group key that is shared by the authorised users. Other desired security
goals are authenticity and traceability described below.
Authenticity
Group authenticity allows each group member to recognise whether a message was
sent by a group member, however, the source of the message may not be known to
the other members. With source authenticity, it is possible to identify the particular
sender within the group, and the origin of messages when the originator is not a group
member.
A group key shared by group members can be used to generate MAC that is used
for group authenticity, but is inadequate for source authenticity since a shared key
cannot be used to differentiate potential senders in the group. There are two basic
approaches to providing source and message authenticity: using public key signatures
or using message authentication codes. Signing every message is costly as signatures
are typically long and computing and verifying a signature results in significant com-
putational overhead. Signature amortization improves efficiency of the system. In
signature amortization a single digital signature is used for authentication of multiple
messages (see [34, 68, 88] for examples). Graph-based authentication generalises the
idea of signature amortization in such a way as to tolerate message losses (see [60, 70]
for examples). An alternative to public key signatures is message authentication codes
(see [14, 17] for instances). MACs are generated using individual key sets of users
instead of the group key. This approach is usually more efficient than digital signature
approach.
Traceability
Traceability can be motivated by looking at the Pay-TV systems. In these systems,
a subscriber possesses a decryption box. The broadcasting center encrypts digital
content and broadcasts it to all subscribers that will use their decoders to decrypt the
content. It is possible that some subscribers collude to produce a pirate decoder. The
pirate decoder, that is not registered with the center, can decrypt the encrypted digital
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content. Given a pirate decoder, traitor tracing provides a method for the center to
recover the identity of a subscriber that participated in the construction of the decoder
(traitor). The traceability would discourage piracy in the system.
It is assumed that each subscriber can recover the decryption key stored in his
decoder, and a subset of subscribers can combine their keys to construct a pirate
decoder. An open box traitor tracing scheme allows the center, given the content of
a pirate decoder, to recover one of the traitors’ keys. A traitor tracing is t-collusion
resistant if in any collusion of up to t colluders at least one of them can be identified.
In black box tracing, the tracer does not have access to the keys inside the pirate box
and can only query the box and observe the response. A lot of research has been done
to construct traitor tracing schemes with various properties, see for examples [15, 20,
46, 62, 63, 64].
1.3 An Overview of Existing Group Key Distribu-
tion Schemes
Group key distribution schemes have been studied in the context of (i) broadcast
encryption system, (ii) key predistribution system, (iii) multicast key distribution
system, (iv) conference key distribution system, and (v) secret sharing key distribution
system. In this section we briefly describe these systems.
1.3.1 Trivial Solutions
The group key establishment problem can be trivially solved by the following methods.
Consider a system wherein each user shares a key with a trusted authority. To es-
tablish a new group key for a selected subset of users (subgroup), the trusted authority
randomly generates the group key, encrypts it using the keys shared with all subgroup
members and individually sends each encrypted version to the corresponding member.
This solution only requires a small amount of storage as each user holds just a single
key. However, it requires a large amount of communication as the number of transmis-
sions is equal to the number of subgroup members. Also, the response time may be
unacceptable since it is necessary to repeatedly send the encrypted group key, one to
each subgroup member, which consumes a considerable amount of time. This solution
can be applied to a decentralised model that assumes a shared key exists between each
pair of users in the group. In this case, any user can take the initiative to generate and
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distribute the group key.
Consider another system wherein every possible subset of users is assigned a key,
and each user holds the keys for all subsets in which he is a member of. To establish
a new group key for a selected subset of users (subgroup), the trusted authority ran-
domly generates the group key, encrypts it using the key associated with the subset
and broadcasts the encrypted version to the group. This solution only requires one
transmission and so the communication length is short. However, it requires a large
amount of storage as each user holds all keys associated with the subsets to which he
belongs. This solution can be performed in a decentralised fashion where any user can
assume the role of the trusted authority.
Consider the event of a new user admitting to the group. To establish a new group
key for the enlarged group, a trusted authority randomly generates the group key, gives
it directly to the new user and broadcasts the new group key encrypted with the old
group key. In this way the new group key is accessible to all authorised users, however,
the trusted authority will be required to directly give every future group key to the
new user. This is because the new user does not have the individual secret information
that is required to participate in group key update algorithms. If the number of new
users is large, this solution is essentially the same as the straightforward solution of
individually giving a group key to authorised users that incurs in high communication
cost.
1.3.2 Broadcast Encryption System
In broadcast encryption system, there are a collection G ⊆ 2U of authorised subsets
and a collection H ⊆ 2U of subsets of colluders. A broadcast encryption scheme enables
a center to securely broadcast data to G ∈ G while preventing any collusion H ∈ H,
where G ∩H = ∅, from finding the data. Broadcast encryption system is introduced by
Fiat and Naor [31]. Their proposed schemes enable a single source to securely broadcast
to an arbitrary subset of users from a group U , and the system is secure against any
collusion of at most t unauthorised users. The system can be used to send a group key
to a subset of users (subgroup) and so provides a solution to group key distributions.
The communication overhead of the centre [31], assuming the existence of one way
function, is O(t2 log2 t log n) keys and each user has to store O(t log t log n) keys, where
n = |U|. Broadcast encryption schemes are further studied by Blundo et al. [10, 11]
and Stinson et al. [84] who consider unconditionally secure model and give lower and
upper bounds on communication overhead and key storage of the system. Luby and
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Staddon [55] use combinatorial methods to show the tradeoff between the number of
keys held by each user, and the number of transmissions required to establish a new
group key. Other works on broadcast encryption include [1, 48, 50, 51, 75].
Recently, Naor et al. [62] proposed two subset-cover revocation schemes: Complete
Subtree (CS) method and Subset Difference (SD) method. Both methods put users
at the leaves of a full binary tree and utilise the tree structure and pseudo-random
sequence generators to generate individual key sets for users. Both schemes can be
used to revoke an arbitrary number of users and collusion of all revoked users cannot
compromise the system secrecy. The notion of stateless receivers is introduced in [62],
that is, users considered in both schemes are not required to change their individual
key sets, and the keys given at the initial stage are used for the entire system lifetime.
To revoke r users, the communication and storage overheads in CS method are r log(n
r
)





keys, respectively. Halevi et al. [37] proposed Layered Subset Difference (LSD) method
to improve the storage overhead of SD method to O(log1+ε n) keys for small ε > 0
while the communication overhead is equivalent to O( r
ε
) keys. Other variants of CS,
SD and LSD methods can be found in [4, 5, 7, 8, 27, 39].
Table 1.1 compares the efficiency of the broadcast encryption schemes and the
trivial solutions described in Section 1.3.1. The computation cost is measured in terms
of the number of decryptions.
Table 1.1: Efficiency comparison of the broadcast encryption schemes and the trivial
schemes
User Storage Communication Computation Collusion
Resilience
CS [62] log n + 1 r log(nr ) 1 n
SD [62] 12 log
2 n + 12 log n + 1 2r − 1 1 n
LSD [37] O(log1+ε n) O( rε ) 1 n
First Trivial 1 n− r 1 n
Second Trivial 2n−1 1 1 n
Broadcast encryption is found in many applications including Pay-TV system and
distribution of copyrighted materials. Below we briefly describe the broadcast encryp-
tion scheme in [62].
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Subset-Cover Revocation Scheme [62]
We describe the SD method of subset-cover revocation scheme. We assume there are
n users (assume n is a power of 2), {U1, · · · , Un}, in the group. The tree consists of n
leaves and 2n−1 nodes (leaves plus internal nodes). To initialise the system, a trusted
authority defines a collection of user subsets, generates secret keys for the subsets and
gives a portion of secret keys to each user through a secure channel as follows.
Subset description: A subset S`,ω is specified by two nodes (`, ω), and defined as
S`,ω = S` \ Sω, where S` and Sω are the sets of users associated with the leaves of the
subtrees rooted at nodes ` and ω, respectively. The collection consists of subsets S`,ω
for all internal nodes ` in the tree and for all descendants ω of node `. Each subset
S`,ω is assigned a key K`,ω and each user knows the keys corresponding to the subsets
that contain him. Observe that each user belongs to O(n) subsets.
Key generation: The method uses a publicly known pseudo-random sequence gener-
ator G : {0, 1}b 7→ {0, 1}3b whose output length is three times the length of the input,
and the concept of label. Let GL(r), GM(r) and GR(r) respectively denote the left,
middle and right third of the output of G on seed r. Also, let P (`), LC(`) and RC(`)
respectively denote the parent, left child and right child node of a node `. The trusted
authority does as follows.
1. For each internal node ` in the tree, chooses a random element r` ∈ {0, 1}
b as
the label LABEL` for node `. The label for subset S`,LC(`) is LABEL`,LC(`) =
GL(LABEL`) and the label for subset S`,RC(`) is LABEL`,RC(`) = GR(LABEL`).
Labels for subsets S`,LC(ω) and S`,RC(ω) for each descendant ω of node ` are
generated by the same way: the label for subset S`,LC(ω) is LABEL`,LC(ω) =
GL(LABEL`,ω); the label for subset S`,RC(ω) is LABEL`,RC(ω) = GR(LABEL`,ω).
The key for each subset S`,ω is K`,ω = GM(LABEL`,ω).
2. Sends to each user Ui the labels LABEL`,ω for every node ` along the path from
the root to Ui’s leaf and for every descendant ω of node ` just hanging off the
path over a secure channel. User Ui securely stores the labels that allow him
to derive all other labels for the subsets that contain him. (Note that a label
LABEL`,ω can be used to derive labels LABEL`,υ, for all descendants υ of node
ω.) Subsequently, the user can determine all secret keys corresponding to subsets
to which he belongs.
The trusted authority does the following to temporarily revoke users Ui1 , · · · , Uim ,
m ≤ n, from the group, and to establish a group key K for the n−m authorised users.
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1. Partitions the authorised users into a collection of disjoint subsets, called the
cover. The algorithm for finding the cover is as follows. Let ST (Ui1 , · · · , Uim) be
the (directed) Steiner Tree [21] induced by leaves of Ui1 , · · · , Uim and the root,
and initially let a tree T = ST (Ui1 , · · · , Uim).
(a) Finds two leaves ` and ω in T such that the least-common-ancestor υ of `
and ω does not contain any other leaf of T in its subtree. Suppose υ1 and
υ2 are the two children of υ such that ` is a descendant of υ1 and ω is a
descendant of υ2. (If there is only one leaf left, make ` = ω to the leaf, υ to
be the root of T and υ1 = υ2 = υ.)
(b) If υ1 6≡ ` then adds the subset Sυ1,` to the cover. Also, if υ2 6≡ ω then adds
the subset Sυ2,ω to the cover.
(c) Updates T by removing all descendants of υ from T and making υ as a leaf.
(d) If T consists of just a single node then stops, otherwise repeats the steps.
2. Randomly chooses the group key K, encrypts K with keys K`,ω corresponding
to all subsets K`,ω in the cover and broadcasts the ciphertexts to the group.
Each authorised user Ui first finds the subset S`,ω where Ui ∈ S`,ω and S`,ω is in the
cover, computes the secret keyK`,ω and decrypts the corresponding ciphertext to obtain
K. Figure 1.4 gives an instance of the system.
Left Figure: A tree structure for a group of 8 users. The subset S1,5 = S1 \ S5 =
{U1, · · · , U8} \ {U3, U4} = {U1, U2, U5, · · · , U8}. Internal node 1 is assigned label
LABEL1 = r1. The label for S1,5 is derived from r1 as follows: LABEL1,5 =
GR(LABEL1,2) = GR(GL(r1)). The secret key for S1,5 is K1,5 = GM (LABEL1,5).
After defining all subsets and their labels, for example, user U1 receives labels
{LABEL1,3, LABEL1,5, LABEL1,9, LABEL2,5, LABEL2,9, LABEL4,9}.
Right Figure: The cover when revoking U3, U4 and U7 is (S2,5, S3,14). The group key
K is encrypted with keys K2,5 and K3,14. Observe that all authorised users can
recover K.
1.3.3 Key Predistribution System
A key predistribution scheme, such as [57, 83], allows a trusted authority to distribute
individual key information to a set of users in such a way that in a later time each
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Figure 1.4: An instance of Subset Difference revocation scheme
user of an authorised subset (subgroup) can compute a common group key without any
interaction. In a (t, n) key predistribution scheme, any subgroup of t out of n users can
compute a common key. A (t, n) key predistribution scheme is called k-secure if group
keys are secure against collusion of up to k users, that is, even if k users pool their
individual key information they cannot compute anything about the group key of any
t-subgroup of other users. Existing constructions of key predistribution systems either
follow Blom’s construction using symmetric polynomials over finite fields [9, 12] and
can lead to information-theoretically optimal schemes, or use key distribution patterns
(KDP) [61]. The KDP approach is a combinatorial in nature and can be used for
any cryptographic keys. Other constructions using key predistribution schemes can be
found in [83, 84]. Below we briefly describe the key predistribution scheme in [9].
Blom Key Predistribution [9]
We describe 1-secure (2, n) of Blom’s scheme. Let p be a large prime number and
publicly known. Suppose the group has n users, {U1, · · · , Un}. A trusted authority
initialises the system as follows.
1. Chooses three random numbers a, b, c ∈ Zp (the set of integers modulo p), and
forms the polynomial F (x, y) = a+ b(x+ y) + cxy mod p.
2. For each user Ui, chooses a unique number ri ∈ Zp and publishes ri, computes a
polynomial Gi(x) = F (x, ri) and sends Gi(x) to Ui over a secure channel.
Later on, any two users Ui and Uj in the system establish a common key K as
follows.
1. Ui computes K = Gi(rj) = F (rj, ri).
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2. Uj computes K = Gj(ri) = F (ri, rj).
1.3.4 Multicast Key Distribution System
Multicast key distribution schemes, independently introduced by Wallner et al. [85] and
Wong et al. [87], allow a group controller to form a new group by evicting all the users
that should not be in the new group, and establish a new group key for the authorised
users. The system employs a logical key hierarchy (LKH) in which each node in a tree
structure corresponds to a key and each leaf corresponds to a user. The LKH is used to
allocate keys to users and the tree root corresponds to the group key. To evict a user,
the group controller multicasts a message such that all authorised users can update
their keys that are also known by the evicted one (called re-keying). Each re-keying is
stateful that requires all authorised users to change their key sets. When being applied
to a group of n users, the schemes in [85, 87] require a user to store logd n+1 keys and
eviction of a single user has communication cost equivalent to d logd n+ 1 keys, where
d is the degree of the tree (scheme [85] uses d = 2, i.e., binary tree).
The schemes are refined in [17, 58] that use one-way function and pseudo-random
generators, respectively, to reduce the communication overhead to (d−1) logd n+1 keys.
The tradeoff between communication overhead and user storage is studied in [18]. The
schemes are primarily designed to support eviction of a single user and so to form an
arbitrary new group, the eviction procedure may be repeatedly invoked. This system is
secure against arbitrary number of colluders. The schemes in [58, 85, 87] also consider
user admission. When a new user joins the group, a secure channel is employed to
deliver the secret information to the new user, and a similar re-keying method as that
of user eviction is used to establish a new group key for the new group. Other works
on multicast key distribution system can be found in [23, 42, 52, 71, 76]. Below we
briefly describe the multicast key distribution scheme in [85].
Wallner-Harder-Agee Key Distribution [85]
Let {U1, · · · , Un} be n users in the multicast group. Without loss of generality, we
assume n is a power of 2. A trusted authority initialises the system as follows.
1. Generates a rooted full binary tree structure with n leaves, associates every user
to a leaf, and generates a key K` for every node ` in the tree.
2. Sends to every user the keys associated to the nodes along the path connecting
the user to the root through a secure channel. Those keys are securely stored by
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the user. The root key K0, which is known to all users, is the common key for
the group.
At some stage, the trusted authority wishes to evict a user Uj from the group and
allow the other members to share a new group key K = K ′0. The trusted authority
does as follows.
1. Generates a new key K ′` for every node ` along the path connecting Uj to the
root (except the leaf associated to Uj).
2. Encrypts new key K ′P (Uj) with key KS(Uj), where P (Uj) and S(Uj) respectively
denote the parent and the sibling of Uj.
3. For every other node ` along the path connecting Uj to the root (except the root),
encrypts new key K ′P (`) with keys K
′
` and KS(`).
4. Multicasts all encrypted new keys.
It is obvious that each user in the new group can decrypt only the keys he is authorised
to receive. The user will update his keys that are also known by Uj with the new keys.
The scheme can be applied repeatedly to evict multiple users. An instance of the
system is given in Figure 1.5.
Left Figure: An LKH for a group of 8 users. For example, user U1 receives keys {K7,
K3, K1, K0}. The group key is K0.
Right Figure: Evicting U1 from the group will update keys {K3, K1, K0} to {K ′3,
K ′1, K
′











0)} where E() denotes a symmetric encryption algorithm. Observe that all
authorised users can update their keys that are also known by U1. The new group
key is K ′0.
1.3.5 Conference Key Distribution System
A conference key distribution system, such as [16, 40], allows an arbitrary group of
users to establish a common conference key. Contributions from all group members
are required to form a conference key. In several rounds, each group member needs to
generate partial key information and send it over a public channel. The conference key
is determined as a function of the partial information provided by all group members.


























Figure 1.5: An instance of LKH key distribution scheme
There has been a lot of effort to extend the conference key distribution schemes,
for example [43, 44], but most of them are for static environments where membership
changes requires a new run of the system setup to establish a new conference key. The
work in [80, 81] first addresses dynamic membership issues in group key agreement sys-
tem. They propose a family of Group Diffie-Hellman (GDH) or Cliques protocols, based
on straightforward extensions of the two-party Diffie-Hellman key agreement protocol,
that can be used to update the conference key in a nontrivial way when membership
changes. Most of conference key distribution schemes are suitable for groups with small
sizes, otherwise it typically involves excessive communication and computation over-
heads. The constructions that are efficient for large groups are independently proposed
in [47] and Chapter 4. Conference key distribution system is an important primitive for
secure collaborative and distributed applications such as teleconferences and replicated
servers where many users may send data within the group. Below we briefly describe
the conference key distribution schemes in [16] and in [81].
Burmester-Desmedt Key Agreement [16]
Let p be a large prime, g be a generator for Z∗p, the multiplicative group of integers
modulo p, and p and g be public. Suppose the group consists of n users, {U0, · · · , Un−1},
and all identifiers i of Ui are taken modulo n. The system initialisation is as follows.
1. Each Ui randomly generates an integer ri, 1 ≤ ri ≤ p− 2, computes zi = g
ri mod
p, and broadcasts zi to the group.
2. Each Ui, after receiving zi−1 and zi+1, computes Vi = (
zi+1
zi−1
)ri mod p, and broad-
casts Vi to the group.




n−2 × · · · × Vi+(n−3)
2 × Vi+(n−2)
1 mod p
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Ki = g
r0r1+r1r2+r2r3+···+rn−1r0 mod p .
When the group membership changes, a new conference key is established by re-
peating the steps described above.
Cliques Key Agreement [81]
Let p be a large prime, g be a generator for Z∗p (the multiplicative group of integers mod-
ulo p) and p, g be publicly known. Suppose the group consists of n users, {U1, · · · , Un}.
We describe system initialisation using the Initial Key Agreement 1 (IKA.1) protocol
of Cliques as follows.
1. For i = 1, · · · , n−1, Ui randomly generates an integer ri, 1 ≤ ri ≤ p−2, computes
zi = g
∏i
j=1 rj mod p, zi,k = g
∏i
j=1,j 6=k rj mod p for 1 ≤ k ≤ i, and sends zi, zi,k for
1 ≤ k ≤ i to Ui+1.
2. Un randomly generates an integer rn, 1 ≤ rn ≤ p− 2, computes
zn,k = g
∏n
j=1,j 6=k rj mod p
for 1 ≤ k ≤ n, and broadcasts zn,k for 1 ≤ k ≤ n to the group.
3. Each Ui computes the group key K = zn as
zn = g
∏n
j=1 rj mod p .
Suppose a member Ud is evicted from {U1, · · · , Un}. Any member Uc, c 6= d, that
remembers the most recent broadcast key information (in this case, zn,k for 1 ≤ k ≤ n)
can update the conference key K as follows: randomly generates an integer r′c, 1 ≤





j=1,j 6=k rj mod p for 1 ≤ k ≤ n, k 6= d, and broadcasts
z′n,k for 1 ≤ k ≤ n, k 6= d, to the group. Each member Ui of the new group computes
the new conference key K ′ as z′n = g
r′c
∏n
j=1 rj mod p.
Suppose a new member Un+1 joins {U1, · · · , Un}. Any member Uc that remembers
the most recent broadcast key information (in this case, zn,k for 1 ≤ k ≤ n) does as
follows: randomly generates an integer r′c, 1 ≤ r
′






p, z′n,k = g
r′c
∏n
j=1,j 6=k rj mod p for 1 ≤ k ≤ n, and sends z′n, z
′
n,k for 1 ≤ k ≤ n to
Un+1. The new member Un+1 does as follows: randomly generates an integer rn+1,





j=1,j 6=k rj mod p for 1 ≤ k ≤ n + 1, and
broadcasts z′n+1,k for 1 ≤ k ≤ n + 1 to the group. Each member Ui of the enlarged
group computes the new conference key K ′ as z′n+1 = g
r′c
∏n+1
j=1 rj mod p.
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1.3.6 Secret Sharing Key Distribution System
Secret sharing key distribution schemes are independently introduced in [2, 64]. The
schemes stem from the combination of threshold secret sharing schemes and Diffie-
Hellman type key exchange protocols. For a group of n users, the schemes allow
revocation of up to a threshold number, say t, users and so the formed subgroup has
size at least n− t users. The secret sharing scheme2 is used to divide the system secret
into w shares, where w ≥ n+ t, and each user receives a share of the system secret. To
form a group key for a user subgroup, shares held by all revoked users and some extra
shares are used as parts of a broadcast message. Each authorised user can combine
his share with the broadcast to compute the group key, while collusion of all revoked
users does not have enough shares to obtain any information about the group key.
Extensions of the schemes can be found in [24, 28, 49, 53]. Below we briefly describe
the secret sharing based scheme in [2].
Anzai-Matsuzaki-Matsumoto Key Distribution [2]
Let p, q be large primes such that q | (p−1) and let g be a generator of a multiplicative
subgroup of Z∗p with order q. The system is bounded by a parameter t as the threshold
of users to be revoked. Suppose the group consists of {U1, · · · , Un} users. A trusted
authority, who is responsible for system initialisation, performs the following steps.
1. Chooses a system secret key S ∈ Zq, S 6= 0, and constructs the polynomial,
F (x) = S +
∑t
j=1 ajx
j mod q, where aj are randomly chosen from Zq.
2. Computes shares si = F (i) and gives si to users Ui, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, through a
secure channel (i and si are the user’s identifier and secret information, respec-
tively). The trusted authority also computes shares si = F (i), for n + 1 ≤ i ≤
n+ t, and keep them as auxiliary shares.
3. Publishes the public keys yi = g
si mod p, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n+ t.
Any user can revoke other m, m ≤ t, users to form a subgroup of n−m remaining
users. Without loss of generality, suppose Ui1 , · · · , Uim is the set of m revoked users.
The user will do the following steps.
1. Randomly chooses an element r ∈ Zq and computes G = g
r mod p.
2In a (t, w) secret sharing scheme, a secret is divided into w shares such that the secret can be
recovered from any t + 1 shares and less than t + 1 shares give no information about the secret (see
Section 1.4.2).
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2. Computes Gj = y
r
j mod p for all j ∈ V , where V = {i1, · · · , im} ∪ {j1, · · · , jt−m}
and {j1, · · · , jt−m} is a (t−m)-subset of {n+ 1, · · · , n+ t}.
3. Broadcasts 〈 G,Gj ‖ j : j ∈ V 〉, where ‖ denotes concatenation of data.
Each user Ui in the subgroup, upon receiving the broadcast, computes the group key
K using Lagrange interpolation at the exponent as follows.







= grS mod p ,






To join a new user, the trusted authority assigns a new identifier d chosen from the
set {n+ t+1, · · · , q−1} ⊆ Zq, where d is different from the identifiers of existing users.
The trusted authority calculates a share sd = F (d), sends sd to the new user Ud using
a secure channel, and publishes the public key yd = g
sd mod p. The join operation
does not affect the existing users. However, as we will show in Appendix A, the join
operation does not maintain system secrecy as the new joined user can learn all past
communication in the system.
1.4 Preliminary Cryptography
We describe some security primitives that will be used to construct group key distri-
bution schemes proposed in the thesis.
1.4.1 Hard Problems and Assumptions
Discrete Logarithm (DL) Problem
Given a finite cyclic group P , a generator g of P , and an element X ∈ P , find the
integer a such that X = ga. DH problem is believed to be hard [30].
Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH)
CDH Problem: Given a finite cyclic group P , a generator g of P , and two elements
X = ga, Y = gb ∈ P , where a and b are unknown, compute Z = gab ∈ P .
CDH Assumption: Any probabilistic polynomial time algorithm solves the CDH
problem only with negligible probability [26].
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Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH)
DDH Problem: Given a finite cyclic group P , a generator g of P , and three elements
X,Y, Z ∈ P , decide whether there exist integers a, b such that X = ga, Y = gb, and
Z = gab.
DDH Assumption: Given a finite cyclic group P and a generator g of P , there is no
efficient algorithm that can distinguish between the two distributions 〈ga, gb, gab〉 and
〈ga, gb, gc〉 where a, b, c are randomly chosen in [1, |P |] [13].
An example of the finite cyclic group is P = Z∗p, the multiplicative group of integers
modulo a large prime p. The problems and assumptions also hold if g is a generator
of a multiplicative subgroup of Z∗p with order q, where q is large prime and p = 2q+ 1.
In this case, a, b, c ∈ [1, q − 1].
1.4.2 Threshold Secret Sharing
Shamir threshold secret sharing [77] can be described as follows. Let q be a prime
number, K0 ∈ Zq be the secret to be shared, n be the number of users (q ≥ n + 1),
and t+ 1 be the threshold for reconstructing the secret.3 Each user Ui corresponds to
a unique public value yi, yi 6= 0, and Ui holds a share Ki = F (yi) (a value of F (x) at
x = yi), where F (x) is a random polynomial of degree t over Zq such that F (0) = K0.
Assuming yi = i and letting the set Φ consist of t + 1 users, the following properties
hold for the scheme.
• The secretK0 can be reconstructed by any t+1 users pooling together their shares
and using polynomial interpolation to calculate the secret as K0 =
∑
i∈ΦKi ×






• The polynomial F (x) can be reconstructed by any t+1 users as F (x) =
∑
i∈ΦKi×






The idea of (v, v)–threshold scheme [45] can be described as follows. The scheme is
basically a simplified version of Shamir’s threshold scheme for the case n = v (it is not
necessary that q is prime and q ≥ n+1). For each user Ui, 1 ≤ i ≤ v−1, the share Ki is
a randomly chosen element of Zq. The share for user Uv is Kv = K0−
∑v−1
i=1 Ki mod q.
Observe that the v users can calculate the secret as K0 =
∑v
i=1Ki mod q.
3This scheme can be applied for any finite field of cardinality greater than n.
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1.4.3 Cumulative Scheme
Cumulative schemes, first defined in [78], are used in [19, 41] to construct secret sharing
schemes for arbitrary access structures. Let Γ be a monotone access structure, as
defined in [82], on a set U . A cumulative scheme for Γ is a map α : U → 2F , where F
is a finite set, such that for any A ⊆ U ,
⋃
Ui∈A
αi = F ⇐⇒ A ∈ Γ ,
where αi = α(Ui). We can represent the scheme as a |U| × |F| cumulative array
C(Γ) = [cij], where row i is indexed by Ui ∈ U and column j is indexed by an element
fj ∈ F , and where each entry cij is either 0 or 1 such that
cij = 1⇐⇒ fj is given to Ui .
The cumulative scheme of [78] is as follows. Let Γ− = A1+· · ·+Am be the minimal form
of the monotone access structure Γ. That is, ∀Ak1 ,Ak2 ∈ Γ
− and Ak1 6= Ak2 , Ak1 6⊂
Ak2 . The dual access structure Γ
∗ = B1 + · · · + Bv is obtained by interchanging sum
and product in the boolean expression for Γ−. Let the finite set be F = {f1, · · · , fv}.
Then α : U → 2F determines αi = {fj : Ui ∈ Bj} .
An example: Let the minimal access structure be Γ− = U1U2 + U2U3 + U3U4. The
dual access structure is Γ∗ = U1U3 + U2U3 + U2U4. Since |Γ
∗| = 3, let the finite set be
F = {f1, f2, f3}. The cumulative array C(Γ
−) is in Table 1.2, where α1 = {f1}, α2 =
{f2, f3}, α3 = {f1, f2} and α4 = {f3}. Observe that
⋃
Ui∈A
αi = F ,∀A ∈ Γ
−.
Table 1.2: Cumulative array for Γ− = U1U2 + U2U3 + U3U4
U1U3 U2U3 U2U4
U1 1 0 0
U2 0 1 1
U3 1 1 0
U4 0 0 1
1.4.4 Key Distribution Pattern
Key distribution patterns (KDP) [61] are finite incidence structures that were originally
designed to distribute keys between pairs of participants in a network and in the absence
of an online key distribution centre. A KDP is used to allocate a collection of keys to
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users in a system such that any pair of users can compute a common key by finding
an appropriate combination of their keys. We recall the definition of a key distribution
pattern.
Definition 1.1 Let X = {x1, · · · , xm} and B = {B1, · · · ,BN} be a family of subsets of
X . The pair (X ,B) is called an (m,N, t)-key distribution pattern ((m,N, t)-KDP) if




for any (t+ 2)-subset {i, j, k1, · · · , kt} of {1, 2, · · · , N}.
The KDP guarantees that for any two subsets {Bi,Bj} and any t subsets {Bk1 , · · · ,Bkt}
where {Bi,Bj} ∩ {Bk1 , · · · ,Bkt} = ∅, there exists at least an element x that belongs to
the two subsets, but does not belong to the t subsets.
KDP can be constructed using several techniques. We give an example of KDP
construction using perfect hash families (PHF) [75]. First we give the description of
PHF [6]. Let v and w be integers such that 2 ≤ w ≤ v. Let V = {1, 2, · · · , v} and
W = {1, 2, · · · , w}. Let F : V → W be a hash function from V to W . The hash
function F is perfect on a subset D ⊆ V if F is injective when being applied to D.
Let t be an integer such that 2 ≤ t ≤ w and let F ⊆ {F : V → W}. F is said
to be an (v, w, t)-perfect hash family if for any D ⊆ V where |D| = t there exists at
least one element F ∈ F such that F is perfect on D. Let PHF (S; v, w, t) denote an
(v, w, t)-perfect hash family with |F| = S.
The KDP construction is as follows. Let F = {F1, · · · , FS} be a PHF (S; v, w, t+2)
from V to W . Suppose X consists of S symmetric w × w matrices,
T 1 = [x1a,b]1≤a,b≤w, · · · , T
S = [xSa,b]1≤a,b≤w ,
where x`a,b = x
`




1 ≤ i ≤ v, suppose Bi consists of F`(i)th row of matrix T
` for all 1 ≤ ` ≤ S, that is,
Bi = {B
1
i , · · · ,B
S
i } ,
where B`i = {x
`
F`(i),1
, · · · , x`F`(i),w} for all 1 ≤ ` ≤ S. (Observe that the size of Bi is Sw




KDP. We need to show that any two subsets {Bi,Bj} have an entry x that does not
belong to any t other subsets {Bk1 , · · · ,Bkt}. Let D = {i, j, k1, · · · , kt}. Since F is a
PHF (S; v, w, t+2), there exists a function Fα ∈ F such that Fα is perfect on D, which
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Bi \ (Bk1 ∪ · · · ∪ Bkt). Observe that Bj has entries of the Fα(j)th row of the matrix
T α which means xαFα(j),Fα(i) ∈ Bj. Since the matrix T




and the entry is not in Bk1 ∪ · · · ∪ Bkt . So if there exists a




Erasure codes are a special class of error-correcting codes that allow recovery of a
message if part of it is corrupted or erased during the transmission.
Definition 1.2 ([48]) An [n, k,m]q erasure code (over the finite field Fq) is a poly-
nomial-time function C : Fkq → F
n
q such that there exists a polynomial-time function
D : F̂nq → F
k
q , where F̂q = Fq ∪ {⊥}, such that: For all v ∈ F
k
q , if u ∈ F̂
n
q is such that
u agrees with C(v) in at least m places, and is ⊥ elsewhere, then D(u) = v.
Given an [n, k,m]q erasure code, one can encode a message v ∈ F
k
q to obtain a
codeword C(v) ∈ Fnq . The message v can be reconstructed even if up to n − m
positions of C(v) are damaged or erased. Erasure codes can be constructed using
error-correcting codes, such as Reed-Solomon codes. Given a message vector v =
(v0, v1, · · · , vk−1) ∈ F
k
q , we construct the polynomial p(x) = v0 + v1x+ · · ·+ vk−1x
k−1.
Let e1, e2, · · · , en be n distinct elements in Fq. The encoding is defined by C(v) =
(pv(e1), pv(e2), · · · , pv(en)), and the decoding D uses k pairs (ei, pv(ei)) to interpolate
the polynomial and reconstruct the coefficients of pv(x) and obtain the source message
v.
1.4.6 Set Cover Problem
Set cover problem [22] is defined as follows. Consider (X ,B), where X = {x1, · · · , xm}
is a finite set and B = {B1, · · · ,BN} is a family of subsets of X , such that every element
of X belongs to at least one set of B. Consider a subset C ⊆ B. We say that C covers





The set cover problem is to find the minimum-sized subset of C of B that covers X .
The set cover problem is a very significant optimisation problem and has been
applied in numerous scenarios. An example is setting up security cameras to cover a
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large art gallery. From each possible camera position, we can see a certain subset of
paintings. Each subset of paintings is a set in our system and we would like to put up
the fewest cameras to see all the paintings.
1.5 Thesis Inside
1.5.1 Aims and Objectives
The main concerns of group key distribution schemes are security and efficiency, and
there has been a lot of research for secure and efficient constructions. The diversity
of group applications also poses a research challenge. Finding group key distribution
schemes for various group communication settings is important to accommodate diverse
group applications.
The aim of the thesis is to find methods for constructing secure and efficient group
key distribution schemes. We also consider group key distribution system where either
single group members or collaboration of several group members can perform security
operations. We construct secure and efficient schemes that cater for these settings, and
consider properties that are desirable in group communication.
The proposed schemes focus on the problem of providing group secrecy in dynamic
environments. All communication channels are assumed to be authentic or an adversary
is assumed to be passive (may eavesdrop on arbitrary communication but may not
interfere with it in any way). An adversary can be an outsider or a quasi-insider.
An outsider is a passive adversary not participating in the group. A quasi-insider is a
group member who wants to passively discover group keys used outside his membership
interval.
1.5.2 Contributions and Structure
The aims are achieved by the following contributions, that are structured into several
chapters. Chapter 1 introduces the topic, overviews the study on group key distri-
bution problem, introduces some security primitives that are used in the thesis, and
presents aims of the thesis and a short description of each chapter along with its main
contribution.
Chapter 2 describes a generalised model of group key distribution systems that will
be used as the system model for proposed group key distribution solutions in the rest
of the thesis. A list of main notations used throughout the thesis is also provided in
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the same chapter.
Chapter 3 studies group key distribution schemes in the context of multicast key
distribution. In particular a secure re-keying scheme with key recovery property is
proposed. The scheme is constructed using one-way hash chain in conjunction with a
logical key hierarchy. As noted in Section 1.3.4, previous schemes such as [17, 18, 85, 87]
require multiple runs of the eviction procedure to form an arbitrary new group, which
is inefficient. The proposed scheme provides an efficient and nontrivial method for
eviction or join of an arbitrary number of users, and it is secure against an arbitrary
number of colluders. When being applied for a single user eviction, the scheme im-
proves the communication overhead of [85, 87]. The proposed scheme also provides key
recovery that allows the key for one session to be recovered from the key of the future
sessions combined with those of the past sessions. This property ensures a reliable
re-keying even if the re-keying information is lost.
Chapter 4 considers decentralised setting of re-keying scheme, and a construction
based on two-party Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol and logical key hierarchy is
given in the chapter. A group key in the proposed scheme is a function of partial key
information from all group members and updating the group key requires contributions
from several group members, and so it can be regarded as a conference key distribution
scheme in dynamic environment. Contrary to other collaborative schemes such as [16,
40, 80, 81] efficient only for small groups, the proposed collaborative scheme is feasible
for large groups. It can be used to form a new group with an arbitrary size by user
eviction or admission, and it is resilient to an arbitrary number of colluders as long as
the DL and CDH problems are intractable.
Most literature on stateless revocation schemes [3, 31, 37, 39, 55, 62, 64, 84] concen-
trates on efficient methods of forming authorised groups by a fixed group controller. In
Chapter 5, the notion of dynamic stateless revocation system is introduced. It allows
the group controller to be dynamic and so any group member can assume the role of
forming a subgroup, while maintaining security of the system. This setting is desired
in numerous applications such as dynamic teleconferences. A dynamic and stateless re-
vocation scheme is also proposed in the chapter, and it is superior to [2, 75] in terms of
communication overhead and collusion size. The construction uses the ideas of logical
key hierarchy, Shamir secret sharing scheme and Diffie-Hellman key agreement, and so
its security relies on the hardness of CDH problem. Several variants, authentication
and user eviction for the proposed scheme are also discussed in the sequel.
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Most existing group key distribution schemes are concerned with only user revoca-
tion (either temporary or permanent); many of them simplify the user join problem
by assuming either the group is static [31, 51, 55, 84] or there is a fixed group con-
troller that securely delivers the new group key for the enlarged group [17, 18, 50, 75].
Chapter 6 focuses on both user revocation and user join problems. The chapter intro-
duces a novel scenario for dynamic group key distribution system that allows any group
member to (i) form a subgroup of existing users U , and (ii) sponsor new users. User
admission has two types: sponsorship and full join. In the former type, a sponsored
member can participate in groups that are initiated by his sponsor but remains outside
U . In the latter type, a new user will join U after receiving enough sponsorships. Two
secure and efficient group key distribution schemes for above scenario, that are built
using algebraic techniques, are also proposed in the chapter. The first scheme provides
sponsorship and full join with a threshold admission structure, while the second scheme
has an arbitrary admission structure. The security of both schemes is based on DDH
assumption with a threshold number of colluders. The chapter also describes a variant,
traceability and user eviction for the proposed schemes.
Chapter 7 addresses the problems of allowing any group member to securely form
a subgroup, and enabling several group members to securely enroll a new user to the
group. In the chapter, a t-resilience group key distribution solution that works over key
distribution patterns (KDP) is proposed, where t is a system parameter. The storage
and communication overheads required in subgroup protocol of the proposed solution
can simultaneously achieve O(log n) keys, where n is the number of users.
Chapter 8 concludes the thesis and suggests future directions.
Chapter 2
A Model of Group Key Distribution
Systems
2.1 Introduction
In this chapter we present a model for group key distribution systems. The model is
generalised to cope with various scenarios and concerns in group applications, and in
turn it will be used as the model for the proposed group key distribution schemes in
the rest of the thesis. Characteristics and attributes of the proposed schemes will be
given in their corresponding chapters.
2.2 The System Model
Let the set N denote the universe of all users, and let K denote the set of all possible
secret keys (secret information) in the system. There is a trusted entity, called the
group controller (GC), that initialises the system, and an initial group of users U0 =
{U1, U2, · · · , Un0} ⊆ N . Each user Ui ∈ U0 holds a set of secret keys (secret information)
K(Ui) ⊂ K. The index i is a unique identifier for user Ui. In the system initialisation,
GC generates system parameters, publishes necessary information, and gives secret
information to each initial user through secure and authentic unicast channels. We
assume such channels exist between the GC and each user in the system.
After the initialisation phase, the system is dynamic and its lifetime consists of
consecutive sessions,
S = (S1, S2, · · · , Ss, · · · , SM) .
In session Ss, there is a user group Us = {U1, U2, · · · , Uns} ⊆ N , and each user Ui ∈
Us holds an individual secret key (secret information) set K(Ui) ⊂ K. Indeed, the
membership of a user in Us is indicated by having the appropriate secret key set that
are required to participate in group operations.
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The system lifetime also consists of consecutive membership events,
E = (E1, E2, · · · , Es, · · · , EM) ,
that require operations in the groups. One membership event occurs in each session
(see next section for the event details). In each event Es, there is a set of entities
that have the privilege of collaboratively performing the membership event. This set
is called privileged set Ps and contributions from all privileged entities in the set are
required for a successful event Es. A privileged entity could be the GC (centralised
setting) and/or a user in N (decentralised setting). Every event may have a different
privileged set.
In each session Ss, the event Es results in a group key (session key) GKs ∈ K shared
by some users in N (note that Us ⊆ N ) while unauthorised users do not share that
key. Therefore, there is a collection of group keys,
{GK1, GK2, · · · , GKs, · · · , GKM} ⊂ K
in the system lifetime, and every group key is a new key.
2.2.1 Membership Events
There are four elementary membership events in the system: Subgroup, Join, Evict,
and Refresh. In session Ss, a membership event Es ∈ {Subgroup, Join, Evict,Refresh}
is invoked by corresponding privileged entities. The membership events are shown in
Tables 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, and 2.4 for subgroup, join, evict, and refresh events, respectively.
Subgroup Event
The purpose of this event is to allow secure communication to or within a subset Gs
in Us. A privileged set Ps = {GC} or Ps ⊂ N invoke this event whereby a group key
GKs is formed and shared by users in Gs. A privileged entity in Ps is called a group
initiator in this context. All communications within Gs are encrypted using the group
key and a secure symmetric encryption algorithm E().
Users in Us \ Gs are considered to be temporarily revoked from session Ss and they
might become authorised users in the future sessions. Therefore, the users for the next
session, Us+1, are those in Us.
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Table 2.1: Subgroup event
If Es = Subgroup
Input: Us, Gs ⊆ Us, Ps = {GC} or Ps ⊂ N
Process: a subgroup protocol
Output: - all Ui ∈ Gs share a group key GKs
- Us+1 = Us
Join Event
In this event a subset of new users Js in N \Us join Us, requiring two accomplishments:
(i) Giving appropriate secret key sets to the new users such that they are eligible for
future membership events, and (ii) Establishing a common key GKs for the enlarged
group Us ∪ Js.
A privileged set Ps = {GC}, or Ps ⊂ N , invokes the admission operation. A
privileged entity in the set is called a sponsor in this context. The new joined users can
be part of any future event in the group. The user group for the next session, Us+1,
are Us ∪ Js.
Table 2.2: Join event
If Es = Join
Input: Us, Js ⊆ N \ Us, Ps = {GC} or Ps ⊂ N
Process: a join protocol
Output: - all Ui ∈ Js obtain secret information K(Ui)
- all Ui ∈ Us ∪ Js share a group key GKs
- Us+1 = Us ∪ Js
Evict Event
This event is opposite to the join event, and involves a subset Rs in Us being evicted
from Us. This requires two accomplishments: (i) Disabling secret key sets of the evicted
users such that they cannot be involved in future group operations, and (ii) Establishing
a secure common key GKs shared by the user subset Us \ Rs.
This operation is performed by a privileged set Ps = {GC}, or Ps ⊂ N , and a
privileged entity in the set is called an evictor. Eviction from Us prevents the users
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in Rs from being part of any future authorised groups and taking part in any future
privileged sets.
Unlike the subgroup event, user revocation to form new groups in this event is
permanent. Users in Rs lose their memberships in Us and all subsequent groups. The
users for the next session, Us+1, are those in Us \ Rs. Note that users in Rs will have
their memberships back in a future session if a join event involving the users takes
place.
Table 2.3: Evict event
If Es = Evict
Input: Us, Rs ⊆ Us, Ps = {GC} or Ps ⊂ Ns
Process: an evict protocol
Output: - all Ui ∈ Us \ Rs share a group key GKs
- all Ui ∈ Rs have unusable secret information K(Ui)
- Us+1 = Us \ Rs
Refresh Event
There is no user addition or user revocation in this event. A group key GKs is es-
tablished for Us by a privileged set Ps = {GC}, or Ps ⊂ N , without changing group
memberships. This event will renew the group key shared by users in the group.
Table 2.4: Refresh event
If Es = Refresh
Input: Us, Ps = {GC} or Ps ⊂ N
Process: a refresh protocol
Output: - all Ui ∈ Us share a group key GKs
- Us+1 = Us
A possible sequence of events is given in Figure 2.1, with events (· · ·, Join, Subgroup,
Subgroup, Evict, Refresh, · · ·).
2.2.2 Group Key Distribution Schemes
A group key distribution scheme provides algorithms to perform membership events
in a group key distribution system. A group key distribution scheme consists of the
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Figure 2.1: A possible sequence of events in the system
following components:
1. A protocol for the GC to initialise the system,
2. Protocols for privileged entities to securely and efficiently execute membership
events in the system. The scheme might support protocols for one or more
membership events. An event protocol can be divided into two basic consecutive
steps.
(a) Transmission – Each privileged entity in Ps performs operations on the
public information and his secret information to construct an event message
M. Transmission of the message to target users is through either a secure
unicast channel or a broadcast (multicast) channel, depending on the event
protocol. We will denote a secure unicast channel by “−−−−−−→” and a
broadcast (multicast) channel by “====⇒” when describing the proposed
schemes.
(b) Computation – Each target user Ui performs computations on the public
information, available secret keys in K(Ui) as well as received event message
M to achieve the purpose of the membership event.
2.2.3 Security Requirements
The main requirements of a group key distribution system are correctness and security.
When new users join or existing users leave the group, the system must ensure that
current memberships change. The system has to guarantee that only authorised users
of a session share the common key for the session.
We consider security of the system against the attack by a collusion C of passive and
computationally bounded adversaries with access to secret keys (secret information)
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K(C) =
⋃
U∈C K(U) and all broadcast (multicast) messages in the system. We say a
group key distribution scheme is c-resilient if any c colluders Ui1 , · · · , Uic , belonging to
sessions (Ss1 , · · · , Ssc′ ), c
′ ≤ c, cannot discover the group key for any session none of
the colluders belong to.
Definition 2.1 A group key distribution scheme is c-resilient if, for any C ⊆ N and
|C| ≤ c, users in C, even if they collude, cannot find group keys GKs for all s such that
Us ∩ C = ∅.
The colluders may belong to different sessions and there may be more than one
colluder in a single session. We note that the security definition is a restricted form
of key confidentiality as it requires the colluders to find the group keys to break the
system. In the formal definition of key confidentiality [62], the system is considered
broken if the adversary can learn something about the key. That is, the adversary can
distinguish the group keys from a random string given all the information known by
the colluders.
The notion of c-resilient defined above can be broken into four security requirements
for group key distribution schemes.
Definition 2.2 Subgroup Secrecy – For any session Ss where S1 ≤ Ss ≤ SM and
Es = Subgroup, a collusion C ⊆ Us \ Gs cannot find the group key GKs.
1
Definition 2.3 Evict Secrecy (also called Forward Secrecy) – For any session Ss where
S1 ≤ Ss ≤ SM , a collusion C ⊆
⋃
Ra, S1 ≤ Sa ≤ Ss, Ea = Evict, cannot find the group
keys GKb, Ss ≤ Sb ≤ SM .
Definition 2.4 Join Secrecy (also called Backward Secrecy) – For any session Ss
where S1 ≤ Ss ≤ SM , a collusion C ⊆
⋃
Ja, Ss ≤ Sa ≤ SM , Ea = Join, cannot
find the group keys GKb, S1 ≤ Sb < Ss.
Definition 2.5 Evict-Join Secrecy (also called Forward-Backward Secrecy) – For any







Sa1 ≤ Ss1 , Ea1 = Evict, Ss2 ≤ Sa2 ≤ SM , Ea2 = Join, cannot find the group keys
GKb, Ss1 ≤ Sb < Ss2.
In the above definitions,
1The definition of subgroup secrecy also implies security for a refresh event.
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(i) Subgroup Secrecy requires that a collusion of users in Us but not in the subgroup
Gs, cannot obtain the group key for the subgroup Gs.
(ii) Evict Secrecy requires that a collusion of users evicted from session Ss and all
sessions preceding Ss, cannot obtain the group key of session Ss or any subsequent
group key.
(iii) Join Secrecy requires that a collusion of new users in session Ss and subsequent
sessions, cannot learn any preceding group key.
(iv) Evict-Join Secrecy requires that a collusion of users consisting of both Evict
Secrecy and Join Secrecy cases, cannot discover keys of groups where they are
not a member of. We observe that Evict-Join Secrecy subsumes both Evict
Secrecy and Join Secrecy.
The above security definitions include attacks from outsiders who only have access
to the broadcast (multicast) messages. We will show that our proposed schemes are
correct and prove that they are secure under the above definitions.
We require a form of authentication for authorised users to assure that the broadcast
(multicast) information for updating the group key, i.e., event messages are originated
from a privileged entity and the messages are unmodified during transmission (source
and message authenticity).
The common approach for providing source and message authentication is using
symmetric-key cryptography. The sender and receiver agree on a secret key which is
used in conjunction with a message authentication code (MAC) algorithm to generate
a MAC for a message. The sender attaches the MAC to the corresponding message and
the receiver verifies both origin and integrity of the received message by using the MAC
verification algorithm. This approach although efficient, but cannot be naively used
in a group communication system (multiple receivers) because any receiver holding
the secret key can impersonate the sender and forge messages on his behalf. Several
variations were proposed to overcome the problem. For examples, the scheme in [17]
uses several secret keys to authenticate every message so that a collusion of a number of
receivers cannot break the authentication system. The scheme in [70] embeds a MAC
in every message and discloses the corresponding secret key to the receiver to enable
verification after certain time elapsed so that the secret key can no longer be used to
forge the message.
We observe that using MACs to authenticate event messages in a dynamic group
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communication system is impractical. This is because authenticating the event mes-
sages when forming a new group requires a new secret key to be shared by members
of the new group beforehand. The pre-existing secret key is used for generating MACs
of the event messages. This raises an issue of how to distribute the pre-existing secret
key to the new group as using a group key distribution scheme to establish the secret
key will require another pre-existing secret key, assuming the authenticity property is
preserved.
A different method which provides source and message authentication, and accom-
modates the dynamic group behaviour involves the use of a public-key signature system.
The sender registers a public signing key with a certificate authority, signs every event
message with the corresponding private key, and appends the signature to the message.
Recipients authenticate both message source and content by executing the signature
verification algorithm with the senders public key. This solution is more costly as
signatures are typically long, and computing and verifying each signature requires a
significant computational overhead. Several schemes were proposed to mitigate this
overheads by amortizing a single signature over several messages such as [34, 68, 88].
The sender signs only one message and the consecutive messages are linked to that
message in a way that allows recipients to verify that they were sent by the signer.
We do not consider authentication systems in the thesis and assume that source and
message authenticity is preserved for all communications (an exception is in Chapter 5
where we give an authentication method for the proposed scheme). We note that
implementing the public-key authentication system will incur some additional storage,
communication and computation costs to our proposed group key distribution schemes.
This will affect the efficiency comparisons made in the subsequent chapters where the
scheme with longer event messages will have more additional costs that make it less
efficient in terms of storage, communication and computation.
2.2.4 Efficiency Requirements
A major requirement of a group key distribution system is to be efficient in group
operations. The efficiency of group key distribution schemes is measured in terms of
the following parameters.
1. Storage – The amount of secure storage that the GC and users use to store K and
K(U), respectively, during the system lifetime. This is measured in bits.
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2. Transmission – The total amount of data transmitted by all entities during an
event protocol. This bandwidth is also measured in bits.
3. Computation – The number of operations that users need to perform during an
event protocol. Only the number of encryptions/decryptions and the number of
exponentiations are taken into account. We assume basic arithmetic operations
are negligible compared to the above costs.
2.2.5 Aspects of Scheme
A group key distribution scheme has a number of aspects and a system must be eval-
uated with respect to all these aspects. Performance of a system is measured by a
number of parameters that are grouped according to these aspects. We divide the
parameters into three categories as follows.
1. Availability – These relate to the cardinality and structure of the user subset
Gs, the new user subset Js and the evicted user subset Rs. It is desirable that
schemes allow arbitrary values for the sizes and structures of these sets. This
category also includes the type of entities (GC or users or both) in the privileged
set Ps for each membership event protocol. If the privileged entities are users, a
further parameter is the structure of privileged users in Ps.
2. Security – These relate to the size of the collusion C and the underlying security
problems of each event protocol. Resilience against arbitrary collusion size and
provable security are required.
3. Efficiency – These include the storage, transmission (communication) and com-
putation costs required by each event protocol. A more efficient protocol has
lower costs. Other parameters in this category are,
(a) Transmission methods – In the case of multiple recipients, a transmission
over broadcast (multicast) channel (one-to-many) consumes less bandwidth
than multiple transmissions over unicast channel (one-to-one).
(b) Transmission rounds – The number of broadcasts (multicasts) rounds that
are required for the completion of an event. It is desirable to have less
rounds.
(c) Storage states – The state of the system and the users’ individual secret
information during the system lifetime. This information might be static
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(fixed from the initialisation time) or dynamic (changed/updated during
sessions). The former and latter status are called stateless and stateful,
respectively.
Another parameter falling in this category is the response time, that is, the time
elapsed between starting and completing execution of each event protocol (time
required for the protocol to become effective). It is desirable to keep the response
time small. We note that lower overheads in other efficiency parameters implies
smaller response time.
2.3 A Summary of Notations
Below, we list the main notations (Table 2.5) used in the thesis. Additional notations
will be employed when necessary, and will be defined when describing the proposed
schemes.
Table 2.5: A summary of main notations
Notation Description Notation Description
N Universe of all users S Session
K Set of all possible secrets E Membership event
U0 Initial user group K Secret key
U User group GK Group key
Ũ Indexes of users in U GC Group controller
G User subgroup U User
G̃ Indexes of users in G n0 Cardinality of U0
R Evicted user subgroup n Cardinality of U
R̃ Indexes of users in R s Session index
J New user subgroup i User index or identifier
J̃ Indexes of users in J ‖ Concatenation of data
P Privileged set ⊕ Exclusive-OR operation
P̃ Indexes of entities in P E() Symmetric encryption
C Collusion of adversaries D() Symmetric decryption
K(U) User U ’s secret key set LKH Logical Key Hierarchy
M Event message KDP Key Distribution Pattern
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2.4 Conclusion
We gave a general framework for the study of group key distribution system. This
framework will be used to describe and analyse the group key distribution systems
proposed in the thesis. We described components and operations that can occur in the
system and revised the basic structure of group key distribution schemes, along with
their security and efficiency requirements.
Chapter 3
A Secure Re-keying Scheme with Key
Recovery Property
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter we study group key distribution schemes from the perspective of mul-
ticast key distribution and consider the re-keying problem in evict and join events.
Previous schemes [85, 87] use re-keying schemes to establish a new group key for a
session of either user eviction or user join. For a user join session, these schemes exclu-
sively use secure unicast channels to distribute secret keys to new users. The schemes
are designed to support eviction or admission of a single user. However they can also
be repeatedly used to evict or join multiple users.
Using single user eviction and join for removing or joining a group is inefficient
because of redundancy in successive re-keying operations, where a new group key is
formed only to be thrown away thereafter. If w users are to be evicted or joined by
this method, the cost in terms of the number of rounds, communication bandwidth and
user computation, will be w times the cost of a single run of re-keying. This overhead
is unacceptable for large size groups with frequent membership change. It is desirable
to have re-keying schemes that efficiently perform group eviction or group join into
a single round. Such schemes would be useful when group operation is performed at
certain intervals, or for applications such as Pay-Per-View where users join or leave the
system in groups (simultaneously or within a very short time interval) and efficiency is
of high importance. The schemes can also be applied to scenarios, such as multi-party
games, where membership changes are distributed over time for performance reasons.
Another important problem in multicast communication is reliability. Multicasting
is an unreliable mode of communication and delivery of all packets is not guaranteed
by the system. Lost packets may also occur because of temporary disconnection from
the network. If the packet that carries the re-keying information is lost, legitimate
40
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users will be unable to compute the group key. This may influence re-keying and so
the re-keying system must be resilient against packet loss. A naive solution is to re-
send the re-keying message. However this not only does not guarantee that re-keying
packets will be delivered, but also results in high communication overhead.
3.1.1 A Summary of Our Contribution
We propose an efficient re-keying scheme that provides multiple user eviction and user
join. The scheme has lower overhead compared to the trivial method of repeatedly
using a single eviction (or join) system, and requires only a single re-keying message
transmitted over a multicast channel per session. The message contains information
not only for authorised users to establish a new group key, but also for new users to
determine their secret key sets in a join event. This substantially reduces the number
of transmissions over unicast channels that is required in trivial case.
The scheme is constructed using a one-way hash chain in conjunction with a logical
key hierarchy. One-way hash chains have been previously used in security systems
including micropayment and high-speed signature systems [69, 73]. We use the hash
chain to generate the keys of a user from some seed values (the keys propagate up the
tree), hence reducing the storage cost of the user. This also reduces the communication
cost because it requires less re-keying information, and some computation previously
performed by the group controller is distributed to the users. The logical tree in our
scheme does not need to be full or balanced and so it can be any tree structure.
The group controller (GC) is the privileged entity for both membership events.
There is no limit on the number of users who can be evicted from, or join the group,
nor is the collusion size limited. We prove that our scheme satisfies the requirements
of strong security, that is, forward secrecy, backward secrecy, and forward-backward
secrecy as defined in Chapter 2. For a single user re-keying, the scheme improves
on Wallner et al.’s scheme [85] and Wong et al.’s scheme [87] by reducing the cost
of communication by factors 2 and d
d−1
, respectively. A user’s cost of computation is
equivalent to u symmetric key decryptions together with v hashing where u+v ≤ logd n.
The required storage for the GC is dn−1
d−1
keys and for a user is logd n+1 keys, assuming
a tree of degree d which is full and balanced. The protocol is stateful and key storage
needs to be updated in each session.
We compare the efficiency of the proposed scheme and basic logical key hierarchy
schemes [85, 87] for both single user re-keying and multiple user re-keying in Table 3.1.
We use the key length as the unit to measure the user storage and communication
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costs. The computation cost is measured in terms of the number of decryptions (u)
and the number of hashing operations (v). We note that schemes [85, 87] use the trivial
method of repeatedly applying single user re-keying to achieve multiple user re-keying.
Table 3.1: Efficiency comparison of the proposed scheme and the basic logical key
hierarchy schemes
Proposed Scheme WHA [85] WGL [87]
GC Storage dn−1d−1 2n− 1
dn−1
d−1
User Storage ` + 1 log2 n + 1 ` + 1
Collusion Resilience n n n
Single User
Communication ≤ (d− 1)` + 1 ≤ 2 log2 n + 1 ≤ d` + 1
Computation∗ u + v ≤ ` u ≤ log2 n u ≤ `
Rounds 1 1 1
Multiple (β) Users





2 (2 log2 n + 1) ≤
n
d (d` + 1)
Computation u + v ≤ ` u ≤ β log2 n u ≤ β`
Rounds 1 β β
n is the total number of users after user eviction or user join
∗u = 1 for the proposed scheme
` = logd n
The scheme also provides key recovery, that is it allows the key for one session to be
recovered from the key of the future sessions combined with those of the past sessions.
This property increases the reliability of the system and ensures that the re-keying will
succeed, even if the re-keying packet is lost. Key recovery are also studied in [54, 79]
in term of self-healing and their model is similar to ours.
3.1.2 Protocols
The proposed scheme includes protocols for user join and user eviction. The protocols
are described in Tables 3.2 and 3.3.
For a join operation, the GC sends to each new user in Js a message M that
contains a portion of the secret information using secure unicast channels. The GC
multicasts a single re-keying messageMrkey containing extra information allowing the
new users Ui ∈ Js to determine their secret key sets K(Ui). The message also includes
information required to determine the group key GKs. Users Ui ∈ Us ∪ Js use Mrkey
and K(Ui) to obtain the group key.
For an evict operation, the GC multicasts a single re-keying messageMrkey to evict
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Table 3.2: Join protocol
If Es = Join
Input: Us, Js ⊆ N \ Us, Ps = {GC}
Process: - GC
M
−−−−−−−−−−−−→ all Ui ∈ Js
- GC
Mrkey
========⇒ all Ui ∈ Us ∪ Js
- all Ui ∈ Js perform computation on M and Mrkey
- all Ui ∈ Us perform computation on Mrkey and K(Ui)
Output: - all Ui ∈ Js obtain secret information K(Ui)
- all Ui ∈ Us ∪ Js share a group key GKs
- Us+1 = Us ∪ Js
Table 3.3: Evict protocol
If Es = Evict
Input: Us, Rs ⊆ Us, Ps = {GC}
Process: - GC
Mrkey
========⇒ Ui ∈ Us \ Rs
- all Ui ∈ Us \ Rs perform computation on Mrkey and K(Ui)
Output: - all Ui ∈ Us \ Rs share a group key GKs
- all Ui ∈ Rs have unusable secret information K(Ui)
- Us+1 = Us \ Rs
users in Rs. Authorised users Ui ∈ Us \ Rs use this message and their secret key sets
K(Ui) to obtain the new group key GKs.
3.1.3 Key Recovery Model
Key recovery allows a legitimate user to recover a lost session key in a subsequent
session. That is, a session key GKs can be recovered in any of the future sessions
Ss+1, · · · , Ss+k (k is a pre-defined system parameter) provided the user is a member of
all these sessions. To provide key recovery, there is an additional recovery message con-
taining information that allows legitimate users to recover the session key. Key recovery
should not breach the security properties of re-keying given in definitions 2.3, 2.4, 2.5.
This is captured in the following definition.
Definition 3.1 A key recovery scheme provides (i) forward secrecy, (ii) backward se-
crecy, or (iii) forward-backward secrecy if it satisfies definitions 2.3, 2.4, or 2.5, re-
spectively. In (iii), it is required that Ss2 ≥ Ss1+2k.
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Organisation of this chapter. In Section 3.2 we give a new re-keying scheme based on
logical key hierarchy, and prove its correctness and security. In Section 3.3 we apply
the re-keying scheme to multicast group operations. Section 3.4 contains a description
of a key recovery method that can be included in the re-keying system. Section 3.5
contains further discussions and conclusion of this chapter.
The main results in this chapter appeared in the Proceedings of The Seventh Aus-
tralasian Conference on Information Security and Privacy – ACISP 2002 [52].
3.2 An LKH Re-keying Scheme
In this section we propose an LKH re-keying scheme that uses one-way hash chains to
evict or join users, and to establish a group key. The scheme provides an algorithm
for the GC to construct the re-keying message, and an algorithm for users to use the
multicast message to compute the group key. The algorithms can be applied for both
user join and user eviction. We will show the details of this application in Section 3.3.
The logical key hierarchy (LKH) can be defined as follows.
Definition 3.2 A logical key hierarchy (LKH) is a tree where each node corresponds
to a key and each leaf corresponds to a user. A user knows the keys of nodes along the
path from the user’s leaf to the root.
Let U = {U1, · · · , Un} be the set of users and T be a tree with n leaves. Nodes of





w , called the node key. l is the level of the node and w is a unique number
identifying the node. Node keys are divided into internal keys and leaf keys. Node
labels are public while node keys are secret. Each leaf corresponds to a user U . Let tU
be the level of the leaf attached to user U . For a user U , let I(U) = {I (0)w , · · · , I
(tU )
w }2
be the set of nodes along the path from his corresponding leaf to the root. The user
holds the set K(U) = {K(0)w , · · · , K
(tU )
w } of node keys along the path to the root, i.e.,
K(U) = {K(l)w : I
(l)
w ∈ I(U)}. All users have a common internal key called the root key
K
(0)
w . Figure 3.1 shows an example of a tree structure for 8 users, where, for example,









A re-keying scheme based on a logical key hierarchy updates the root key K
(0)
w by
updating a subset K(T ) of internal keys, including the root key K (0)w ∈ K(T ), to a
1An internal node has one or more child nodes while a leaf has no child.
2The node identifiers w are not the same values.
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Figure 3.1: An example of a tree structure for 8 users
subset K′(T ) of new keys. The basic method of updating the internal keys using LKH
can be found in Wallner et al. [85]. Our method employs a one-way hash chain to
increase the efficiency of re-keying.
Definition 3.3 Let h() be a one-way hash function and v denote a positive integer.
hv(x) is a one-way hash chain where the function h is obtained by v times application
of h(), and h0(x) = x. Thus hv(x) = h(h(· · · (h︸ ︷︷ ︸
v times
(x)) · · ·)).
We assume the function h() is cryptographically secure. For example, we can use the
one-way hash function in [32, 89].
We first describe the re-keying protocol single-K(T ) for a single user eviction or
join. Later we consider multi-K(T ) for multiple user eviction or join.
3.2.1 Single-K(T )
First we consider the special case where K(T ) = {K (0)w , · · · , K
(t)
w } for all levels t,
t < max{tU : U ∈ U}. The set K(T ) contains only one node key at each level.
Let I(T ) = {I (l)w : K
(l)
w ∈ K(T )} be the set of nodes corresponding to keys in K(T )
and let I(T )(l) be the set of nodes at level l of I(T ). Note that I(T )(l) contains only
a single node. Let D(I (l)w ) be the set of nodes having parent I
(l)
w (the nodes are at level
l + 1). For a node I
(l)
w ∈ I(T ), the set D(I
(l)
w ) can be partitioned into two subsets
DX(I
(l)
w ) and DY (I
(l)
w ) where DX(I
(l)
w ) = D(I
(l)
w )∩ I(T )(l+1) consists of nodes in D(I
(l)
w )
that their corresponding keys must be changed, while DY (I
(l)
w ) = D(I
(l)
w ) \ DX(I
(l)
w )
contains the rest of the nodes in D(I (l)w ). Note that DX(I
(l)
w ) contains only a single
node.
Transmission: The Re-keying Algorithm for the GC
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1. The GC chooses a random number r ∈R Zq for a large number q.
2. For level l = t, · · · , 0 and a node I (l)w ∈ I(T )(l),




w = ht−l(r) where ht−l() is
a one-way hash chain.
(b) The GC encrypts K
′(l)
w with keys of all nodes in DY (I
(l)
w ).











w ∈ I(T ), I
(l+1)





where E() denotes the encryption algorithm. Note that labels of node keys that
are used to encrypt are included in the re-keying message.3
3. The GC multicastsMrkey to the system.
Computation: The Re-keying Algorithm for Users U ∈ U
1. User U finds the nodes that are both in I(U) and Mrkey, in this case, a single
node. Without loss of generality, let I
(y+1)
w be the node in I(U) ∩Mrkey.






w ) ∈ Mrkey using his node key K
(y+1)
w ∈ K(U) to
update K
(y)
w ∈ K(U). That is, K
′(y)
w = DK(y+1)w (EK(y+1)w (K
′(y)
w )) where D() denotes
the decryption algorithm.
3. User U needs to update keys of node I
(y)
w and all its ancestors, i.e., I
(y−1)
w , · · · , I
(0)
w .







w ) where hy−l() is a one way hash chain.
Theorem 3.1 If the tree T is a full and balanced tree of degree d, then updating single-
K(T ) requires (i) a communication cost equivalent to at most 2((d−1) logd n+1) log2 q
bits4 and (ii) a user computation cost equal to a single decryption plus at most logd n−1
hashing operations.
The basic algorithm described above can be extended to evict or join multiple users.
We use multi-K(T ) to denote the re-keying operation used in this case.
3We assume the output of the hash function h() has log2 q bits. The number q should be large
enough such that the encryption algorithm E() is secure against brute force attack.
4We assume the output of the encryption algorithm is of size log2 q bits.
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3.2.2 Multi-K(T )
We can generalise the re-keying algorithm to update multi-K(T ). The set K(T ) con-
sists of node keys where for a node key K
(l)
w ∈ K(T ), ancestors of K
(l)
w are also in K(T ).
The root key K
(0)




w ∈ K(T )} and
|I(T )(l)| ≥ 1 in this case. Let t = max{l : I (l)w ∈ I(T )} be the level of the deepest node
in I(T ) such that I(T ) = ∪I(T )(l) : l = t, · · · , 0. We summarise the re-keying process
in Table 3.4, giving an algorithm for the GC to generate the re-keying messageMrkey,
and in Table 3.5, showing how users U ∈ U update their keys.
Transmission: The Re-keying Algorithm for the GC
Table 3.4: The re-keying algorithm to generateMrkey
(1) Mrkey = ∅
(2) for l = t to 0 {
(3) for all I
(l)
w ∈ I(T )(l) {
(4) if DX(I
(l)

































































(12) Mrkey =Mrkey ∪Mtmp
(13) }
(14) }
The algorithm in Table 3.4 works as follows. It starts at level t and visits nodes in each
level one by one, before moving to the next level down. At each level l it examines
every node in I(T )(l), updates the keys of the nodes and produces the re-keying message
Mrkey.
• Step (1) initialisesMrkey = ∅.
• Steps (2) and (3) together take every node I (l)w in I(T )(l), starting from level l = t
and going to level l = 0, and examine the nodes as in steps (4) to (12).
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• Step (4) tests if at least a child node of I (l)w is in I(T )(l+1).
– If it is not, step (5) updates the node key K
(l)
w to a random value and step
(6) encrypts the updated node key K ′(l)w with keys of all nodes in DY (I
(l)
w )
and stores the result inMtmp.
– If it is, step (9) updates the node key K
(l)
w to the hash value of a seed,
where the seed is an updated key K
′(l+1)





w ). Observe that updating a node key K
(l)
w implies keys of all nodes
in DX(I
(l)
w ) have been updated. Step (10) encrypts the updated node key
K
′(l)
w with keys of all nodes in DY (I
(l)
w ) and the updated keys of all nodes in
DX(I
(l)
w ) except the updated key used as the seed, and stores the result in
Mtmp.
• Step (12) addsMtmp toMrkey.
After executing the algorithm, the GC multicastsMrkey.
Computation: The Re-keying Algorithm for Users U ∈ U
Table 3.5: The re-keying algorithm to update user keys
(1) for l = tU − 1 to 0 {




w ∈ I(U) {
(3) if I
(l+1)


















(5) else if I
(l+1)


















(7) else if I
(l+1)












The algorithm in Table 3.5 works as follows. It starts from the deepest internal node
and visits a node at each level before moving to the next level down. At each level, it
examines the node and its child to update the node key (if necessary).
• Steps (1) and (2) together take a pair of nodes I (l)w , I
(l+1)
w ∈ I(U) starting from
level l = tU − 1 to level l = 0, and examine the pair in steps (3) to (8).
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– Step (3) verifies if I
(l+1)
w is in Mrkey and the node key K
(l+1)
w has been
updated. If the conditions hold, the updated value for the node key K
(l)
w is
in Mrkey and step (4) decrypts it using the updated node key K
′(l+1)
w and





w is in Mrkey and the node key K
(l+1)
w has not been updated, the
updated value for the node key K
(l)
w is inMrkey and step (6) uses the node
key K
(l+1)





w is not inMrkey and the node key K
(l+1)
w has been updated, step (8)
updates the node key K
(l)
w to the hash value of K
′(l+1)
w .
– Otherwise, it is unnecessary to update the node key K
(l)
w .
• Observe that if a node key is updated, the keys of all its ancestors have to be
updated also.
Theorem 3.2 If T is a full and balanced tree of degree d, updating multi-K(T ) requires,





)) log2 q bits
5 and (ii) users’
computation cost of u decryption operations and v hashing operations, where u + v ≤
logd n.





)) log2 q bits is for the
worst case where all internal keys have to be updated. The following shows that even
in the worst case, the length of the multicast message in our scheme is less than the
length of the multicast message in the trivial method described in Section 3.1. This is
because using the trivial method requires n
d
executions of single-K(T ) algorithm and
so it needs total 2n
d




















(d− 1)(logd n− 1)
logd n−1∑
e=1
de < n(logd n− 1) .
Theorem 3.3 The re-keying scheme satisfies the following properties (assuming all
re-keying messages are accessible).
5Again, we assume the cipher of the encryption algorithm has log2 q bits.
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(i) All users can calculate the same new root key.
(ii) A user U can only find the new keys for K(U) ∩ K(T ) and not any other new
key.
(iii) A passive adversary who knows the keys in K(T ) cannot discover any new key in
K′(T ).
(iv) A passive adversary who knows the new keys in K′(T ) cannot discover any key
in K(T ).
Proof: (sketch) (i) Referring to Table 3.4, observe that the new root key is a one-
way hash chain of a random number r ∈R Zq. Steps (2) to (5) indicate that there may
be more than one r. Let r1, r2, · · · , rm be the random numbers. Steps (2), (3), (8) and
(9) guarantee that only one of the random numbers is used for the new root key. Let
the chosen one be r ∈ {r1, r2, · · · , rm} and let p, where 0 ≤ p ≤ t, be the level of r.
The new root key is calculated as hp(r). Step (6) shows that some users have r and
step (10) ensures that all other users get one of the h1(r), · · · , hp(r). Together with the
steps in Table 3.5 we see that once a user gets one of the r, h1(r), · · · , hp(r), he uses it
as a seed to update node keys from the level of the seed to level 0, and so updates the
root key.
(ii) Steps (6) and (10) in Table 3.4 show that each new node key K
′(l)
w ∈ K′(T ) is
encrypted using keys of its children and no other keys. This guarantees that a user
only discovers the new keys along the path from his leaf to the root, unless he can
break the one-way hash function h().
(iii) Steps (5) and (9) in Table 3.4 show that the new keys in K′(T ) are randomly
generated, or are calculated using the one-way hash chains of random numbers. Steps
(6) and (10) ensure that the new keys in K′(T ) are never encrypted with keys in K(T ),
and so a passive adversary cannot derive any information about the new key in K′(T )
unless he can break the encryption algorithm E().
(iv) Similar to (iii). 2
3.3 Group Operations
The initial operation in a multicast group is setting up the system. After that, the
membership of the group changes as a result of the execution of user eviction and user
join operations.
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The set of all users of a multicast group corresponds to the set of all leaves in a tree
structure. Each node corresponds to a key and users use the root key as the group key.
When group membership changes, the tree is updated such that only authorised users
remain in the tree. Also some node keys, including the root key, are updated so that
a new group key for the authorised users be established.
3.3.1 System Initialisation
A multicast group is initialised by the group controller (GC) as follows. Recall that U0
is the initial group of n0 users.
1. The GC constructs a tree structure with n0 leaves, to each node it gives a unique
label I
(l)
w and attaches a randomly generated keyK
(l)
w ∈R Zq, K
(l)
w 6= 0, and assigns
each leaf to a user U ∈ U0. The GC publishes the tree structure (node labels and
users’ positions) in a public bulletin board and keeps all node keys secret.
2. The GC sends to each user U ∈ U0, a set K(U) of node keys along the path from
U ’s leaf to the root over a secure unicast channel. User U holds the set K(U) as
his secret keys. The cardinality of K(U) is the height of U ’s leaf.
The constructed tree can be any tree structure and should be designed to suit the
type of application and the requiring behavior. But to make the re-keying efficient, the
tree structure should be balanced. In a full and balanced tree of degree d, the total
number of nodes is dn−1
d−1
and the height of a leaf is logd n+ 1.
Theorem 3.4 Assuming a full and balanced tree of degree d, a group controller has to
store dn−1
d−1
log2 q bits, and a user has to store (logd n+ 1) log2 q bits.
3.3.2 User Eviction
Suppose in session Ss a subset Rs ⊆ Us of users are evicted from Us, and a group key
GKs is established for authorised users in Us \ Rs. The evicted users must not obtain
GKs or any subsequent group keys. Let the logical key hierarchy be Ts.
Group Controller. The GC does the following.
1. Updates the tree structure by pruning leaves corresponding to users in Rs. Ob-
serve that the resulting tree may have some redundant internal nodes. To increase
efficiency, the GC may remove the redundant nodes by,
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(a) pruning the internal nodes having only one child by replacing the parent
with the child, and
(b) pruning the internal nodes having no child.
As a result, the GC also removes keys of redundant nodes from his storage and
rearranges the levels of affected nodes and keys in the updated tree. Let the
updated tree be denoted by T ′s. The GC publishes T
′
s in a public bulletin board.
Observe that only users in Us \ Rs are in T
′
s.
2. Evicts Rs and establishes the group key GKs (updating the root key). This
requires all internal keys belonging to the evicted users to be updated. In the
updated tree T ′s, let K(Rs) ⊆
⋃
U∈Rs
K(U) \ {K(tU )w } be the set of internal keys
that need to be updated. The GC performs the re-keying scheme in Section 3.2
with T = T ′s and K(T ) = K(Rs).
Users. Users in Us \ Rs do the following.
1. Each affected user U ∈ Us \Rs removes the redundant nodes and keys from I(U)
and K(U), respectively, and rearranges the levels of the affected nodes and keys.
2. Each user U ∈ Us \ Rs receives the re-keying message Mrkey and performs the
re-keying scheme in Section 3.2 to update the keys in K(U) ∩ K(Rs) and obtain
the group key GKs.
We note that the logical key hierarchy for the next session Ss+1 will be Ts+1 = T
′
s
with user group Us+1 = Us \ Rs.
Example 3.1 Suppose Rs = {U3, U5, U6} are evicted from the group in Figure 3.1.
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2. After decryption, users U1 and U2 will have K
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Figure 3.2: Updated tree T ′s when evicting users U3, U5 and U6
Theorem 3.5 User eviction provides evict secrecy (forward secrecy). That is, for any
session Ss where S1 ≤ Ss ≤ SM , a collusion of arbitrary size C =
⋃
Ra, S1 ≤ Sa ≤
Ss, Ea = Evict, cannot distinguish the group key GKb, Ss ≤ Sb ≤ SM , from a random
string.
Proof: (sketch) First we prove security for a single session Ss. That is, we show
that the collusion of users C = Rs cannot obtain the session key GKs. Users in Rs
know K(Rs) but do not have access to any other internal keys. The proof of security
in this case is similar to the proof of Theorem 3.3, part (iii), since K(T ) = K(Rs)
and GKs ∈ K
′(T ). To prove security for multiple sessions, we only need to prove that
K(Ra) : S1 ≤ Sa ≤ Ss gives no information about GKb : Ss ≤ Sb ≤ SM . This can also
be proved using an argument similar to that of Theorem 3.3, part (iii). 2
Observe that instead of keys in K(Rs), the updated version of the keys are used
for further group operations. By referring to Theorem 3.3, part (iii), users in Rs only
know K(Rs) but not any updated version of the keys. Then we have the following.
Corollary 3.1 Secret keys belonging to users in Rs are disabled for future group op-
erations.
3.3.3 User Join
Suppose in session Ss, a subset Js ⊆ N \ Us of new users join Us. A set of secret keys
K(U) has to be delivered to each new user U ∈ Js, and a group key GKs needs to be
established for the group Us∪Js such that new users in Js cannot obtain any previous
group keys. Let the logical key hierarchy be Ts.
Group Controller. The GC does the following.
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1. Updates the tree structure by adding |Js| new leaves to the tree.
(a) The new leaves can be simply attached to the existing internal nodes, or
(b) New internal nodes may be created in order to attach the new leaves. A
new internal node replaces an existing node (either an internal node or a
leaf) and the existing node (and its descendants if any) becomes the child
(and the descendants if any) of the new internal node.
The GC then rearranges the levels of the affected nodes and keys in the updated
tree T ′s, and publishes T
′
s in a public bulletin board. For efficient re-keying, the
new leaves should be added in such a way that T ′s is as balanced as possible.
2. Produces a randomly chosen key for each new leaf and associates each new user
U ∈ Js to a new leaf. The GC then securely sends the key associated with the
user to him over a secure unicast channel. The leaf key of the user U is K
(tU )
w .
Observe that all users in Us ∪ Js are in T
′
s.
3. In the updated tree T ′s, let I(Js) =
⋃
U∈Js
I(U) \ {I (tU )w } be the set of internal
nodes belonging to the new users. Joining Js and establishing the group key
GKs (updating the root key) requires the internal keys of all nodes in I(Js) to
be updated. The GC performs the re-keying scheme in Section 3.2 with T = T ′s
and K(T ) = {K(l)w : I
(l)
w ∈ I(Js)}.
Users. Users in Us ∪ Js do the following.
1. Before re-keying, each new user U ∈ Js knows only I(U), but not K(U)\{K
(tU )
w }.
User U performs the re-keying operation described in Section 3.2 to obtain the
updated keys in K(U) and the group key GKs.
2. Each affected user U ∈ Us adds the new internal nodes (new ancestors of U ’s
leaf) to I(U) and rearranges the levels of his affected nodes and keys. Note that
the user does not know the keys of the new internal nodes. The user performs the
re-keying operation described in Section 3.2 to update the keys in K(U)∩K(Js)
(to obtain the updated keys of the new internal nodes) and obtain the group key
GKs.
3. The rest of the users in Us perform the re-keying operation of Section 3.2 to
update the keys in K(U) ∩ K(Js) and obtain the group key GKs.
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Note that unlike other schemes where to join a new user U the GC must send all the
keys in K(U) to U through a secure unicast channel, the join operation in our scheme
requires the GC to send only the leaf key to U through a secure unicast channel. The
new user obtains other keys through the re-keying (multicast channel).
We note that the logical key hierarchy for the next session Ss+1 will be Ts+1 = T
′
s
with user group Us+1 = Us ∪ Js.
Example 3.2 Suppose Js = {U9, U10} join the group in Figure 3.1.
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2. After decryption, users U1, · · · , U5 will have K
′(0)
0 from Mrkey. Users U6 and U9
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Figure 3.3: Updated tree T ′s when joining new users U9 and U10
In light of Theorem 3.3, part (iv), and using an argument similar to the proof of
Theorem 3.5, we have
Theorem 3.6 User join provides join secrecy (backward secrecy). That is, for any
session Ss where S1 ≤ Ss ≤ SM , an arbitrary size collusion C =
⋃
Ja, Ss ≤ Sa ≤
SM , Ea = Join, cannot distinguish the group key GKb, S1 ≤ Sb < Ss, from a random
string.
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Theorem 3.7 User eviction together with user join provide evict-join secrecy (forward-
backward secrecy). That is, for any sessions Ss1 , Ss2 where S1 ≤ Ss1 < Ss2 ≤ SM , an






Ja2), S1 ≤ Sa1 ≤ Ss1 , Ea1 = Evict, Ss2 ≤
Sa2 ≤ SM , Ea2 = Join, cannot distinguish the group key GKb, Ss1 ≤ Sb < Ss2, from a
random string.
3.4 Key Recovery
In this section we propose a solution to increase reliability of re-keying messages by
allowing legitimate users to recover their previous group keys in each session. More
specifically, in each session Ss, legitimate users can recover k previous group keys
GKs−k, · · · , GKs−1. A straightforward approach to provide this property is to give
GKs−k, · · · , GKs−1 in session Ss encrypted with the session key GKs. It is easy to show
that this satisfies the security requirement of forward secrecy, but does not satisfy the
security requirements of backward secrecy and forward-backward secrecy.
Our proposed key recovery technique is as follows. A group key GK is broken into
two values P and F . For each group key, the value P is part of the re-keying messages
in the k preceding sessions while the value F is part of the re-keying messages in the
k subsequent sessions. More specifically, for a group key GKs in session Ss, Ps is
given in sessions Ss−k, · · · , Ss−1 and Fs is given in sessions Ss+1, · · · , Ss+k. Therefore,
computing (recovering) the group key GKs requires a pair Ps and Fs, where Ps and
Fs can be obtained in a session Ssp and a session Ssf , respectively, for any s − k ≤
sp < s < sf ≤ s + k. This implies that the group key GKs can be recovered in
any session Ss+1, · · · , Ss+k. In general, the message in session Ss will include two sets,
Ps = {Ps+1, · · · , Ps+k} and Fs = {Fs−k, · · · , Fs−1}
6 which makes it possible to compute
(recover) k preceding session keys GKs−k, · · · , GKs−1. A snapshot of the sets P and F
over multiple sessions is given in Figure 3.4.
In practice, the value P can be chosen randomly and the value F will be computed
from GK and P , that is, F = GK ⊕ P where ⊕ denotes the bitwise Exclusive-OR op-
eration. This is possible since for a key GKs in session Ss, Ps is given in sessions before
session Ss and Fs is given in sessions after session Ss. Thus, after obtaining Ps and Fs,
it is easy to compute GKs = Ps⊕Fs. In general, the set P contains random values and
the set F contains values that are computed. Observe that for a session Ss, the set Ps
inherits k− 1 elements from the set Ps−1, that is, Ps ∩Ps−1 = {Ps+1, · · · , Ps+k−1}, and
6This is not the case for the first k sessions (s = 1, · · · , k).
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Figure 3.4: The sets P and F in sessions Ss−1, Ss, and Ss+1
the element Ps+k will be randomly generated. Also, the set Fs inherits k − 1 elements
from the set Fs−1, that is, Fs ∩ Fs−1 = {Fs−k, · · · , Fs−2}, and the element Fs−1 is
computed from Fs−1 = GKs−1 ⊕ Ps−1.
We can incorporate the above key recovery method into the re-keying system. The
result will be a system with the ability to not only establish the group keys, but also
recover previous group keys that are lost, while maintaining all the security properties.
To do so, the GC multicasts a key recovery message Mrec in addition to a re-keying
messageMrkey. Suppose an update to the multicast group Us is required. The update
is by either a user eviction or a user join operation. Without loss of generality, we
assume a user eviction operation is invoked in session Ss.
Group Controller. The GC does the following.
1. Performs the re-keying algorithm to obtain GKs and multicastsMrkey.
2. Generates the set Ps = {Ps+1, · · · , Ps+k} and computes the set Fs = {Fs−k, · · · ,
Fs−1} where ∀Fj ∈ Fs, Fj = GKj ⊕ Pj. Next, the GC multicasts key recovery
messageMrec = {EGKs(Ps ∪ Fs)}.
Users. Each user U ∈ Us \ Rs does the following.
1. ReceivesMrkey and performs the re-keying algorithm to obtain GKs.
2. Receives Mrec and decrypts DGKs(Mrec) to obtain the sets Ps and Fs. User U
may recover the previous session keys GKs−k, · · · , GKs−1 by computing GKj =
Pj ⊕Fj where Pj ∈ Pg, for s− k ≤ j ≤ s− 1, j− k ≤ g ≤ j− 1, and Fj ∈ Fg, for
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s− k ≤ j ≤ s− 1, j + 1 ≤ g ≤ s. User U may retain Fs to be used in subsequent
sessions.
Theorem 3.8 Recovering k previous group keys requires (i) a message length of 2k log2 q
bits and (ii) a legitimate user to perform k XOR operations.
Theorem 3.9 The key recovery system maintains,
(i) evict secrecy (forward secrecy) in the sense of Theorem 3.5.
(ii) join secrecy (backward secrecy) in the sense of Theorem 3.6.
(iii) evict-join secrecy (forward-backward secrecy) in the sense of Theorem 3.7 provided
that Ss2 ≥ Ss1+2k.
Proof: (sketch) The colluders have access to some key recovery messages. We show
that using the information, the colluders cannot discover keys of the sessions that none
of them belong to, unless they can break the encryption algorithm E().
(i) Observe that the colluding users in C =
⋃
Ra, S1 ≤ Sa ≤ Ss, Ea = Evict, know
only the values P2, · · · , Ps+k−1 and F1, · · · , Fs−2. Using these values, C may recover
GK2, · · · , GKs−2 but not GKs−1, · · · , GKs+k−1 since they do not know the values
Fs−1, · · · , Fs+k−1. It follows that they cannot find group keys GKs, · · · , GKM .
(ii) Observe that the colluding users in C =
⋃
Ja, Ss ≤ Sa ≤ SM , Ea = Join, know
only the values Ps+1, · · · , PM and Fs−k, · · · , FM−1. Using these values, C may re-
cover GKs+1, · · · , GKM−1 but not GKs−k, · · · , GKs since they do not know the values
Ps−k, · · · , Ps. It follows that they cannot find group keys GK1, · · · , GKs−1.
(iii) Let Ss2 = Ss1+2k. Users in
⋃
Ra, S1 ≤ Sa ≤ Ss1 , Ea = Evict, know only the
values P2, · · · , Ps1+k−1 and F1, · · · , Fs1−2. Users in
⋃
Jb, Ss1+2k ≤ Sb ≤ SM , Eb =
Join, know only the values Ps1+2k+1, · · · , PM and Fs1+k, · · · , FM−1. Using these val-
ues, C cannot recover GKs1−1, · · · , GKs1+2k which means they cannot find group keys
GKs1 , · · · , GKs2−1. Observe that if Ss2 < Ss1+2k, C may find some group keys of
GKs1 , · · · , GKs2−1. 2
Since efficiency and recovery capability depend on k, in practice we must choose k
by considering the network rate of packet loss. k can be dynamically chosen to suit
network conditions.
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3.5 Further Discussion and Conclusion
So far, we only allowed one operation in a session: either user eviction or user join.
To increase efficiency we may consider user eviction and user join in the same session.
Suppose in session Ss, the GC needs to evict a subset of users Rs and join a subset of
new users Js. To obtain the new session key GKs, the GC first removes leaves of the
evicted users and the redundant internal nodes, then adds the new internal nodes and
the new leaves, and rearranges the levels of the affected nodes and keys to form T ′s. The
GC then performs the re-keying operation with T = T ′s and K(T ) = K(Rs) ∪ K(Js)
(note that K(Rs) ∩ K(Js) 6= ∅). Users do the necessary adjustment to their nodes
and keys, and perform re-keying operations to update (obtain) their keys including the
session key GKs.
In some cases, the session key that is used to encrypt group communication must be
updated without changing membership of the group. To refresh the encryption key, the
GC might generate a new root key, encrypt it with its children keys and multicast the
encrypted version to group members. Another way to produce a fresh encryption key
for the same group is to employ a pseudo-random function fk [35]. An encryption key
is determined from fk on a unique number with k being the session key of the group.
Note that fk will give a new encryption key for a new unique number, in which case
the GC only needs to multicast a new unique number to establish a fresh encryption key.
We have considered the re-keying problem for groups in multicast environments
with unreliable communication. We have proposed a re-keying scheme that can be
used for multiple user eviction and join. We have proven security of the scheme and
shown that, relative to the trivial method, it has better efficiency in terms of the
number of rounds, communication bandwidth and user computation. The scheme also
requires less computation compared to other known methods. We have also considered
the problem of reliability of re-keying when the packets can be lost, and proposed a key
recovery technique that allows the keys for k previous sessions to be calculated, hence
providing robustness against loss of packets. We have evaluated security and efficiency
of the resulting method.
Chapter 4
A Collaborative Re-keying Scheme
4.1 Introduction
The secure multicast re-keying schemes in the previous chapter and in [17, 18, 58, 85, 87]
assume one trusted party (the group controller) generates and distributes users’ keys
in the initialisation phase, and also manages key updates. In this chapter we study the
decentralised setting of re-keying scheme where collaborations of group users can take
over group controller’s responsibilities. We do not require a group controller (GC) for
key generation and distribution in the system setup, or for user eviction and addition
operations. This model allows the system to function without requiring a GC and has
the advantages of decentralised systems as described in Chapter 1.
4.1.1 A Summary of Our Contribution
We construct a secure and efficient collaborative re-keying scheme based on a logical key
hierarchy (LKH) and a key agreement protocol whereby two or more parties jointly
initialise the system, execute group operations and establish new session keys with
communication over only multicast channels. We may consider the proposed scheme
as an extension of the two-party Diffie-Hellman (DH) key exchange protocol [26] where
the extension involves multiple parties in dynamic environments. The basic idea is
to successively run the basic two-party DH protocol from leaf to root direction in
order to update keys of a logical tree including the session key. We note that unlike
other collaborative schemes such as [16, 40, 80, 81], efficient only for small groups, our
proposed collaborative scheme is scalable to large groups and has low computation,
communication and storage costs for re-keying. In fact, it has at most log2 n rounds of
communication, at most log2 n modular exponentiations and log2 n+ 1 keys for a user
(only one of those keys is kept secret). The scheme is stateful requiring secret keys
to be updated in each session. The scheme supports arbitrary sets of evicted users
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and new users, and provides forward, backward and forward-backward secrecy with
arbitrary collusions.
We show the efficiency comparison of the proposed scheme and well-known collab-
orative schemes [16, 81] in Table 4.1. The user storage and communication costs are
measured in terms of the number of keys, and the computation cost is measured in
terms of the number of exponentiations. We note that scheme [81] requires a single
user to store n + 1 keys and other users to store one key. User eviction of the scheme
requires a single authorised user to compute n exponentiations and other authorised
users to compute one exponentiation. Moreover, user admission of the scheme requires
new users to compute n exponentiations and existing users to compute one exponenti-
ation. The proposed scheme and schemes [16, 81] allow eviction of up to n users and
admission of an arbitrary number of users.
Table 4.1: Efficiency comparison of the proposed scheme and several relevant schemes
Proposed Scheme BD [16] STW [81]
User Eviction
User Storage log2 n + 1 1 1 or n + 1
Single User
Communication ≤ log2 n 2n n
Computation ≤ log2 n n + 2 1 or n
Rounds 1 2 1
Multiple (β) Users
Communication ≤ n− 1 2n n
Computation ≤ log2 n n + 2 1 or n
Rounds ≤ log2 n 2 1
User Join
User Storage log2 n + 1 1 1 or n + 1
Single User
Communication ≤ log2 n 2n 2n− 1
Computation ≤ log2 n n + 2 1 or n
Rounds 1 2 2
Multiple (α) Users
Communication ≤ n− 1 2n n(α + 1)− 12(α
2 − α + 2)
Computation ≤ log2 n n + 2 1 or n
Rounds ≤ log2 n 2 α + 1
n is the total number of users after user eviction or user join
We note that there are some similarity in the scheme descriptions of this chapter
and the previous chapter, nevertheless, we deliberately separate those schemes into two
chapters for the sake of clarity.
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4.1.2 Protocols
The join and evict protocols in the collaborative scheme are described in Tables 4.2
and 4.3, respectively.
Table 4.2: Join protocol
If Es = Join
Input: Us, Js ⊆ N \ Us, Ps ⊆ Us ∪ Js
Process: for some rounds:
- some Uz ∈ Ps
Mrkey
========⇒ all Ui ∈ Us ∪ Js, Ui 6= Uz
- all Ui ∈ Js do computation on Mrkey and secrets of former rounds
- some Ui ∈ Us do computation on Mrkey and K(Ui)
Output: - all Ui ∈ Js obtain secret information K(Ui)
- all Ui ∈ Us ∪ Js share a group key GKs
- Us+1 = Us ∪ Js
The join operation comprises several rounds wherein new users in Js gradually
obtain their secret key sets, and also a group key is gradually formed for the enlarged
group. In every round, each sponsor Uz in a subset of Ps multicasts a re-keying message
Mrkey containing information for the new users Ui ∈ Js to ascertain some pieces of
their secret key sets K(Ui). Each re-keying message in a round also contains some
information to establish the group key GKs, requiring some users Ui ∈ Us to perform
computation on the messages and K(Ui). After fulfilling all rounds, the new users have
their complete secret key sets and users in Us ∪ Js share a common key.
Table 4.3: Evict protocol
If Es = Evict
Input: Us, Rs ⊆ Us, Ps ⊆ Us \ Rs
Process: for some rounds
- some Uz ∈ Ps
Mrkey
========⇒ Ui ∈ Us \ Rs, Ui 6= Uz
- some Ui ∈ Us \ Rs do computation on Mrkey and K(Ui)
Output: - all Ui ∈ Us \ Rs share a group key GKs
- all Ui ∈ Rs have unusable secret information K(Ui)
- Us+1 = Us \ Rs
The evict operation is divided into a number of rounds as well. In each round, each
evictor Uz in a subset of Ps multicasts a re-keying messageMrkey and authorised users
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Ui ∈ Us \ Rs perform computation on the messages and their secret key sets K(Ui) to
establish the group key GKs. The authorised users also disable the secret key sets of
the evicted users.
Organisation of this chapter. We propose a collaborative re-keying scheme in Sec-
tion 4.2, and give security and efficiency assessments. The application of the scheme
to group operations is described in Section 4.3. Section 4.4 contains a summary of this
chapter.
The main results of this chapter appeared in the Proceedings of The Fifth Aus-
tralasian Conference on Information Security and Privacy – ACISP 2000 [50].
4.2 A Collaborative LKH Construction
The notions of two-party key agreement protocol and extended logical key hierarchy are
central to the construction. They are defined as follows [59].
Definition 4.1 A two-party key agreement protocol involves two users establishing a
common secret key K. They use public functions f() and h(), and private keys Ki for
Ui, i = 1, 2. User U1 sends Y1 = f(K1) to user U2, and user U2 sends Y2 = f(K2) in
return, then they can compute K ′1 = h(K1, Y2) and K
′
2 = h(K2, Y1), respectively. If f()
and h() are chosen such that K ′1 = K
′
2, then the two users will share a common key.
For a key K, Y = f(K) is called the shadow key of K.
For simplicity, we employ the Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol [26] to deter-
mine the shared common key. Let p and q be large primes that satisfy q | p− 1, and g
be an element in Z∗p whose order is q. Let K1, K2 ∈ Z
∗
q be the keys belonging to users
U1 and U2, respectively, and let Y1 = g
K1 mod p, Y2 = g
K2 mod p be the shadow keys.
The shared key is K = K ′1 = (Y2)
K1 = (Y1)
K2 = K ′2 = (g
K1K2 mod p) mod q.
The extended logical key hierarchy is an extension of the logical key hierarchy
defined in Chapter 3. Although many of the components are the same, we describe
them all here for completeness.
Definition 4.2 An extended logical key hierarchy (x-LKH) is a tree structure where
each node corresponds to a key and each leaf corresponds to a user. A user knows
not only the keys of nodes along the path from the user’s leaf to the root (as in LKH,
Definition 3.2) but also the shadow keys of nodes that are siblings of nodes along the
path from the user’s leaf to the root.
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We require a full binary tree (a binary tree in which each node has exactly zero or
two children)1 in the construction. Let U = {U1, · · · , Un} be the set of users and T be
the full binary tree with n leaves. Nodes of the tree are divided into internal nodes
and leaves. Each node is given a label I
(l)
w and a key K
(l)
w , called the node key, where
l is the level of the node and w is a unique number identifying the node. Node keys
are divided into internal keys and leaf keys. Let Î
(l)
w denote the sibling of I
(l)
w , and Y
(l)
w
denote the shadow key of K
(l)
w . Node labels and shadow keys are publicly known while
node keys are kept secret. A user U is attached to a leaf I
(tU )
w where tU is the level of
the leaf corresponding to user U .
Let A(I(l)w ) = {I
(0)




w } be the set of ancestors of I
(l)
w . Let the set
I(U) = A(I (tU )w ) ∪ {I
(tU )
w } contain the leaf I
(tU )
w and all ancestors of that leaf. Let
Î(U) = {Î(l)w : I
(l)
w ∈ I(U)} be the set of siblings of nodes in I(U).2 User U knows
the node keys K(U) = {K(l)w : I
(l)
w ∈ I(U)} corresponding to the nodes in I(U), and
the shadow keys Y(U) = {Y (l)w : I
(l)
w ∈ Î(U)} corresponding to the nodes in Î(U).
Only the K(U) are kept secret by the user. Note that all users have the root node
I
(0)
w with corresponding root key K
(0)
w . Figure 4.1 gives an example of a tree structure




























































Figure 4.1: An example of a tree structure for 8 users
Characteristics of node keys
A leaf key is randomly generated by the user corresponding to the leaf, and is known
only by that user. An internal key, which is known to more than a user, is computed as
follows. An internal node in a full binary tree has two child nodes. For an internal node
I
(l)
w , let D(I
(l)




w2 } denote the set of its two child nodes. Computation of
1Although the tree may be unbalanced, for the sake of clarity we assume a balanced tree in our
efficiency analysis.
2The root node I
(0)
w does not have a sibling so we may consider Î(U) 63 Î
(0)
w .
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the internal key K
(l)
w requires the knowledge of the key of one of the two child nodes




















w2 mod p) mod q .
(4.1)
The above procedure implies that internal keys are computed in the direction of
the leaf to the root. Then we have the following lemma.
Lemma 4.1 Knowing a leaf key together with shadow keys of siblings of nodes along
the path from the leaf to the root, it is possible to calculate internal keys of nodes along
the path from the leaf to the root.
Therefore instead of securely storing all node keys K(U), it is enough for the user
U to securely keep the leaf key K
(tU )
w ∈ K(U) and store the shadow keys Y(U) in
unprotected memory. All internal keys K(U) \ {K (tU )w } can be calculated from these
information. As an example, user U1 in Figure 4.1 keeps K
(3)














K(U1). Another advantage of storing Y(U) is in reducing the size of the multicast
message as the shadow keys might be reused in the key update operation (see next
section). Nevertheless, note that in practice a shadow key is longer (an element of Z∗p)
than a node key (an element of Z∗q), and so larger storage is required to store Y(U).
In general the key K
(l)
w of a node I
(l)






















Let U(I(l)w ) = {U : I
(l)
w ∈ I(U)} be the set of users U having I
(l)
w in I(U) (leaves
having ancestor I
(l)
w ). Observe that K
(l)
w is a function of the leaf keys K
(tU )
w of all users
U ∈ U(I(l)w ). For example, K
(1)



















 mod q .
We call a node key that is consistent with equation (4.2) an LKH consistent node
key.
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4.2.1 Updating Internal Keys
We give a method for users to interactively update the root key K
(0)
w by updating a
subset of internal keys (including the root key) in a logical key hierarchy. All mem-
bership event protocols, which we propose in the next section, use the method as their
fundamental operation.
Suppose there is a set I(T ) consisting of some internal nodes in the tree T that have
the property that for an internal node I
(l)
w ∈ I(T ), all ancestors of the node are also in
the set, that is, A(I (l)w ) ⊂ I(T ). Observe that I(T ) always includes the root node I
(0)
w .
Let K(T ) = {K(l)w : I
(l)
w ∈ I(T )} be the key set of the node set I(T ). Suppose all node
keys in the tree T , excluding those in K(T ), are LKH consistent keys. We require the
key set K(T ) to be updated to a new key set K′(T ) = {K ′(l)w : I
(l)
w ∈ I(T )} of LKH
consistent keys.
In the following, we show how users in U(I (l)w ) update the internal key K
(l)
w ∈ K(T )
to K ′(l)w ∈ K
′(T ), for all I (l)w ∈ I(T ). Observe that updating K(T ) implies updating
the root key K
(0)









w ∈ Î(U) \ I(T )} ⊂ Y(U).
The user U needs to update node keys {K (l)w : I
(l)
w ∈ I(U)∩I(T )} ⊂ K(U) and shadow
keys {Y (l)w : I
(l)
w ∈ Î(U) ∩ I(T )} ⊂ Y(U) accordingly.
Protocol to Update K(T )
Recall that an internal key is computed from keys of its two child nodes, and D(I (l)w )
denotes the child node set of I
(l)
w . Observe that for all nodes I
(l)
w ∈ I(T ), D(I
(l)
w )
satisfies one of the following three cases.
Case I : D(I(l)w ) ∩ I(T ) = ∅,
Case II : |D(I (l)w ) ∩ I(T )| = 1, and
Case III: |D(I (l)w ) ∩ I(T )| = 2, i.e., D(I
(l)
w ) ⊆ I(T ).
Let t = max{l : I (l)w ∈ I(T )} be the deepest level of nodes in I(T ). The key update
process starts from internal nodes at level t and goes towards the internal node at level
0 (root node). The protocol to compute K ′(l)w for an internal node I
(l)
w ∈ I(T ) is as




w2 , and the user set
U(I(l)w ) is the union of two distinct user subsets U(I
(l+1)
w1 ) and U(I
(l+1)
w2 ).






















w2 mod p) mod q.
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w1 which is known to users in U(I
(l+1)
w1 ). This is because I
(l+1)
w1 ∈ I(T ) and the
key update process is from level h to level 0. The new internal key K ′(l)w is computed
from K ′(l+1)w1 ∈ K
′(T ) and K(l+1)w2 .
1. Transmission: A privileged user Uz ∈ U(I
(l+1)
w1 ) computes the new shadow key
Y ′(l+1)w1 = g






w1 } for users in U(I
(l+1)
w2 ).
2. Calculation: Users U ∈ U(I (l)w ) compute the new internal key K ′
(l)
w as follows.








K′(l+1)w1 mod p) mod q.












w2 mod p) mod q.




w2 ∈ I(T ). Note that there exist
new keys K ′(l+1)w1 , K
′(l+1)
w2
∈ K′(T ) which are known to users in U(I (l+1)w1 ) and U(I
(l+1)
w2 ),
respectively. The new internal key K ′(l)w is computed from both new keys. It requires
a privileged user Uz1 ∈ U(I
(l+1)
w1 ) and another privileged user Uz2 ∈ U(I
(l+1)
w2 ) to ex-
change re-keying messages. That is, each of them independently (and simultaneously)
transmits a re-keying message Mrkey like the protocol for case II. Users Ui ∈ U(I
(l)
w )
compute the new internal key as K ′(l)w = (g
K′(l+1)w1 K
′(l+1)
w2 mod p) mod q.
A summary of the key update procedures is given in Tables 4.4 and 4.5.
Table 4.4: Procedures for updating internal keys
K′(T ) = ∅
for l = h to 0 {
for all I
(l)
w ∈ I(T ) {
if D(I
(l)
w ) ∩ I(T ) = ∅
K ′(l)w = Protocol for case I
if |D(I
(l)
w ) ∩ I(T )| = 1
K ′(l)w = Protocol for case II
if |D(I
(l)
w ) ∩ I(T )| = 2
K ′(l)w = Protocol for case III
K′(T ) = K′(T ) ∪ {K ′(l)w }
}
}
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Table 4.5: Case I, case II and case III protocols
Users U ∈ U(I
(l+1)





























K ′(l)w = ((Y
(l+1)
w2 )






























K ′(l)w = ((Y
′(l+1)
w2 )
K′(l+1)w1 mod p) mod q K ′(l)w = ((Y
′(l+1)
w1 )
K′(l+1)w2 mod p) mod q
*Assuming I
(l+1)
w1 ∈ I(T ).
The key update gives not only the new key set K′(T ) but also the new shadow key
set Y ′(T ) = {Y ′(l)w : I
(l)
w ∈ I(T )}.3 Observe that users U ∈ U need to update their
node keys K
(l)
w to K ′
(l)
w , for all I
(l)
w ∈ I(U) ∩ I(T ). This can be done by updating
their shadow keys Y
(l)
w to Y ′
(l)
w , for all I
(l)
w ∈ Î(U) ∩ I(T ). This gives us the following
corollary.
Corollary 4.1 Knowing the leaf key together with the shadow keys of nodes in Î(U) \
I(T ) and the new shadow keys of nodes in Î(U) ∩ I(T ), it is possible for user U to
calculate the internal keys of nodes in I(U) \ I(T ) and the new internal keys of nodes
in I(U) ∩ I(T ).
It is easy to see that the number of re-keying messages (new shadow keys) is equal
to the size |I(T )| in the key update. Furthermore, it is necessary to know the smallest
set of privileged users P required to multicast the re-keying messages. The properties
of the set P are as follows:
• The cardinality of P is equal to the cardinality of a node set I(P), I(P) ⊂ I(T ),
3It is unnecessary to compute and multicast the shadow key of root node I
(0)
w , so we may consider
Y ′(T ) 63 Y ′(0)w .
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that has the following property: for a node I
(l)
w ∈ I(P), the node is not an
ancestor of any other nodes in I(T ), that is, A(I (l)w ) ∩ I(T ) = ∅.
• The set P contains one element from each U(I (l)w ), for all I
(l)
w ∈ I(P). That is,
P = {Uz1 , Uz2 , · · · , Uz|I(P)|} such that Uz1 ∈ U(I
(l)
w1), Uz2 ∈ U(I
(l)





w2 , · · · , I
(l)
w|I(P)| ∈ I(P).
It is obvious that for each I
(l)
w ∈ I(P), the new shadow key Y ′
(l)
w can be multicasted
by a privileged user U ∈ P . Moreover observe that for I (l)w ∈ I(T ) \ I(P), the new
shadow key Y ′(l)w can be multicasted by at least one privileged user U ∈ P . This is
because a node I
(l)
w1 ∈ I(T ) \ I(P) is an ancestor of at least one node I
(l)
w2 ∈ I(P) and
so U(I(l)w2) ⊂ U(I
(l)
w1). The privileged user that multicasts Y
′(l)
w2
can also multicast Y ′(l)w1 .
The above observation gives the following corollary.
Corollary 4.2 Updating K(T ) involves a set P of privileged users computing and mul-
ticasting re-keying messages (new shadow keys Y ′(T )). The set P contains one user
from each U(I (l)w ), for all I
(l)
w ∈ I(T ) such that A(I
(l)
w ) ∩ I(T ) = ∅.
In practice, the privileged set P consists of users having more resources, such as
high computation power and bandwidth. If in the middle of a key update process, say
when updating the key of node I
(l)
w , the privileged user Uz ∈ U(I
(l)
w ) cannot perform
his role further because of network failure, then he can pass his role to another user
U ∈ U(I(l)w ) for a successful key update. This flexibility increases the reliability of
re-keying.
Theorem 4.1 Assuming T is a full and balanced binary tree, updating K(T ) requires
(i) a communication cost of at most (n − 1)(log2 p + log2 q) bits
4, (ii) transmissions
of at most log2 n rounds, and (iii) a user computation cost of at most log2 n modular
exponentiations.
Proof: (i) The highest communication cost is when I(T ) consisting of all internal
nodes of T . In this case, there are |I(T )| = n − 1 new shadow keys requiring (n −
1)(log2 p+ log2 q) bits of multicast to update K(T ).
(ii) When I(T ) consists of all internal nodes, there are h = log2 n levels in I(T ) and
updating each internal key requires message exchanges (protocol for case III). While
internal keys at the same level can be updated simultaneously, internal keys at different
4We assume that a node label is log2 q bits long.
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levels need to be updated in a sequence (from higher level to lower level). So updating
involves log2 n sequences of transmissions (rounds).
(iii) The highest computation cost is for users in U(I (l)w ) where I
(l)
w ∈ I(T ) is the parent
of leaves. In this case, a user in U(I (l)w ) needs to update all his internal keys, requiring
log2 n modular exponentiations (note that updating a single internal key requires a
single modular exponentiation). 2
It is worth pointing out that when I(T ) = {I (0)w , I
(1)




w }, only a single
privileged user is needed to multicast the new shadow keys Y ′(T ) = {Y ′(1)w , · · · , Y
′(l−1)
w ,
Y ′(l)w } in only a single round. This is possible because all keys in K(T ) are updated
using protocol for case II and so there is no re-keying message exchange. The privileged
user may pre-compute all new internal keys to generate all new shadow keys, then he
concatenates the new shadow keys into a single re-keying message and multicast it.
Theorem 4.2 The key update protocol satisfies the following properties, assuming all
re-keying messages (shadow keys) are accessible.
(i) All users calculate the same new root key.
(ii) A user U can only find the new keys for K(U) ∩ K(T ) and not any other new
key.
(iii) A passive adversary who knows the keys in K(T ) cannot discover any new key in
K′(T ).
(iv) A passive adversary who knows new keys in K′(T ) cannot discover any key in
K(T ).
Proof: (sketch) (i) Tables 4.4 and 4.5 show that for all I
(l)
w ∈ I(T ), all users
U ∈ U(I(l)w ) will calculate the same new internal key for the node K ′
(l)
w . Observe that
the root node I
(0)
w is always in I(T ) and all users in U are indeed those in U(I
(0)
w ). This
guarantees that all users in U will calculate the same new root key K ′(0)w .
(ii) The key update protocol explicitly shows that a user U is always able to determine
new keys for K(U)∩K(T ). Equation (4.1) demonstrates that computation of the node
key of an internal node requires the knowledge of at least a node key of one of its two
child nodes. This implies that knowing a key in K(U) only leads to computation of
another node key which is also in K(U). So, the user U only has enough information
to compute those new keys for K(T ) that are also new keys for K(U) ∩ K(T ).
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(iii) Equation (4.2) exhibits that computation of the node key of an internal node
requires the knowledge of at least a node key of its descendants. Observe that for
all new keys in K′(T ), the node keys of their descendants are never in K(T ). So
the adversary cannot find K′(T ) from K(T ). Next, we consider the attack where the
adversary tries to finds new keys in K′(T ) from re-keying messages (shadow keys).
In the light of equation (4.2), an internal key is in the form
K(l)w = g




1. a random value (leaf key)
2. an internal key
for i = 1, 2. All shadow keys are publicly known, including gK1 mod p and gK2 mod p.
Without loss of generality, suppose K
(l)
w is a new key in K′(T ) and without knowing
both K1 and K2, the adversary wants to find K
(l)
w . He may derive K
(l)
w from gK1 mod p
and gK2 mod p, however, the difficulty to do so is equivalent to Computational Diffie-
Hellman (CDH) problem which is believed to be hard.
The adversary may also discover K
(l)
w by finding Ki from g
Ki mod p, for i ∈ {1, 2}.
If Ki is an internal key, the difficulty of finding K
(l)
w is the same as CDH problem
shown above. If Ki is a random value (leaf key), the difficulty is equal to Discrete
Logarithm (DL) problem which is an intractable problem. The CDH and DL problems
are described in Chapter 1.
(iv) Similar to (iii). 2
4.3 Group Operations
The first operation in a group is system setup. This is followed by user evictions and
user joins for the rest of the system lifetime.
4.3.1 System Initialisation
The group controller (GC) does the following to initialise the system.
1. Chooses two large primes p and q, such that q | p − 1, and a generator g of a
multiplicative subgroup of Z∗p whose order is q.
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2. Constructs a full binary tree T0 with n0 = |U0| leaves, gives a unique label I
(l)
w to
every node, and attaches every user U ∈ U0 to a leaf I
(tU )
w . The information in
steps 1 and 2 is made public.
3. Randomly chooses every leaf key K
(tU )
w from Z∗q and computes every internal key
K
(l)
w , using equation (4.1), from leaf to root. These keys are secret.
4. Sends the leaf key K
(tU )
w over a secure unicast channel and the shadow keys Y(U)
over a multicast channel to every user U ∈ U0. Each user U keeps K
(tU )
w as a
secret key and stores Y(U), which will allow him to compute other secret keys
K(U) \ {K(tU )w }, referring to Lemma 4.1.
The system can be initialised without the GC’s presence. Instead, all users U ∈ U0
can collaboratively perform the task as the following shows.
1. They agree on p, q, g, and T0 (structure, labels and their positions in the tree),
and publish the information.
2. Each user U randomly chooses a key K
(tU )
w from Z∗q for his corresponding leaf
I
(tU )
w , and keeps the leaf key in K(U). The user also multicasts a shadow key
Y
(tU )
w of his corresponding leaf I
(tU )
w , where other users U ′ ∈ U(Î
(tU )
w ) ⊂ U0 will
store the shadow key in Y(U ′).
3. To generate internal keys, they invoke the key update protocol in Section 4.2.1
with (i) T = T0 and (ii) I(T ) consisting of all internal nodes. Observe that
K(T ) = ∅ and the set does not contain LKH consistent keys.
The protocol outputs K′(T ) and Y ′(T ). Note that K′(T ) gives LKH consistent
internal keys for T0, and in the light of Theorem 4.2, part (ii), every user U ∈ U0 will




w ∈ I(U) \ {I
(tU )
w }} ⊂ K′(T ) and no
other key. Furthermore, by Corollary 4.1, the user only needs to store the shadow keys
Y(U).
Theorem 4.3 The collaborative re-keying scheme allows group members to initialise
the system. Assuming a full and balanced binary tree, a user has to store log2 n log2 p+
log2 q bits, but only log2 q bits of the storage have to be kept secure.
Shadow keys are effectively public, so it is possible to publish the shadow keys in a
public bulletin board. A user stores only log2 q bits of secret information.
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4.3.2 User Eviction
Suppose in session Ss, users in Rs ⊆ Us are evicted from Us and a group key GKs is
established for authorised users Us \ Rs. User eviction requires all users U ∈ Us \ Rs
to update their keys K(U) ∩ K(U ′), for all users U ′ ∈ Rs (and so update the root key
shared by users in Us), such that the evicted users do not know the updated keys.
The user eviction protocol involves two consecutive operations: updating the tree
and updating the keys.
Updating the tree Suppose Ts is the logical key hierarchy for Us. Users in Us \ Rs
update Ts with respect to the following procedures.
1. Users Us \Rs prune leaves corresponding to all users in Rs, prune internal nodes
having no child, and prune internal nodes having only one child by replacing the
parent with the child. Observe that the “replacing” nodes and their descendants
(if any) will be shifted to lower levels.
2. Users Us \ Rs adjust the levels l of shifted nodes while retaining their unique
numbers w.
3. For every pruned node I
(l)
w ; (i) users U ∈ U(I
(l)
w ) ⊂ Us \ Rs delete the node from
I(U) and its corresponding node key from K(U); and (ii) users U ∈ U(Î(l)w ) ⊂
Us \Rs delete the node from Î(U) and its corresponding shadow key from Y(U).
4. For every replacing node I
(l)
w , users U ∈ U(Î
(l)
w ) ⊂ Us \Rs add the node to I(U).
5. For every shifted node I
(l)
w ; (i) users U ∈ U(I
(l)
w ) ⊂ Us \ Rs adjust the corre-
sponding level in I(U) and its corresponding node key’s level in K(U); and (ii)
users U ∈ U(Î(l)w ) ⊂ Us \ Rs adjust the corresponding level in Î(U) and its
corresponding shadow key’s level in Y(U).
This guarantees that every node in the updated tree T ′s has exactly one sibling
(a full binary tree) and only users (leaves) in Us \ Rs remain in T
′
s. Let the set
K(Rs) =
⋃
(K(U) ∩ K(U ′)) : U ∈ Us \ Rs, U
′ ∈ Rs consist of internal keys that
belong to evicted users (including the root key K
(0)
w ) with respect to T ′s. Observe that





Updating the keys The following steps are taken to update K(Rs).
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1. For every replacing node I
(l)
w , a user U ∈ U(I
(l)
w ) ⊂ Us \Rs multicasts the shadow
key Y
(l)
w , which will be stored by other users U ′ ∈ U(Î
(l)
w ) ⊂ Us \ Rs in Y(U
′).
2. Users Us \ Rs invoke the key update protocol in Section 4.2.1 with (i) T = T
′
s
and (ii) I(T ) = I(Rs).
The protocol outputs K′(T ) = K′(Rs), consisting of updated keys for K(Rs) includ-
ing the updated root key K ′(0)w ∈ K
′(Rs). Theorem 4.2, parts (i) and (ii), guarantees
that all users U ∈ Us \ Rs obtain new keys for K(U) ∩ K(Rs) and share the new root
key K ′(0)w as the group key GKs, and no other new keys.
Theorem 4.4 The user eviction protocol allows a set of evictors Ps ⊆ Us \ Rs to
collaboratively remove an arbitrary number of users Rs from a group Us. The evictor
set size and the operation cost follow Corollary 4.2 and Theorem 4.1, respectively.
Theorem 4.5 The collaborative scheme provides evict secrecy (forward secrecy). That
is, for any session Ss where S1 ≤ Ss ≤ SM , an arbitrary size collusion C =
⋃
Ra, S1 ≤
Sa ≤ Ss, Ea = Evict, cannot obtain the group key GKb, Ss ≤ Sb ≤ SM .
Proof: (sketch) For simplicity, we assume C = Rs for a single session Ss. We need
to show that the collusion C cannot find K′(Rs). It is always the case that after the
updating the tree operation, the colluders only know the keys in K(Rs) and no other
node keys of the updated tree T ′s. The rest of the proof is similar to that of Theorem 4.2,
part (iii).
We can easily extend the security proof above to multiple sessions. Observe that
even if R1 ∪ R2 ∪ · · · ∪ Rs−1 collude with Rs, they only know K(Rs) and so cannot
find K′(Rs). 2
In the next session Ss+1, the user group will be Us+1 = Us \ Rs with logical tree
hierarchy Ts+1 = T
′
s. Since the evicted users cannot find K
′(Rs), their secret keys are
outdated and unusable for operation in the next sessions.
Example 4.1 Suppose Rs = {U3, U6, U8} are to be evicted from Us in Figure 4.1.
1. Users Us \ Rs = {U1, U2, U4, U5, U7} update the tree structure as shown in Fig-
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2. User U4 multicasts Y
(3)
10 to users U1 and U2. User U5 multicasts Y
(3)
11 to user
U7. User U7 multicasts Y
(3)
13 to users U5. Moreover, users in Us \ Rs invoke the
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Figure 4.2: Updated tree T ′s for group Us \ Rs
4.3.3 User Join
Suppose in session Ss, new users in Js ⊆ N \ Us join Us. Each new user U ∈ Js
corresponds to a node set I(U), and will be given a node key set K(U) and a shadow
key set Y(U). Furthermore, a group key GKs will be established for authorised users
Us ∪Js. This requires all users U ∈ Us to update their keys of nodes I(U)∩I(U
′), for
all users U ′ ∈ Js (and so updating the root key shared by users in Us), such that the
new users only know the updated keys.
The user join protocol consists of two consecutive steps: updating the tree and up-
dating the keys.
Updating the tree Suppose Ts is the logical key hierarchy for Us. Users in Us update
Ts with respect to the following procedures.
1. Users Us add |Js| new leaves. A new internal node must be created to attach a
new leaf. The new internal node replaces an existing node and the existing node
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becomes another child node of the new internal node. Observe that the displaced
node and its descendants (if any) will be shifted to higher levels.
2. Users Us adjust the levels l of shifted nodes while retaining their unique numbers
w.
3. For every new leaf I
(tU′ )
w , users U ∈ U(Î
(l)
w ) ⊂ Us add it to Î(U).
4. For every new internal node I
(l)
w ; (i) users U ∈ U(I
(l)
w ) ⊂ Us add the node to I(U);
and (ii) users U ∈ U(Î(l)w ) ⊂ Us add the node to Î(U).
5. For every replaced node I
(l)
w , users U ∈ U(Î
(l)
w ) ⊂ Us delete the node from Î(U)
and its corresponding shadow key from Y(U).
6. For every shifted node I
(l)
w ; (i) users U ∈ U(I
(l)
w ) ⊂ Us adjust the node level in I(U)
and its corresponding node key’s level in K(U); and (ii) users U ∈ U(Î(l)w ) ⊂ Us
adjust the node level in Î(U) and its corresponding shadow key’s level in Y(U).
7. Users Us correspond each new user U
′ ∈ Js to a new leaf I
(tU′ )
w and ancestors of
the new leaf A(I
(tU′)
w ), i.e., I(U ′).
This ensures that the updated tree T ′s is a full binary tree consisting of all users
(leaves) in Us ∪ Js. Let the set I(Js) =
⋃
(I(U) ∩ I(U ′)) : U ∈ Us, U
′ ∈ Js consist of
nodes in T ′s that correspond to new users (including the root node I
(0)
w ). Observe that




w ∈ I(Js)} are not LKH consistent keys.
Updating the keys The following steps update K(Js).
1. Each new user U ′ ∈ Js randomly chooses his leaf key K
(tU′)
w from Z∗q, and multi-
casts the shadow key Y
(l)
w that will be stored by other users U ∈ U(I
(l)
w ) ⊂ Us∪Js.
2. For each new user U ′ ∈ Js with new leaf I
(tU′ )
w , an existing user U ∈ U(Î
(tU′)
w )
multicasts shadow keys Y
(l)
w , for all I
(l)
w ∈ Î(U ′) \ I(Js), which will be stored in
Y(U ′) by the new user.
3. Users Us ∪ Js invoke the key update protocol in Section 4.2.1 with (i) T = T
′
s
and (ii) I(T ) = I(Js).
The protocol outputs K′(T ) = K′(Js), consisting of updated keys for K(Js) includ-
ing the updated root key K ′(0)w ∈ K
′(Js). Theorem 4.2, parts (i) and (ii), guarantees
that all users U ∈ Us ∪ Js obtain new keys for I(U) ∩ I(Js) and share the new root
key K ′(0)w as the group key GKs, and no other new keys.
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Theorem 4.6 The user join protocol allows a set of sponsors Ps ⊆ Us ∪ Js to collab-
oratively admit an arbitrary number of new users Js to a group Us. The sponsor set
size and the operation cost follow Corollary 4.2 and Theorem 4.1, respectively.
Theorem 4.7 The collaborative scheme provides join secrecy (backward secrecy). That
is, for any session Ss where S1 ≤ Ss ≤ SM , an arbitrary size collusion C =
⋃
Ja, Ss ≤
Sa ≤ SM , Ea = Join, cannot obtain the group key GKb, S1 ≤ Sb < Ss.
Proof: (sketch) For clarity, we assume C = Js for a single session Ss. We need to
prove that the collusion C cannot obtain K(Js). It is always the case that after the
updating the tree operation, C only knows I(Js) and not any node keys of the updated
tree T ′s. The rest of the proof is similar to that of Theorem 4.2, part (iv).
For multiple session security, observe that although Js,Js+1, · · · ,JM collude, they
only know I(Js) and so cannot find K(Js). 2
Theorem 4.8 The collaborative scheme provides evict-join secrecy (forward-backward
secrecy). That is, for any sessions Ss1 , Ss2 where S1 ≤ Ss1 < Ss2 ≤ SM , an arbi-






Ja2), S1 ≤ Sa1 ≤ Ss1 , Ea1 = Evict, Ss2 ≤ Sa2 ≤
SM , Ea2 = Join, cannot obtain the group key GKb, Ss1 ≤ Sb < Ss2.
Proof: (sketch) It can be easily derived from the proof for Theorem 4.5 and Theo-
rem 4.7. 2
In the next session Ss+1, the user group will be Us+1 = Us ∪ Js with logical tree
hierarchy Ts+1 = T
′
s. The new users obtain appropriate secret keys and so they can
participate in subsequent sessions.
Example 4.2 Suppose Js = {U9, U10} join Us in Figure 4.1.
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4. Users in Us ∪ Js invoke the key update protocol in Section 4.2.1 with (i) T =
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Figure 4.3: Updated tree T ′s for group Us ∪ Js
4.4 Conclusion
We have considered the re-keying problem in collaborative environments. Our con-
struction combines the two-party key agreement protocols with a logical key hierarchy
to allow a session key to be collaboratively computed by multiple parties. We have
proven that the proposed re-keying scheme is secure and efficient. We have also demon-
strated how to use the re-keying scheme to initialise the system without the existence
of a group controller, and to provide secure user eviction and user join operations.
Chapter 5
A Dynamic and Stateless Revocation
Scheme
5.1 Introduction
Group management in traditional group key distribution systems is centralised. There
is a fixed group controller (group manager), GC, and an initial set of users, U0. The GC
initialises the system by generating and securely delivering individual keys to the users.
After initialisation, the GC establishes authorised groups by broadcasting a message
allowing users of the target subgroup to compute a common group key. Most literature
on group key distribution schemes focuses on efficient methods of forming authorised
groups under such a system [3, 31, 37, 39, 55, 62, 64, 84]. One common approach
is treating unauthorised users in a session as those who must be temporarily revoked
from U0. So a group key distribution scheme is also called revocation scheme.
A dynamic group key distribution system allows the group controller to be dynamic
and so any group member can assume the role of the group manager in the transmis-
sion phase of an event protocol. We consider the scenario that after the initialisation
phase, any group member can replace the GC as the group initiator, hence allowing
a decentralised model. Allowing a group member to form a subgroup has numerous
applications. For example in dynamic teleconferences, where users want to transmit
data to a subgroup of users, a fixed group controller model results in a very inefficient
solution. This is because either all communications from users must go through the
group controller and then broadcasted to the designated group, or numerous group
keys need to be established. These solutions have drawbacks such as single point of
failure, and high communication overhead for the group controller and also communi-
cation delay. Dynamic revocation schemes alleviate these problems and result in more
efficient solutions.
Another simple solution to the problem of dynamic group initiator is to employ the
79
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scheme of a single group controller as a building block and associate a single group
controller scheme to each user such that the user is the group controller and the rest
of the group are the receivers. The obvious drawback of this solution is that the key
storage of each user is prohibitively large, that is n− 1 times the storage of a user plus
the storage of a group controller in a single group controller scheme. This is linear in
n, and for large groups is unacceptable.
In some cases secret keys of users are generated and stored in computing devices
at manufacturing time and the keys are unchangeable. Accordingly, it is preferable
to assume users cannot change their secret keys after system initialisation, i.e., their
secret keys are stateless.
5.1.1 A Summary of Our Contribution
We propose a stateless revocation scheme that can be used by any member of a group
to form an arbitrary subgroup of his choice. This is achieved by a single broadcast
message from the user to the group and allows the group key to be computed by
the users of the target subgroup. The proposed scheme can be easily modified to a
centralised setting where the GC is the only group initiator in the system. We assume
that the group is fixed (no new users are added) and users require to form subgroups
at different times.
The construction uses the logical key hierarchy in conjunction with the Shamir se-
cret sharing scheme [77] and the Diffie-Hellman key agreement [26]. The main advan-
tage of the proposed system over other dynamic and stateless revocation systems [2, 75]
is scalability for large groups and higher levels of collusion resilience. Our scheme pro-
vides n-resilience while the schemes in [2, 75] provide t-resilience such that when t is
large, say t ≈ n, they become very inefficient. The bandwidth and computation of the
system in [2] for any t′, t′ ≤ t, revoked users is of order t. Our scheme has efficient
storage while keeping bandwidth and computation costs of order logd n for a tree degree
d. We also give a variant of the scheme that reduces the number of system keys and
the amount of published information.
Table 5.1 compares the efficiency of our scheme and its variant, and the schemes
in [2, 75]. The user storage and communication costs are measured in terms of the
number of keys. Our scheme, its variant and the scheme in [2] are public-key based
and so the computation cost of these schemes is measured in terms of the number of
exponentiations. The scheme in [75] is symmetric-key based and so the computation
cost of this scheme is measured in terms of the number of decryptions. Our scheme can
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be used to revoke up to n users (β ≤ n), while its variant and the scheme in [2] limit
the number of revoked users to t (β ≤ t), and the scheme in [75] requires the number
of revoked users to be small (β ≈ 0).
Table 5.1: Efficiency comparison of the proposed schemes and several relevant schemes
Proposed Schemes AMM SW
Main Variant [2] [75]
User Storage logd n + 1 t(logd n− 1) + 1 1 O(log n)
Public Keys dn−1d−1 d(t(logd n− 1) + 1) n + t 0
Collusion Resilience n t t t
Single User
Communication (d− 1) logd n (d− 1)(t(logd n− 1) + 1) t + 1 O(log n)
Computation (d− 1) logd n (d− 1)(t(logd n− 1) + 1) t + 1 1
Multiple (β) Users
Communication ≤ (1− 1d)n ≤ (d− 1)(t(logd n− 1) + 1) t + 1 O(log n)
Computation ≤ (1− 1d)n ≤ (d− 1)(t(logd n− 1) + 1) t + 1 1
We prove security of our scheme and give a method of providing authentication
to the system. We point out that methods such as the Subset Difference (SD) [62]
and the Layered Subset Difference (LSD) [37] can also be employed to provide efficient
dynamic and stateless revocation schemes. Finally we discuss permanent revocation
within our scheme.
5.1.2 Protocol
Table 5.2: Subgroup protocol
If Es = Subgroup
Input: Us, Gs ⊆ Us, Ps = {Uz}, Uz ∈ Gs
Process: - Uz
M
========⇒ all Ui ∈ Gs, Ui 6= Uz
- all Ui ∈ Gs perform computation on M and K(Ui)
Output: - all Ui ∈ Gs share a group key GKs
- Us+1 = Us
There is only a group initiator who broadcasts a subgroup messageM that allows
each user Ui ∈ Gs to calculate the group key GKs using his secret keys in K(Ui) while
preventing users outside Gs from doing so.
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Organisation of this chapter. In Section 5.2 we describe a dynamic revocation scheme
with stateless storage, and show how to transform the scheme into a centralised setting.
We assess security and efficiency of the system, and show how to provide authentication
for this system. In Section 5.3 we propose a new method of system initialisation with
improved efficiency, but do not change the revocation operation. In Section 5.4 we
present additional discussions and summarise this chapter.
The main parts of this chapter appeared in the Proceedings of The Fourth Interna-
tional Conference on Information Security and Cryptology – ICISC 2001 [51].
5.2 The Dynamic Scheme
The notions of logical key hierarchy, Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol, and threshold
secret sharing are central to our construction. The definitions of logical key hierarchy
(LKH) and Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol can be found in Chapters 3 and 4,
respectively. Shamir threshold secret sharing [77] is described in Chapter 1. Below we
add another property of Shamir threshold secret sharing.
A new shareKj (a value of F (x) at x = j) can be generated by any t+1 users
as Kj =
∑






Note that j = 0 gives the secret K0.
5.2.1 System Initialisation
The group controller (GC) is in charge of the system setup and does the following.
1. Generates two large primes p, q, where q | p − 1, and a generator g of a multi-
plicative subgroup of Z∗p with order q. The GC then publishes p, q and g.
2. Builds an LKH tree of degree d with n0 leaves.
1 Every node in the tree is either
a leaf or a parent with d child nodes. Let I denote the set of all nodes in the
tree. Each node is labelled by a unique number w such that w 6= 0.
3. Logically associates each user U ∈ U0 with a leaf of the tree. Knowledge of the
tree structure together with node labels and users’ association with leaves are
public. Figure 5.1 is an example of a tree structure. The nodes are labelled by
1Although the tree may not be full and balanced, we assume a full and balanced tree in our
efficiency analysis.
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Figure 5.1: A tree structure of degree 2 for 8 users
4. Generates a set of secret keys, K(I) = {Kw : w ∈ I, Kw ∈ Z
∗
q}, and a set
Y(I) = {Yw : w ∈ I, Yw = g
Kw mod p} of public keys. For all w ∈ I, node w is
associated with a pair of secret key Kw and public key Yw.
5. Publishes all the public keys and securely sends to each user U ∈ U0 the set of
secret keys, K(U) ⊂ K(I), from U ’s leaf to the root. User U keeps these keys
as his secret information. For example, the logical key hierarchy of Figure 5.1
is shown in Figure 5.2 so the set of secret keys for U1, for example, is K(U1) =
{K1, K2, K4, K8}.
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Figure 5.2: A logical key hierarchy for Figure 5.1
The system setup above requires the GC to generate dn−1
d−1
secret keys and to publish
dn−1
d−1
public keys. A user has to store secret keys from a leaf to the root (height of tree),
which is h+ 1, where h = logd n keys.
Theorem 5.1 In the above scheme, the storage sizes for a group controller and a user
are dn−1
d−1
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5.2.2 User Revocation
Suppose in session Ss, a group member Uz in Us wants to form a subgroup Gs ⊆ Us.
This can be achieved by revoking the users Us \ Gs and forming a group key for the
subgroup Gs. The privileged set for this operation is Ps = {Uz} where Uz ∈ Gs. Let
I(U) be the set of nodes from user U ’s leaf to the root.
1. Transmission: A group initiator Uz ∈ Ps does the following.
(a) Randomly chooses an element r ∈ Z∗q and calculates ğ = g
r mod p.
(b) Uses the algorithm in Section 5.2.3 to find a set T of nodes that satisfy the
following conditions:
(i) ∀U ∈ Gs, T ∩ I(U) 6= ∅;
(ii) ∀U ∈ Us \ Gs, T ∩ I(U) = ∅.
(The algorithm guarantees that ∀U ∈ Gs, |T ∩I(U)| = 1, which means each
user in Gs has exactly one node in T .) Let |T | = m.
(c) Chooses a set Θ of m − 1 distinct elements from Z∗q such that T ∩ Θ = ∅.





ψ(T ,w,j) mod p
and Y̆j = (Yj)
r mod p. Note that Yw,∀w ∈ T are in Y(I) while Yj,∀j ∈ Θ
are new public keys.
(d) Broadcasts subgroup message
M = {ğ, Y̆j ‖ j : j ∈ Θ} .
2. Calculation: Each user U ∈ Gs uses a secret key Kv ∈ K(U), where v ∈ T ∩I(U),






ψ(Θ∪{v},j,0) mod p .
Theorem 5.2 The user revocation protocol allows any group member to form a sub-
group Gs from a group Us.
Proof: We need to show that all users in Gs are able to compute the group key GKs
based on their secret keys and the broadcast data.
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Without loss of generality, assume T = {1, 2, · · · ,m}. Let the secret keys and
public keys associated with T be {Kw : w ∈ T } and {Yw = g
Kw mod p : w ∈ T },
respectively. Notice that there implicitly exists a unique polynomial F (x) of degree at
most m− 1 such that gF (w) = gKw , for all w ∈ T . Using the public keys of T , that is,
{gKw mod p : w ∈ T }, one can calculate Yj = g










ψ(T ,w,j) mod p .


















= grF (0) mod p .
2
Theorem 5.3 Assuming that the Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) problem is
hard, an arbitrary collusion C ⊆ Us \ Gs cannot find the group key GKs for any session
Ss where S1 ≤ Ss ≤ SM and Es = Subgroup. Thus the user revocation protocol provides
subgroup secrecy.
Proof: First we note that C cannot gain any information regarding F (x) from their
secret keys K(C) =
⋃
U∈C K(U) because T ∩ I(U) = ∅,∀U ∈ C. So they cannot obtain
the value F (0) to compute the group key grF (0).
Further we show that C is not able to find the group key GKs from broadcast
messages. The CDH (Computational Diffie-Hellman) problem, which is believed to be
hard [26], is the basis of our revocation protocol. The CDH problem is described in
Chapter 1.
Our proof uses a “reduction argument”. That is, if there exists an oracle (proba-
bilistic polynomial-time) G that can compute GKs using all the information known to
Us \ Gs, then the same oracle can be used to solve the CDH problem.
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It is sufficient to show that if there exists a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm
G that on inputs gr, grF (j), ∀j ∈ Θ and gF (w),∀w ∈ T , outputs grF (0) with a non-
negligible probability, and F (x) is a polynomial of degree at most m − 1, then G
can be used to solve the CDH problem. That is, given gX1 and gX2 , where X1 and
X2 are two randomly chosen elements of Z
∗
q, G can be used to find g
X1X2 . Let Θ =
{j1, · · · , jm−1}. We randomly choose m− 1 elements L1, · · · , Lm−1 ∈ Z
∗
q and construct
a unique polynomial H(x) of degree at most m− 1 such that H(je) = Le,∀e, 1 ≤ e ≤
m − 1, and gH(0) = gX2 . This can be used to calculate gH(je) = gLe , 1 ≤ e ≤ m − 1,
and also gH(α) for all α ∈ Zq, and hence g
H(w),∀w ∈ T . Furthermore, since we know
Le we can compute
(gX1)Le = (gX1)H(je), je ∈ Θ .
Now if G is given the inputs gX1 ; (gX1)Le , e = 1, · · · ,m − 1; and gH(w), w ∈ T , it will
output gX1H(0) = gX1X2 . This means G can solve the CDH problem which contradicts
the hardness assumption of the CDH problem. 2
The above scheme can be used for multiple sessions with a different r for each
session. We can extend the above proof to multiple sessions as given below.
Proof: For simplicity, we assume that the scheme is run twice (two sessions) for the
same T and we show that an adversary who can collude with the users in Us \ Gs,
after seeing all the broadcasts (and even the group key for the first session), is not
able to compute the group key of the second session. We may further assume that Θ
is the same for two sessions and so the polynomial F (x) will be the same. The only
different values in the two runs are the random values r1 and r2, respectively. We will
again employ the “reduction arguments” for the proof. Assume that G is a probabilistic
polynomial-time algorithm that on inputs gr1 , gr2 , gr1F (j), gr2F (j),∀j ∈ Θ, gF (w),∀w ∈ T
and gr1F (0), outputs gr2F (0) with a non-negligible probability. We show that we can use
G to solve the CDH problem. Let gX1 , gX2 be two elements with X1, X2 randomly
chosen from Z∗q. As before, let Θ = {j1, · · · , jm−1} and choose m− 1 random elements
L1, · · · , Lm−1 ∈ Z
∗
q. There exists a unique polynomial H(x) of degree at most m − 1
such that H(je) = Le,∀e, 1 ≤ e ≤ m−1, and g
H(0) = gX2 . We also randomly choose r1
and compute gr1H(0). We can feed G with the following data: (1) gr1 , gr1H(je),∀je ∈ Θ,
gH(w),∀w ∈ T and gr1H(0) (i.e., all the information obtained by the adversary from the
first session); and (2) gX1 , (gX1)Le , e = 1, · · · ,m− 1 (the information from the second
session). By the assumption of G, it outputs gX1H(0) = gX1X2 , which shows that G can
solve the CDH problem and we obtain a contradiction, and therefore the desired result
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follows. 2
5.2.3 An Algorithm for Finding T
We want to find a set of nodes T where all users in Gs, but not any users in Us \ Gs,
have at least a node in the set. Let the root of the tree be at level zero and leaves be
at level h (similar to Figure 5.1).2 The algorithm for finding T is as follows.
Recall that I denotes the set of all nodes in the tree and let I (l) be the set of nodes
at level l. That is, I =
⋃
I(l) : 0 ≤ l ≤ h. Also, recall that I(U) denotes the set of
nodes from user U ’s leaf to the root. Note that I(U) only has a node at level l denoted
by w
(l)
U . Moreover, let I(Us \ Gs) =
⋃
I(U) : U ∈ Us \ Gs be the set of nodes of the
revoked users and let I(Us \ Gs)
(l) denote the set of nodes at level l of I(Us \ Gs). That
is, I(Us \ Gs) =
⋃
I(Us \ Gs)
(l) : 0 ≤ l ≤ h and I(Us \ Gs)
(l) ⊆ I(l). The algorithm is
shown in Table 5.3.
Table 5.3: An algorithm to find T
(1) T = ∅, Uleft = Gs
(2) for l = 0 to h {
(3) Itemp1 = I(l) \ I(Us \ Gs)(l)
(4) Utemp = {U : U ∈ Uleft, w
(l)
U ∈ Itemp1}




U ∈ I(U), U ∈ Utemp}
(6) T = T ∪ Itemp2
(7) Uleft = Uleft \ Utemp
(8) if Uleft = ∅
(9) stop
(10) }
Intuitively, the algorithm works as follows. It starts from the root and visits all
nodes in each level, before moving to the next level up. A node is put in T if the
following conditions are satisfied.
(i) the node does not belong to a revoked user, and
(ii) no other node on its path to the root is in T .
Let Uleft be the set of users in Gs who do not have any node in T .
1. Initialise T = ∅ and Uleft = Gs.
2For an unbalanced tree, level h is located at the lowest leaves of the tree where h + 1 is height of
the unbalanced tree.
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2. Repeat 2.1 – 2.5 for each level from l = 0 to l = h.
2.1 put all nodes in level l, except those belonging to the revoked users, in Itemp1.
2.2 look for users in Uleft who have at least one node in Itemp1. These users are
kept in Utemp. It is possible that nodes in Itemp1 do not belong to any user
in Utemp.
2.3 select nodes in Itemp1 that belong to at least one user in Utemp. These nodes
are stored in Itemp2.
2.4 add Itemp2 to T and subtract Utemp from Uleft.
2.5 check if Uleft is empty, that is if all users in Gs have at least a node in T .
If this is the case, then the algorithm stops; otherwise it goes to the next
level.
Theorem 5.4 The output set T of the above algorithm satisfies the following proper-
ties.
(i) ∀U ∈ Gs, T ∩ I(U) 6= ∅, and
(ii) ∀U ∈ Us \ Gs, T ∩ I(U) = ∅.
The algorithm guarantees that ∀U ∈ Gs, |T ∩ I(U)| = 1 and T is a minimal set.
Proof (sketch): Step (3) excludes all nodes belonging to the revoked users and fulfils
property (ii). Note that a node at a lower level belongs to more users and a node at
the highest level (a leaf node, l = h) belongs to a single user. In step (2), the algorithm
runs from the lowest level (l = 0) to the highest level (l = h), and constructs T from
the most common nodes to the least common nodes. Together with steps (4), (5) and
(7), the algorithm ensures that once the node at level l of the user U , w
(l)
U , is in T ,
nodes on the higher levels belonging to the same user will not be in T . This guarantees
that ∀U ∈ Gs, |T ∩ I(U)| = 1 and results in T being minimal. The algorithm may
terminate at level l, l < h, if property (i) is satisfied. Otherwise, it will proceed to level
l = h to guarantee this property. 2
Theorem 5.5 The above scheme allows revocation of |Us \ Gs| users, 1 ≤ |Us \ Gs| ≤
|Us| − 1, from a group Us. Revocation of one user requires transmission of ((d −
1) logd ns − 1)(log2 p + log2 q) + log2 p bits and revocation of multiple users requires
transmission of at most ((1− 1
d
)ns − 1)(log2 p+ log2 q) + log2 p bits.
Proof: Recall that |Us| = ns. Revoking one user always gives |T | = (d − 1) logd ns
nodes and so |Θ| = (d − 1) logd ns − 1 elements. The required bandwidth is ((d −
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1) logd ns − 1)(log2 p + log2 q) + log2 p bits. For multiple user revocation, the worst
case is when |Us \ Gs| =
ns
d
users and the leaves associated with the revoked users have









elements. The required bandwidth is ((1− 1
d
)ns − 1)(log2 p+ log2 q) + log2 p bits. 2
Corollary 5.1 Establishing a group key GKs requires a user in Gs to compute (d −
1) logd ns and at most (1−
1
d
)ns modular exponentiations for revocations of |Us \Gs| = 1
and |Us \ Gs| > 1 users, respectively.
We highlight the existence of natural subgroups in LKH due to the fact that a
parent node is an ancestor of a subset of leaves. Precisely, a parent node w at level
l is the ancestor of a subgroup {U : I(U) 3 w} of dh−l users (leaves) assuming a full
and balanced d-ary tree with the highest level h. The users can use the node key Kw
as the group key without extra transmission and computation. The number of such
subgroups is equal to the number of parent nodes in the tree, which is ns−1
d−1
.
Example 5.1 Consider Figure 5.1 and suppose user U1 wants to form a subgroup
Gs = {U1, U2, U5, U6, U7, U8} by revoking Us \ Gs = {U3, U4}. The group initiator U1
does the following.
1. Generates r and calculates ğ = gr mod p.
2. Sets I(Us \ Gs) = {1, 2, 5, 10, 11} and executes the algorithm in Section 5.2.3.
The result is T = {3, 4} as shown in Figure 5.3 where dashed nodes are nodes
belonging to Us \ Gs and bold nodes are nodes of the minimal set T .
3. Suppose U1 chooses Θ = {16}. Then U1 uses Y3 and Y4 to calculate Y16, Y̆16 =
(Y16)
r mod p and broadcasts subgroup message M = {ğ, Y̆16 ‖ 16}.
4. Users U1 and U2 use K4, and users U5, · · · , U8 use K3 to calculate GKs.
5. Users U3 and U4 are not able to calculate GKs since they do not have K3 or K4.
5.2.4 Authentication
In group applications such as private teleconferencing, authenticity of data and the
identity of the sender is very important. Being inspired by [2] and [66], we describe
below a technique that can be used to prevent modification or forging of broadcast
data, and to identify the sender.
Suppose a sender Ui wants to broadcast datamsg, then he needs to do the following.
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Figure 5.3: The sets I(Us \ Gs) and T when revoking users U3 and U4
1. Use the secret key, Kw ∈ K(Ui), corresponding to his leaf node as his secret
identity id, that is id = Kw.
2. Generate a random number r over Z∗q and compute ğ = g
r mod p.
3. Calculate hash = fowh(msg ‖ i ‖ ğ) mod q, where fowh is a publicly known one
way hash function, and calculate a signature sign = (−hash× r) + id mod q.
4. Broadcast the signed dataM = {msg ‖ i ‖ ğ ‖ sign}.
Receivers verify as follows.
1. Compute hash′ = fowh(msg ‖ i ‖ ğ) mod q from M and assign id
′ = Yw, where
Yw is the public key of Kw (the leaf key of the sender Ui).
2. Check id′
?
= gsign × (ğ)hash
′
mod p. If they are equal, then receivers accept the
integrity of the data and authenticity of the sender. Otherwise, either data or
the sender, or both, are tampered with.
The above authentication system can be used by a group initiator to authenticate
broadcast data ğ and Y̆j ‖ j : j ∈ Θ sent during the revocation stage, as described
below.
The group initiator Uz computes msg = {ğ ‖ Y̆j ‖ j : j ∈ Θ} (we combine all data
into one message), calculates hash = fowh(msg ‖ z) and sign = (−hash×r)+id over Zq
(id is the secret key corresponding to Uz’s leaf node), and broadcasts signed subgroup
messageM = {msg ‖ z ‖ sign}. To verify, users in subgroup Gs will calculate id
′ and
hash′, and check id′
?
= gsign × (ğ)hash
′
mod p.
The authentication technique is based on DL (Discrete Logarithm) problem. Refer
to [66] for further security proof.
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5.2.5 A Centralised Protocol
There is a group controller (GC) who initially sets up the group and at a later stage
revokes the memberships as required by the subgroup to be formed. The dynamic
scheme in Section 5.2 can be easily converted to the centralised model. The two
systems have similar performances except, in this model, public keys are not required.
The user revocation works as follows.
1. Transmission: The GC does the following.
(a) Same as step 1a of the protocol in Section 5.2.2.
(b) Finds T and uses Lagrange interpolation to generate a polynomial F (x) of




Kw ×Ψ(T , w) mod q .
(c) Chooses Θ and calculates Kj = F (j), Y̆j = (ğ)
Kj mod p, for all j ∈ Θ.
(d) Similar to step 1d of the protocol in Section 5.2.2.
2. Calculation: Similar to step 2 of the protocol in Section 5.2.2.
The correctness and security of the centralised protocol is the same as the dynamic
one.
Alternatively, the GC can choose a random value for the group key GKs, encrypt
GKs with the secret key Kw,∀w ∈ T , and broadcast the result. Each user U ∈ Gs
decrypts the encrypted broadcast using his secret key Kv, where v ∈ T ∩I(U), to find
GKs. An arbitrary collusion of revoked users Us \ Gs cannot discover GKs as they do
not have any secret key Kw used to encrypt the group key (remember the properties
of the set T ).
5.3 A Variant of Key Generation and Allocation
In the dynamic scheme described in the previous section, the total number of keys in
the system is |I| (the number of nodes in the tree). In this section we propose a variant
of the scheme that reduces the number of system keys while maintaining security. It has
the advantage of reducing the storage required by the GC and the amount of published
information.
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The reduction in the number of system keys is at the cost of reducing the collusion
resilience of the system. That is, the modified system provides collusion resilience
for up to t colluders where t is a pre-determined threshold parameter. This may
be a disadvantage for some applications where we cannot bound the collusion size
beforehand, while in other situations it may be a reasonable assumption.
The basic idea is as follows. For a d-ary tree of height h + 1, we choose dh keys
for the system and allocate a key to each node in such a way that, d distinct keys
are assigned to the nodes in the lth level, 1 ≤ l ≤ h, such that the d children of the
same parent have distinct keys. Each user is associated with a leaf but not all leaves
are assigned to users. The keys of a user are his leaf key together with all the node
keys along the path to the root. The leaves corresponding to the users are chosen in
such a way that for any set of t users, {Ui1 , · · · , Uit}, and a user Ui′ /∈ {Ui1 , · · · , Uit},
there exists at least one key which belongs to user Ui′ , but does not belong to users in
{Ui1 , · · · , Uit}. In other words, d and h must be chosen such that n < d
h (note that
there are dh leaves of the tree and n is the number of users). Figure 5.4 illustrates the
leaf assignment for 9 users in a 3-ary tree of height 4. The system requires only 9 keys.
9999999998 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8777777777
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Figure 5.4: A tree structure with d = 3 and h = 3 for 9 users
In the following we give a construction for this approach using polynomials over
finite fields.
5.3.1 System Initialisation
The group controller (GC) does the following. Note that n0 = |U0|.
1. Generates p, q and g, similar to the system initialisation in Section 5.2.1, and
publishes them.
2. Selects t, the required level of collusion resilience, chooses a prime d and computes
u = dlogd n0e. Next, the GC chooses the tree depth h such that h > t(u− 1) and
h ≤ d.
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3. Forms a set of polynomials Fd[x]u = {F (x) ∈ Fd[x] : deg(F (x)) ≤ u − 1} and
associates a polynomial Fi(x) ∈ Fd[x]u to a user Ui, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n0. Note that
|Fd[x]u| = d
u ≥ n0.
4. Chooses a set of h distinct elements of Zd, L = {α
(1), · · · , α(h)}, each associated
with one level of the tree. To each user Ui, 1 ≤ i ≤ n0, the GC assigns an identity
vector Vi = (Fi(α
(1)), · · · , Fi(α
(h))) = (v
(1)
i , · · · , v
(h)
i ) over Zd.
5. Generates a set of secret keys K(I) = {K (l)a : K
(l)
a ∈ Z∗q, 0 ≤ a ≤ d−1, 1 ≤ l ≤ h}
and a set of public keys Y(I) = {Y (l)a = gK
(l)
a mod p : 0 ≤ a ≤ d− 1, 1 ≤ l ≤ h}.
6. All public keys are published. For 1 ≤ i ≤ n0, the GC secretly sends a set of





: 1 ≤ l ≤ h} ⊂ K(I) to user Ui.
Observe that the underlying structure above is a full and balanced tree of degree d
with dh leaves. Since n0 < d
h, only some of the leaves are associated with the users.
There are only dh secret keys. The system initialisation requires the GC to generate
dh = d(t(u− 1) + 1)
≈ d(t(logd n− 1) + 1)
secret keys, and to publish dh ≈ d(t(logd n − 1) + 1) public keys. A user has to store
h ≈ t(logd n− 1) + 1 secret keys.
5.3.2 User Revocation
The revocation protocol is the same as that described in Section 5.2.2. We need to show
that with the above key allocation, T as defined in Section 5.2.2 is not an empty set.
This is true because each user has a subset of h keys that corresponds to a polynomial
of degree at most u− 1. It follows that the number of common keys of any two users
is at most u− 1. This is because if two users, Ui and Ui′ , have a common key at level
l, it means that Fi(α
(l)) = Fi′(α
(l)). The condition h > t(u − 1) yields that a set T
satisfying the required conditions can be found. Since the cardinality of T determines
the transmission overhead, we would like the size of T to be as small as possible. To
find T , we can use the same algorithm as in Section 5.2.3. However, the resulting T is
not necessarily minimal.
Theorem 5.6 The variant scheme has the following properties.
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(i) Assuming that the Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) problem is hard, a col-
lusion C ⊆ Us \ Gs, |C| ≤ t cannot find the group key GKs for any session Ss
where S1 ≤ Ss ≤ SM and Es = Subgroup.
(ii) The transmission overhead for |Us \ Gs|, 1 ≤ |Us \ Gs| ≤ t, user revocation from
a group Us is at most ((d − 1)(t(logd n − 1) + 1) − 1)(log2 p + log2 q) + log2 p
bits. A user in Gs needs to compute at most (d − 1)(t(logd n − 1) + 1) modular
exponentiations.
(iii) The storage of a group controller is d(t(logd n− 1) + 1) log2 q bits, the storage of
a user is (t(logd n− 1)+1) log2 q bits, and there are d(t(logd n− 1)+1) log2 p bits
of public keys.
Proof: (i) Similar to the proof for Theorem 5.3, but in this case C is bounded by t.
(ii) The maximum value of |T | corresponds to one user revocation, in which case
|T | = dh− h
= (d− 1)h
≈ (d− 1)(t(logd n− 1) + 1)
nodes and so |Θ| ≈ (d − 1)(t(logd n − 1) + 1) − 1 elements. This worst case requires
((d − 1)(t(logd n − 1) + 1) − 1)(log2 p + log2 q) + log2 p bits of bandwidth and user
computation of (d− 1)(t(logd n− 1) + 1) modular exponentiations.
Revocation of multiple users (at most t users) has smaller |T | and so the required
bandwidth and user computation are less than the worst case.
(iii) It is straightforward from the system initialisation. 2
Example 5.2 Let n0 = 9, t = 2 and d = 3. It follows that u = 2, h > 2, i.e., h = 3
and F3[x]2 = {F (x) ∈ F3[x] : deg(F (x)) ≤ 1}. Polynomials for users are the following.
F1(x) = 0 mod 3 F2(x) = x mod 3 F3(x) = 2x mod 3
F4(x) = 1 mod 3 F5(x) = 1 + x mod 3 F6(x) = 1 + 2x mod 3
F7(x) = 2 mod 3 F8(x) = 2 + x mod 3 F9(x) = 2 + 2x mod 3
Let L = {2, 0, 1}, then vectors for the users are the following.
V1 = (0, 0, 0) V2 = (2, 0, 1) V3 = (1, 0, 2)
V4 = (1, 1, 1) V5 = (0, 1, 2) V6 = (2, 1, 0)
V7 = (2, 2, 2) V8 = (1, 2, 0) V9 = (0, 2, 1)
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Figure 5.4 is a tree structure for the example above. Note that each secret key K
(l)
a
(or public key Y
(l)
a ) is labelled by a unique pair a and l. In the example, the unique
pair a and l is mapped to a unique number w = a+ (l − 1)d+ 1 in the tree.
Authentication
We may use the technique in Section 5.2.4 with a slight change to provide the variant
scheme with sender authentication and message authentication. The authentication
capabilities require the sender to hold a secret that is unknown by others. The technique
in Section 5.2.4 assumes that the sender’s leaf key Kw is unique to him, so it can be
used for his secret identity id. This assumption is not guaranteed in the variant scheme




Kw mod q, which is unique to him, for his secret identity id.
In this case, the receivers compute id′ =
∏
w∈I(Ui)
Yw mod p from public keys during
verification.
5.4 Further Discussion and Conclusion
In this section we point out some interesting aspects of the proposed dynamic and
stateless revocation scheme, and summarise this chapter.
Other Variants. The Subset Difference (SD) method in [62] and the Layered Subset
Difference (LSD) method in [37] are based on binary tree structures. It has been shown
in their work that using SD or LSD method to generate and allocate system’s secret
keys gives efficient user storage. Also, for a given set of authorised users, the method
provides an algorithm to find a small set of secret keys that are known only to the
authorised users (this means efficient communication bandwidth, see Chapter 1).
We may apply one of the methods and its algorithm to the proposed dynamic
construction. That is, the GC uses the method for secret key generation and allocation.
The GC also generates public keys corresponding to the secret keys in the initialisation
phase. To form an authorised subgroup of his choice, a group member uses the set
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cover algorithm of the method to discover the indices of secret keys that are known
only to subgroup users (note that the set cover algorithm, tree structure and indices
are public). By referring to the discovered indices, the group initiator uses the public
versions of the secret keys to generate a subgroup message and further broadcasts
the message whereby users in the subgroup compute the common key. The following
describes the operation in more detail.
Let I be the set of indices of secret keys in the system. Let K(I) = {Kw : Kw ∈
Z∗q, w ∈ I} and K(U) ⊂ K(I) be the secret key set in the system and the secret
key set of each user U ∈ Us, respectively. These keys are generated and allocated
using either SD or LSD method by the GC. Moreover, the GC generates public key set
Y(I) = {Yw = g
Kw mod p, w ∈ I}.
Suppose a group member Uz would like to form a subgroup Gs by revoking users in
Us \ Gs. The group initiator Uz uses the set cover algorithm provided by the method
to discover a set of indices T satisfying: (i) ∀U ∈ Gs, T ∩ {w : Kw ∈ K(U)} 6= ∅
and (ii) ∀U ∈ Us \ Gs, T ∩ {w : Kw ∈ K(U)} = ∅. The algorithm guarantees the two
properties of T since it always outputs the indices of secret keys that are known only
to subgroup users. After obtaining T , Uz follows steps 1a, 1c and 1d of the protocol
in Section 5.2.2 to generate and broadcast the subgroup message. Users U ∈ Gs use a
secret key Kv ∈ K(U), where v ∈ T , to compute the common key as in step 2 of the
protocol in Section 5.2.2.
Permanent Revocation. The proposed user revocation is on a temporary basis where
a user is effectively revoked for a session only. It might be necessary to permanently
revoke a user, for example when his keys are compromised. In this case it is necessary
to update the system keys. Permanent revocation (eviction) needs the assistance of
the GC. We show below a method, inspired by [2], to evict users. Suppose users in
Rs = Gs \Us must be evicted. That is, the system keys must be updated such that the
key information known to the evicted group has to be changed. In the following, we
show how to update the keys.
1. The GC uses the revocation protocol in Section 5.2.2 to temporarily revoke the
users in Rs and obtain a group key GKs.
2. The GC and all users in Us update their secret keys as K
′
w = Kw ×GKs mod q.
3. The GC replaces public value g with g′ = g
1
GKs mod p.
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It is possible to generate the system keys using a pseudo-random function fK [35],
in which case the GC only needs to hold a single secret key K which is the index to
a pseudo-random function family. The system’s secret keys are obtained as Kw =
fK(w) mod q. In this case the GC computes K
′
w = fK(w) × GKs mod q. For every
permanent revocation, the GC only needs to update the group key without the need to
change fK(w).
Chapter Summary. We have considered the problem of establishing a common key
among subgroups of the original group, with dynamic and fixed group initiator. This
is important in many multi-party applications including teleconferencing and Pay-TV
systems. We have approached the problem as a revocation problem and have proposed
a construction with dynamic group initiator and with proven security. The proposed
scheme is efficient in practice and resilient against arbitrary collusions. The dynamic
setting of the scheme is made possible by the existence of public keys. Finding efficient
solutions without the need for public keys is an interesting research direction. We
have also shown that the scheme can be easily modified to a scheme with fixed group
initiator, without compromising security. A method of adding authentication to the
scheme has also been suggested.
In addition, we have proposed an extension to the basic scheme to reduce the num-
ber of system keys (and public keys accordingly), and showed that further extensions
using SD and LSD methods are possible to achieve superior performance. We also have
demonstrated how users can be permanently removed from the group.
Chapter 6
Group Key Distribution Schemes with
Decentralised User Join – An Algebraic
Approach
6.1 Introduction
In general a group key distribution scheme requires two cryptographic operations: user
join and user revocation (either temporary, permanent, or both). Most published pa-
pers have been concerned with only user revocation; many researchers have overlooked
the join problem, simply assuming the group is static such as [31, 55, 84] and Chap-
ter 5, or: when a new user joins the group, a new common key is generated and sent to
the new user using a secure channel. To provide backward security, the new common
key is sent to the old group users encrypted with the old common key which makes it
decryptable by all the users [17, 18, 75]. Such a simplistic solution has two obvious
drawbacks: (i) the new joined user has only a single session membership because he
only has the group key of the session and is not eligible for future group operations; (ii)
it requires the group controller (GC) to be on-line for the operation, and when the GC
is unavailable no join operation can be performed. Furthermore, it is usually assumed
that admission requires a new user to go through an initialisation process similar to
other users of U0 to obtain unique key information from the GC [2, 62, 64].
Allowing group users to perform user join and revocation provides system availabil-
ity and flexibility which are important in many applications, such as ad-hoc networks.
The schemes in [2, 75] and Chapter 5 allow a group user to take the role of the GC for
the revocation operation, but not for the join operation. It is desirable to construct
group key distribution schemes that have this decentralised setting for both user re-
vocation and join. That is, after system initialisation each group member can form a
subgroup by sending a single broadcast message. Moreover, collaborations of several
group members may admit new members to the system. This is achieved by securely
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sending data to a new user such that the new user can compute key information. Sys-
tems with the dynamic setting for user revocation and the collaborative setting for user
join have higher reliability since they function without a group controller.
Allowing join without the assistance of the GC is essential for flexible and reliable
operation of groups in applications such as a rescue operation, where new volunteers
or recruits must join the group and, because of a broken communication link, it is
not possible to contact the GC. In these situations the group must be able to function
independently: that is, group members must be able to admit new users to the group.
Another example is where new recruits may urgently require to join a group when the
director (GC) is absent. Having a system where several managers can cooperate to
grant membership is then helpful. However, this mechanism must be designed so that
it cannot be abused by corrupt group members. One solution requires several specified
trusted managers to cooperate to grant membership.
Allowing group members to admit new members is also an important requirement
for content distribution systems. For example, suppose a content distributor wishes
to create a network of branches to distribute content, some through a central branch
and some only through local branches (for example local news). In systems with a
centralised group controller, the controller generates all key sets and gives subsets to
each branch who will give them to their local subscribers. This solution requires the
key sets to be designed for all users in advance. A more efficient and flexible solution
is to give some autonomy to local branches and allow them to generate some key sets
for their local subscribers.
6.1.1 A Summary of Our Contribution
Our focus in this chapter is decentralised user join. We introduce a novel scenario for
dynamic group key distribution schemes which allows any group member to (i) form
a subgroup of existing users U , and (ii) sponsor new users to groups initiated by him.
A sponsored member can participate in groups that are initiated by the sponsor but
remains outside U . A new user will join the universe of users U if he receives enough
sponsorships. There are specified subsets of group members, called access sets, able to
admit new users to the group U . Cooperation of users in an access set is required to
exact admission of a new user; arbitrary subsets of users cannot do so. This provides
a mechanism for self sufficiency, flexibility in admitting new users and security in the
sense of ensuring that the new members have the approval of specified subsets of users.
Therefore after the initialisation phase, the group members can fully control the group
6.1. Introduction 100
and there is no need for the GC. A group key is only computable by members of
an authorised group. A collusion of users outside the authorised group will have no
information about the key, even if all messages broadcast through the lifetime of the
system are available.
We propose a construction that caters for the above scenario using symmetric poly-
nomials over finite fields, and cumulative arrays. We use threshold cryptography [77]
to replace the GC and distribute the trust to group members. We describe two dynamic
group key distribution schemes with safe and flexible join operations. The first scheme
provides sponsorship and full join with a threshold admission structure, where any
subset of users of a specified size (t+1) is an access set. We give a second scheme with
an arbitrary admission structure, where the collection of access sets also includes some
arbitrary access sets of up to some size (t). We call such access sets t-arbitrary access
sets. We also give a variant of the second scheme with better efficiency. Both schemes
allow subgroup establishment of size at least |U| − t users and are secure against a
collusion of at most t corrupt users, assuming any access set is not a subset of the col-
lusion. The efficiency of the schemes does not depend on the number of users n but is,
rather, only a function of t. It is reasonable to assume such a collection of subgroups,
since in practice the number of users requesting secure communication can be bounded
accurately a priori. We firstly assume that key storage is stateless in the subgroup
operation but later remove this assumption and allow key storage to be stateful in
the join operation to maintain security. We present user eviction (permanent removal)
methods and demonstrate traceability of colluders in the proposed schemes. We also
show our proposed schemes satisfy the flexibility and security requirements, and we
evaluate their efficiency.
6.1.2 Protocols
The subgroup protocol of this scheme is identical to that in Table 5.2 of Chapter 5.
The join and evict protocols are as follows.
Table 6.1 shows the protocol for a join event. For a sponsorship operation, a single
sponsor Uz ∈ Ps transmits a join message M to each new user Ui ∈ Js over a secure
unicast channel (we assume such a channel exists between the sponsor and each new
user). A sponsorship operation requires a new user Ui to keep only the message as
his secret information K(Ui). Full join operation is a multiple sponsorship requiring
sponsors Uz in an access set Ps to individually transmit join messagesM to each new
user Ui ∈ Js. A new user Ui uses these messages to determine his secret information
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Table 6.1: Join protocol
If Es = Join
∗
Input: Us, Js ⊆ N \ Us, Ps ⊆ Us
Process: - all Uz ∈ Ps
M
−−−−−−−−−−−−→ all Ui ∈ Js
- all Ui ∈ Js perform computation on M
- follow subgroup protocol with Gs = Us ∪ Js
Output: - all Ui ∈ Js obtain secret information K(Ui)
- all Ui ∈ Us ∪ Js share a group key GKs
- Us+1 = Us ∪ Js
∗For sponsorship, Ps = {Uz}, Uz ∈ Us
K(Ui).
Table 6.2: Evict protocol
If Es = Evict
Input: Us, Rs ⊆ Us, Ps = {Uz}, Uz ∈ Us \ Rs
Process: - Uz
M
========⇒ Ui ∈ Us \ Rs
- all Ui ∈ Us \ Rs perform computation on M and K(Ui)
Output: - all Ui ∈ Us \ Rs share a group key GKs
- all Ui ∈ Rs have unusable secret information K(Ui)
- Us+1 = Us \ Rs
Table 6.2 exhibits the evict protocol. To evict users in Rs, a single evictor Uz ∈ Ps
broadcasts a single eviction messageM and each authorised user Ui ∈ Us\Rs performs
computation on the message and his secret information K(Ui), whereby the authorised
users share a common key GKs and the secret information of evicted users is disabled.
Organisation of this chapter. Section 6.2 gives a basic construction of a dynamic
group key distribution scheme that provides sponsorship and full join with threshold
access sets using symmetric polynomials. User eviction methods and traceability are
also discussed in that section. In Section 6.3, we extend the basic dynamic group
key distribution scheme using cumulative arrays to allow t-arbitrary access sets in the
system. We furthermore show how to add new t-arbitrary access sets during sessions.
Section 6.4 gives a variant of the extended scheme with better efficiency. Additional
comments and conclusions are given in Section 6.5.
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Parts of this chapter appeared in the Proceedings of The Third Conference on Se-
curity in Communication Networks – SCN 2002 [53] and Proceedings of The Fifth
International Conference on Information Security and Cryptology – ICISC 2002 [49].
6.2 A Decentralised GKDS
This construction is inspired by the Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol and threshold
secret sharing. The descriptions of both cryptographic tools can be found in Chapter 4
and Chapter 1, respectively. In this scheme (i) any user can establish a group key for
a subgroup, (ii) any user can sponsor a new user to a group initiated by him, and (iii)
any t + 1 or more users is an access set being able to grant full membership to a new
user.
6.2.1 System Initialisation
The group controller (GC) initialises the system as follows.
1. Generates two large primes p, q such that q | (p − 1), and chooses a generator g
of a multiplicative subgroup of Z∗p with order q. p, q and g are made public.
2. Chooses a value for the system parameter t and constructs a random symmetric
polynomial,






lyk mod q ,
where the al,k ∈ Zq(0 ≤ l ≤ t, 0 ≤ k ≤ t) are randomly chosen, and al,k = ak,l for
all l, k. The polynomial F (x, y) is kept secret.
3. Calculates a polynomial Fi(x) = F (x, i) for each user Ui ∈ U0, and gives the poly-




q, where Ai,l =
∑t
k=0 al,ki
k mod q. User Ui keeps the polynomial Fi(x) as his se-
cret information, K(Ui) = {Fi(x)}.
The secret information of the GC is the symmetric polynomial F (x, y) of degree t
in x and y, and that of each user is the polynomial Fi(x) of degree t in x.
Theorem 6.1 ([9]) The scheme requires a group controller to store (t+1)(t+2)
2
log2 q
bits and a user to store (t+ 1) log2 q bits of secret information.
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Note that a user Ui has a secret polynomial Fi(x) and any other user Ui′ knows a
point Fi(i
′) of Fi(x) because Fi(i
′) = Fi′(i) (the symmetric property of F (x, y)) and
Ui′ has the polynomial Fi′(x). The polynomial Fi(x) and users’ points give a secret
sharing system with threshold t + 1, secret Fi(0) and shares Fi(i
′). In general each
user corresponds to a unique secret sharing system and it gives an instance of Anzai
et al. [2] system (see Chapter 1).
All al,k in the polynomial F (x, y) are randomly chosen. To reduce the GC’s storage,
we may use a pseudo-random number generator. Let He() be a secure pseudo-random
generator where e is the key. The GC produces al,k = He(min (l, k),max (l, k)) mod q
and so needs to only store the key e which is log2 q bits long.
6.2.2 Subgroup Event
We give a subgroup protocol where a user in Us can use to form a subgroup Gs and
establish a group key GKs for the subgroup. The privileged set for this operation
consists of a group initiator Uz ∈ Gs, so that Ps = {Uz}. The protocol can be used to
form a subgroup with |Gs| ≥ |Us| − t. Let Ũs = {i : Ui ∈ Us} and G̃s = {i : Ui ∈ Gs} be
the sets of identities.
1. Transmission: A group initiator Uz ∈ Gs does the following.
(a) Randomly generates an element r ∈ Z∗q and calculates ğ = g
r mod q.
(b) Chooses a set Θ ⊆ Z∗q such that Θ ∩ Ũs = ∅, a 6= b, for all a, b ∈ Θ, and
|Θ| = t+ |Gs| − |Us|. Let ∆ = Θ ∪ (Ũs \ G̃s).
(c) Uses his secret polynomial Fz(x) ∈ K(Uz) to calculate ğj = ğ
Fz(j) mod p, for
all j ∈ ∆, and broadcasts the subgroup message
M = {ğ, z, ğj ‖ j : j ∈ ∆} .
2. Calculation: Each user Ui ∈ Gs uses his secret polynomial Fi(x) ∈ K(Ui) and the






ψ(∆∪{i},j) mod p .
A summary of the subgroup protocol is shown in Table 6.3.
Theorem 6.2 The subgroup protocol allows any group member to form a subgroup Gs
with at least |Us| − t users from a group Us. It requires a broadcast message of length
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Table 6.3: The subgroup protocol
A group initiator Uz ∈ Gs Users Ui ∈ Gs
〈p, q, g, t, Ũs, G̃s, Fz(x)〉 〈p, q, Fi(x)〉
r ∈R Z
∗
q , Θ ⊆ Z
∗
q
Θ ∩ Ũs = ∅
|Θ| = t + |G̃s| − |Ũs|
∆ = Θ ∪ (Ũs \ G̃s)
ğ = gr mod p
ğj = ğ
Fz(j) mod p, ∀j ∈ ∆
M={ğ,z,ğj‖j:j∈∆}
==================⇒





GKs = v × w mod p
(t + 1)(log2 p + log2 q) bits, and requires a subgroup user to compute t + 1 modular
exponentiations.
Proof: Recall that in the system, the group initiator Uz has a secret polynomial
Fz(x) and any other user Ui knows a point Fz(i) of Fz(x), because Fz(i) = Fi(z) (the
symmetric property of F (x, y)) and Ui has the polynomial Fi(x). We may consider
Fz(x) as a (t + 1)–secret sharing system with secret Fz(0) and each user Ui holding a
share Fz(i).
To form a subgroup Gs, |Gs| ≥ |Us|−t, the group initiator Uz broadcasts the message
M consisting of
(i) the |Us| − |Gs| shares (at the exponent) belonging to users in Us \ Gs. That is, ğj
for all j ∈ Ũs \ G̃s, and
(ii) the t+ |Gs| − |Us| auxiliary shares (at the exponent). That is, ğj for all j ∈ Θ.
Thus, the broadcast messageM contains |∆| = t shares of Fz(x) (at the exponent).
Every user Ui ∈ Gs can compute the group key from M and his share Fi(z) (=
Fz(i)). Note that ğ
Fi(z) (= ğFz(i)) is not included in M so user Ui can reach the
threshold t + 1 of Fz(x) (at the exponent). The group key is computed by employing




















= grFz(0) mod p .
Since the threshold is t + 1, only t shares (at the exponent) can be released in
M. The t shares could be shares belonging to users in Us \ Gs, auxiliary shares, or
both. This implies that the protocol can revoke at most |Us \ Gs| = t users and so the
subgroup Gs has at least |Us| − t users at a time.
It is straightforward to show that (t+1)(log2 p+ log2 q) bits are broadcasted in the
protocol and that each authorised user has to compute t+ 1 modular exponentiations.
2
Theorem 6.3 The subgroup protocol provides Subgroup Secrecy – For any session Ss
where S1 ≤ Ss ≤ SM and Es = Subgroup, a collusion C ⊆ Us \ Gs, |C| ≤ t cannot find
the group key GKs.
Proof: We note that C (at most t non-subgroup users) cannot obtain Fz(0) from
their secret keys K(C) =
⋃
Ui∈C
K(Ui) = {Fi(x) : Ui ∈ C} and so cannot calculate the
group key GKs = ğ
Fz(0) (ğ is publicly known). This is because C has at most t shares,
Fz(i) (= Fi(z)) : Ui ∈ C, while calculating Fz(0) requires t + 1 shares. Moreover, C
cannot obtain GKs from the broadcast message M (only containing t shares at the
exponent) and computation on ğFz(i) : Ui ∈ C will not give any additional information
because they are already released inM.
Now we consider the case where C tries to find the group key GKs from broadcast
messages. The proof uses the Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) assumption that can
be found in Chapter 1.
We use a “reduction argument”: if there exists an algorithm (probabilistic polynomi-
al-time) V , that uses the secret keys K(C), the broadcast message M and all public
information, to distinguish GKs = g
rFz(0) from a random value, then V contradicts the
DDH assumption.
Without loss of generality, we assume that the group initiator is Uz who performs
polynomially many subgroup operations. We assume C = {Ud} (t = 1). Let V be the
algorithm that on input of values Fz(d), polynomially many tuples 〈g
rj , grjFz(d), grjFz(0)〉
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generated with randomly chosen rj’s, and a pair g
r, grFz(d), distinguishes between grFz(0)
and a random value.
Let V ′ be the algorithm that uses V to break the DDH assumption. V ′ is given
input ga, gb and C, and has to decide whether C is gab or a random value. V ′ generates
inputs to V . Let Fz(0) = b and r = a. V
′ generates a randomly chosen set C ′ = {Ud′}.
V ′ also generates values Fz(d
′), random rj’s and tuples 〈g
rj , grjFz(d
′), grjb〉, and gives
them to V . Then V ′ gives the values ga, gaFz(d
′), C to V , takes the output of V and
outputs the same value. In this way V ′ can distinguish between gab and C, contradict-
ing the DDH assumption. 2
Observe that to be efficient, the threshold t has to be relatively small and conse-
quently the above protocol can be used to form relatively large subgroups. To form a
small subgroup, say |Gs| ≈ 0, we may use the following simple protocol to establish the
group key.
1. Transmission: A group initiator Uz ∈ Gs does the following.
(a) Randomly chooses a group key GKs ∈ Z
∗
p and encrypts it with keys K(z,i) =
Fz(i) for all Ui ∈ Gs.
(b) Broadcasts to all users a subgroup message
M =
{
z, EK(z,i)(GKs) ‖ i : Ui ∈ Gs
}
,
where EK(z,i)() is a symmetric cipher with key K(z,i).
2. Calculation: Each user Ui ∈ Gs computes K(z,i) = Fi(z) (from the symmetric
property of F (x, y)) and decrypts EK(z,i)(GKs) ∈ M to obtain the group key
GKs.
It is obvious that only users in Gs can obtain the group key GKs. The broadcast size
is |Gs| log2 p+ (|Gs|+ 1) log2 q bits and an authorised user performs a single decryption
operation. In general the protocol can be used to form subgroups of any size.
6.2.3 Join Event
We divide user join into two subclasses: sponsorship (partial join) and full join. The
importance of these operations is that the admission of new users to groups is controlled
by the user(s) instead of by the GC1 and so the scheme is fully decentralised.
1To our knowledge, in all the previous GKDS the join operation, if possible at all, is GC-dependent
requiring an on-line GC.
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Sponsorship (Partial Join): The new user is sponsored by an existing group mem-
ber and receives secret information from him through a secure unicast channel.
The new user can only calculate the session keys for groups formed by his spon-
sor and is effectively a passive user whose membership is fully controlled by his
sponsor.
Full Join: The new user is sponsored by multiple group members and receives secret
information from them. If he receives enough sponsorship, he becomes a group
member with the same rights as other group users (i.e., for example he can
perform subgroup and user join operations).
Our proposed join protocol adds a new step prior to the transmission and calcula-
tion steps in order to satisfy the backward secrecy requirement of the join operation.
In the new step, the system’s secret symmetric polynomial F (x, y) and users’ secret
polynomials are updated or refreshed. Each update or refresh uses a group key known
to all existing users but not to new users, and the system’s polynomial and users’
polynomials are self-refreshing without further communication after the group key is
established. We note that updating a secret and shares of the secret has been consid-
ered in proactive secret sharing schemes [38].
Sponsorship (Partial Join)
The sponsorship operation allows a new user to be in a group formed by his sponsor.
The privileged set of this operation is Ps = {Uz}, where the sponsor Uz can be any
user in Us.
Suppose a sponsor Uz ∈ Us wants to form a group that includes a set of new users
Js ⊆ N \ Us. Uz needs to sponsor the new users into Us as follows. Let Ũs = {i : Ui ∈
Us} be the set of identities.
1. Self-refreshing: Users Ui ∈ Us do the following.
(a) The sponsor Uz performs a refresh event to establish a group key GKs for the
group Us by invoking the subgroup protocol in Section 6.2.2 with Gs = Us.
(b) The users Ui ∈ Us update their secret information K(Ui) = {F
′
i (x)} where
F ′i (x) = GKs + Fi(x) mod q.
2. Transmission and Computation: For each new user Ui ∈ Js, the sponsor Uz
assigns a unique identity i ∈ Zq such that i 6∈ Ũs and i 6= 0, then uses his
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z(i) (a share of F
′
z(x)) and
securely sends it to the new user Ui. The new user Ui keeps f
′
(z,i) as his secret
information K(Ui) = {f
′
(z,i)}.
After giving secret information to all new users, the sponsor Uz can establish ses-
sion keys for groups that include the new users in subsequent sessions. In this case,
the sponsor will become a group initiator who executes the subgroup protocol in Sec-
tion 6.2.2 to establish the group keys. The new users can only calculate the group
keys using their secret information and cannot perform other operations. Observe that
an execution of refresh event (subgroup operation with Gs = Us ∪ Js) following the
sponsorship protocol will give a group key for users in Us ∪ Js.
Note that only the sponsor Uz ∈ Us can perform operation on groups that include
the new users in Js (since Uz is the manager of those groups). Other users in Us \{Uz}
cannot do so since the new users do not have shares of secret information (polynomials)
belonging to users in Us \ {Uz}. To do so, they have to sponsor the new users into
their own groups (we assume the sponsors assign the same identity for a new user). At
most t sponsors are allowed to sponsor the same new users to maintain the passiveness
property of the new users (this can be done by, for example, publishing the status of
existing groups).
In practical applications, sponsorship provides a solution for a head office (group
controller) to share some admission capability to several trusted branches (users). The
trusted branches can create their own groups while the head office will still be able to
monitor the whole system.
Theorem 6.4 The sponsorship (partial join) protocol with a self-refreshing step allows
a group member to sponsor a set Js of arbitrary number of new users to a group
Us. Sponsoring a new user requires a transmission of log2 q bits over a secure unicast
channel. An arbitrary collusion of at most t new users sponsored by one or more group
members cannot learn all group keys that were established prior to their admission.
Proof: It is straightforward from the above description. The security proof follows
from that of the full join protocol in Theorem 6.5 (to be given later). 2
Full Join
To have the same capability as existing users, new users must be sponsored by at least
t + 1 group members. Let Ps ⊆ Us, |Ps| ≥ t + 1, be the privileged set of sponsors
6.2. A Decentralised GKDS 109
and P̃s = {z : Uz ∈ Ps} be the set of identities. Suppose the sponsors agree on the
admission of a set of new users Js to the group Us.
1. Self-refreshing: Similar to step 1 of sponsorship (partial join) protocol. A sponsor
Uz ∈ Ps performs a refresh event to create a group key GKs, and users Ui ∈ Us
use the common key to update their secret information K(Ui) = {F
′
i (x)}.
2. Transmission: Sponsors Uz ∈ Ps do the following.
(a) Agree on a unique identity i ∈ Z∗q for each new user Ui ∈ Js such that
i 6∈ Ũs.





independently distribute join messages
M = {f ′(z,i) ‖ z}
over secure unicast channels to each new user Ui ∈ Js.
3. Calculation: Each new user Ui ∈ Js receives the join messages M from all












A summary of the full join protocol is shown in Table 6.4. After all new users ob-
tain their secret information, any user in Us ∪ Js performs a refresh event (subgroup
operation with Gs = Us ∪ Js) to establish a group key for Us ∪ Js.
Table 6.4: The join protocol
Sponsors Uz ∈ Ps New users Ui ∈ Js
〈F ′z(x)〉 〈q〉







F ′i (x) =
∑
z∈P̃s
f ′(z,i)Ψ(P̃s, z) mod q
Note that a full join protocol is indeed a collection of multiple sponsorship (partial
join) protocols performed by different sponsors. It follows that the security of full join
protocol subsumes the security of sponsorship (partial join) protocol.
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Theorem 6.5 The full join protocol with a self-refreshing step satisfies Join Secrecy –
For any session Ss where S1 ≤ Ss ≤ SM , a collusion C ⊆
⋃
Ja : Ss ≤ Sa ≤ SM , Ea =
Join and |C| ≤ t cannot find the group keys GKb : S1 ≤ Sb < Ss.
Proof: Although the system secret F (x, y) is updated in every join operation, we
may assume secret information of C, K(C) = {F ′i (x) : Ui ∈ C} is determined from an
updated system secret F ′(x, y) = GKs + F (x, y) mod q, as when C tries to find group
keys of previous sessions. Referring to the self-refreshing step, the group key GKs is
established by a sponsor Uz ∈ Ps before joining the new users (the collusion C). Since
C do not know GKs, they cannot find group keys of sessions before Ss. So the security
is guaranteed by the difficulty of finding GKs. The rest of the proof is similar to that
of Theorem 6.3. The proof also implies that C cannot use the join messages M to
break join secrecy. 2
Theorem 6.6 Using the full join protocol, any t+1 or more group members may fully
admit a set Js, of arbitrary size, of new users to a group Us, while any t or less group
members cannot do so. It requires transmission of 2(t+1) log2 q bits over secure unicast
channels to admit a new user.
Proof: After the self-refreshing step, the system secret F (x, y) has been updated to
F ′(x, y) = GKs + F (x, y) mod q. To have a full membership in the group Us, a new
user Ui ∈ Js must have secret information F
′(x, y)|y=i. Since Ui receives at least t+ 1




i (z), for all z ∈ P̃s (in
general |P̃s| ≥ t+1), he can interpolate to obtain K(Ui) = {F
′
i (x) = F
′(x, i)}. Clearly,
less than t+ 1 pieces of information are not enough to compute F ′(x, i). The sponsors
need to transmit messages of a total of 2(t + 1) log2 q bits to give the t + 1 pieces of
information. 2
Discussion
The backward secrecy of the user join protocol relies on a Self-refreshing step where
secret information in the system is updated before admitting new users. As an al-
ternative, we may apply the following method to ensure backward secrecy, with the
extra cost of additional encryption and decryption operations in each execution of the
subgroup protocol in Section 6.2.2.
The idea is to encrypt the subgroup message with a key shared by all group users.
That is, prior to the execution of the subgroup protocol in session Ss, the group initiator
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(or any user in Us) performs a refresh operation to establish a key K for the group Us
(users in Us do not update their secret information). When executing the subgroup
protocol, the group initiator is required to encrypt the subgroup message using the
key K and broadcast the encrypted version, and the authorised users are required to
decrypt the encrypted broadcast so that they can compute the session key. Note that
we may use the same key K to encrypt subgroup messages of consecutive sessions (i.e.,
as long as the group memberships are unchanged).
Using this alternative method, a sponsor Uz only needs to securely send shares Fz(i)
to new users. The backward secrecy of user join relies on the encryption of subgroup
messages in previous sessions. The new users, even t of them colluding, do not have
the encrypting keys and so they cannot access the content of the encrypted broadcasts
(assuming the encryption algorithm is secure). It follows that the collusion does not
have adequate information to compute the previous session keys. The argument in
Theorem 6.3 implies the security proof of this method.
6.2.4 Evict Event
The aim of this operation is to establish a common key for group users, excluding some
evicted users, and prevent the evicted users from being parts of any authorised groups
in future sessions. It requires that the evicted users (even collusion of them) cannot
obtain any future group keys. Moreover, in decentralised systems the evicted users
cannot participate in any future group operations. A naive approach to satisfying
the requirements is to generate a new system secret (i.e., a new random symmetric
polynomial) in a session of eviction, and exclude all currently evicted users from the
transmission of shares (i.e., new polynomials) of the new secret. This approach is
clearly secure but very inefficient since it essentially re-initialises the system. In the
following we discuss two approaches of adding user eviction to the scheme that utilise
the subgroup protocol in Section 6.2.2. Suppose in session Ss, a set of users Rs are
evicted from Us so the set Us \ Rs consists of authorised users for the session.
Trivial Approach
An evictor performs the subgroup protocol with Gs = Us \ Rs that gives a common
key GKs for the authorised group Gs. For an effective eviction, executions of subgroup
protocol in subsequent sessions must consistently also exclude Rs from authorised
groups, that is, Rs ⊆ Ua \ Ga (i.e., Rs ∩ Ga = ∅), Ea ∈ {Subgroup, Evict, Refresh} for
Sa = Ss, · · · , SM so that the evicted users cannot find future group keys. Consequently,
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the set of excluded users is monotonically increasing and, to maintain security, it must
not exceed t users in a session. Referring to the argument in Theorem 6.3 gives the
following theorem.
Theorem 6.7 Using the trivial approach for user eviction satisfies evict secrecy – For
any session Ss where S1 ≤ Ss ≤ SM , a collusion C ⊆
⋃
Ra, S1 ≤ Sa ≤ Ss, Ea = Evict,
and |C| ≤ t, cannot find the group keys GKb, Ss ≤ Sb ≤ SM .
Note that the size of the excluded user set is bounded above by t where t is the
degree of polynomial used in the system. Small values of t restrict the number of
excluded users, while large t values give inefficient communication cost. In the follow-
ing we give a method of having scalable user eviction with reasonable communication
cost by sacrificing efficiency of user storage. The idea is to employ multiple indepen-
dent polynomials with monotonically increasing degrees (for example, t, 2t, 3t, · · ·). By
default, the group initiator uses a polynomial with the lowest, but sufficiently large
degree, to exclude users in the execution of subgroup protocol. When the size of the
excluded user set exceeds the degree of the currently used polynomial, a group initiator
replaces it with another polynomial with higher degree in the execution of the subgroup
protocol. With this method, the communication cost depends on the number of ex-
cluded users, and increases when there are more users to be excluded. To provide users
with the required polynomials, during system initialisation, the GC generates random
symmetric polynomials with monotonically increasing degrees and securely delivers a
share of every polynomial to each user. This requires large user storage. Note that as
those polynomials are determined during the initialisation phase, their degrees should
be chosen by taking into account the worst scenario.
This approach has stateless user storage and, using the above method, it is possible
to evict arbitrarily large numbers of users. An evicted user is prevented from computing
future group keys, but he may participate in future group operations, for example,
contributing to the admission of new users.
We may separate the broadcast message of a subgroup protocol into two parts.
The first part related to the evicted users of the preceding sessions and the second part
related to the excluded users of the current session. The first part is usually much
longer than the second part. To have efficient execution time in a session, the first part
can be computed and broadcasted prior to the session (for example, during system idle
time) since the evicted users were already known. Users of the session might do some
pre-computation towards the group key using the first part, however, only authorised
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users may complete the group key computation when the second part is broadcasted
in the session.
Self-refreshing Approach
An evictor performs the subgroup protocol with Gs = Us \ Rs that gives a common
key GKs, and the authorised users Ui ∈ Gs update their secret information K(Ui) =
{F ′i (x) = GKs + Fi(x) mod q} (and so update the system secret F
′(x, y) = GKs +
F (x, y) mod q). Successive group operations must use the updated secret information
in their protocol executions, and successful executions of the subgroup protocol will not
exclude Rs from authorised groups. Without knowingGKs, the evicted usersRs cannot
update their secret information to match the new system secret. Their outdated secret
information is unusable both for computing future group keys and for contributing to
further group operations, and so they are effectively evicted. The security proof of
above user eviction follows the argument in Theorem 6.3. Nevertheless, this approach
does not completely satisfy evict secrecy: it is secure only if the colluders belong to the
same session. A collusion of evicted users from different sessions will break the system
as the following shows.
The user group in session Ss+1 is Us+1 = Us \ Rs and they know the group key
GKs. Without loss of generality, assume another set of users Rs+1 is evicted from
Us+1. An evictor applies the subgroup protocol with Gs+1 = Us \ Rs+1 to obtain a
group key GKs+1. The group key is obviously unknown to Rs+1 and also Rs since
users in Rs do not have GKs to match the updated system secret. However, if some
users from Rs+1 and some users from Rs collude, they will succeed in obtaining GKs+1.
For example, a user Ui in Rs+1 who knows the group key GKs can reveal it to a user
Ui′ in Rs. Then user Ui′ will know his updated secret information K(Ui′) = {F
′
i′(x) =
GKs +Fi′(x) mod q}, which can be used to obtain GKs+1 and subsequent group keys.
This approach has stateful user storage and allows at most t users to be evicted
in a session. Assuming a single session collusion, a colluder is prevented from both
computing subsequent group keys and performing any role in future group operations.
Discussion
It is worth pointing out that in practice, user eviction can be addressed by applying
certain policies. For example, group members who voluntarily return their smart-cards
at the end of a subscription period will be returned their deposited moneys. A smart-
card contains the secret information of a user and a user will be effectively evicted by
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returning his smart-card as he no longer has the secret information to participate in
group operations (assuming the smart-cart is secure). This approach would reduce the
number of users that need to be evicted using the trivial approach or the self-refreshing
approach.
6.2.5 Traceability
The aim of traitor tracing is to trace the colluders whose keys are used to build an
illegal decryption device (pirate device). Boneh and Franklin in [15] constructed a
public key tracing scheme based on the Decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption. Their
scheme guarantees deterministic tracing if the extracted keys are in canonical form
and black-box confirmation test is possible. Naor and Pinkas in [64] proposed similar
tracing algorithms for their revocation scheme. We use the same approach as [64].
The main difference from [64] is that in our case traitors’ secret keys are polynomials.
The pirate device can calculate the group keys from broadcast messages. The group
controller (GC) will act as the tracer.
Let the key information of the user Ui in canonical form be written as a vector
Vi = (1, i, i
2, · · · , it) (mod q), and a polynomial Fi(x) which is the inner product of Vi
and (B0, B1, B2, · · · , Bt) where Bk =
∑t
l=0 al,kx
l mod q, k = 0, · · · , t, are the coefficients





Consider a set C = {Ui1 , Ui2 , · · · , Uiw}, w ≤ t, of colluders who construct a pirate
device. In the following we show that if colluders create a linear combination of the
vectors Vpr = α1Vi1 + α2Vi2 + · · · + αwViw (mod q) and a linear combination of the
polynomials Fpr(x) = α1Fi1(x) + α2Fi2(x) + · · · + αwFiw(x) (mod q), and supply the
pair Vpr and Fpr(x) to a pirate device
2, the device can calculate the group key from a
broadcast messageM.
Deriving group key We begin by describing the subgroup messageM broadcasted
by a privileged user Uz that holds the secret polynomial Fz(x). Let C̃ = {i : Ui ∈ C}
be the set of colluders’ identities. Without loss of generality, suppose the message is,
M = {ğ, z, ğFz(j) mod p ‖ j : j ∈ ∆}
2We assume that this is the only way for colluders to construct the pirate device.
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where ∆ ⊆ Z∗q, |∆| = t and C̃ 6⊆ ∆. Let ∆ = {j1, j2, · · · , jt}. The pirate device can
construct vectors Vj = (1, j, j






























(mod q) , (6.1)
where z0, z1, · · · , zt−1, zt are coefficients of the polynomial Fz(x) and Fz(j1), Fz(j2), · · · ,
Fz(jt) are t points of the polynomial. These values are unknown to the pirate de-
vice. We may represent the coefficients of the polynomial Fz(x) as a vector Z =
(z0, z1, · · · , zt−1, zt). We first show that Fpr(z) = Vpr ·Z mod q, where “·” denotes inner
product operation. From the symmetric property of the polynomial F (x, y), we know

















= Vpr · Z mod q .
Let A,B and C denote the three matrices in equation (6.1), from left to right. We
have AB = C. To deduce the group key ğFz(0) (= ğz0), the pirate device calculates
the inverse of the matrix A (= A−1) and modifies the matrix equation to B = A−1C.
Observe that multiplying the first row of the matrix A−1 by matrix C will give z0, that
is, z0 = d1Fz(j1)+d2Fz(j2)+ · · ·+dtFz(jt)+dt+1Fpr(z) mod q where d1, d2, · · · , dt, dt+1
are elements of the first row of the matrix A−1. Then the group key is found as
ğz0 = (ğFz(j1))d1 × (ğFz(j2))d2 × · · · × (ğFz(jt))dt × (ğFpr(z))dt+1 mod p .
Notice that the values needed to calculate the group key ğz0 are known by the pirate
device using the broadcast messageM and the pair Vpr and Fpr(x).
Tracing Algorithm
Traitor tracing may be of one of the following two types.
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1) Black box tracing If the keys in the pirate decoder cannot be extracted, the GC
examines the output of the pirate box on chosen inputs and uses this information to
trace traitors. The tracing algorithm follows the methods proposed in [64] and uses a
black-box confirmation test. The test can determine if a candidate set of users have
contributed to the construction of a given pirate box. The black-box confirmation test
for a candidate set T is as follows. Let |T | ≤ t and T̃ = {i : Ui ∈ T }.
1. If |T | < t, generate a random set W , |W| = t, of users such that T ⊂ W . If
|T | = t then W = T .
2. Construct a symmetric polynomial P (x, y) such that P (x, i) = F (x, i) for all
Ui ∈ W but P (x, i) 6= F (x, i) for all Ui /∈ W .
3. Generate a message M = {ğ, v, ğP (j,v) mod p ‖ j : j ∈ D} for a random element
v ∈ Z∗q and a random set D ⊆ Z
∗
q such that |D| = t and T̃ ∩ D = ∅, and feedM
to the pirate device.
4. If the output of the pirate device is ğP (0,v), the GC knows T ∩ C = C. Otherwise,
the GC may conclude T ∩ C = ∅. Note that if T ∩ C 6= ∅ and T ∩ C 6= C, the
algorithm cannot guarantee anything.
The tracer examines t-subsets of users and uses the confirmation test to determine
if a candidate set contains all the colluders. Once such a t-set is found, then a tracing
algorithm similar to [64] can be used to identify a specific traitor.
2) Tracing when the pirate key is accessible We assume that if a pirate de-
coder can decrypt with negligible error then the pirate key inside the decoder is a linear
combination of secret keys of colluders.
Given the pirate key in canonical form and assuming that at most t
2
colluders have
contributed to the construction of the pirate device, the tracing problem is the same
as the decoding problem in a (Generalised) Reed-Solomon code that has a polynomial
time algorithm [56]. We have the following result.
Theorem 6.8 Given a pirate key which is a linear combination of at most t
2
keys
of group members, it is possible to trace colluders whose keys appear with non-zero
coefficients in the linear combination.
For more details on the algorithm and its correctness, refer to [64].
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6.3 The Extended Scheme
The full join protocol in Section 6.2.3 (we will refer to full join as join in the rest of
this chapter) has the property that any t + 1 or more group members can admit new
users. An increase in the value of t makes join events less accessible, as approval of
many users is required. In some cases it is desirable that less than t+ 1 users be able
to join new users. That is, users in some specified subsets might need higher privileges.
We extend the group key distribution scheme in Section 6.2 to provide this property.
We need additional cryptographic tools that will be employed in the construction.
The notion of cumulative scheme and the concept of (v, v)–threshold scheme are de-
scribed in Section 1.4.
In the extended scheme a privileged set of sponsors can be any subset of at least
t+1 users, or an access set of a minimal access structure. That is, Ps ∈ Γ
−∪{A : A ⊆
Us, |A| ≥ t + 1}, where Γ
− is a collection of t-arbitrary access sets A ⊆ U0, |A| ≤ t,
defined by the GC. The extended scheme inherits all properties of the basic scheme
and also has the property of not only any t + 1 or more users, but also all users of a
t-arbitrary access set, being able to grant full membership to a new user.
6.3.1 System Initialisation
The group controller (GC) performs the following steps.
1. Performs steps 1, 2, and 3 of the system initialisation in Section 6.2.1.




that U− ⊆ U0.
3. Constructs and publishes a w× v cumulative array C(Γ−) = [cij] where w and v
are the cardinalities of the sets U− and F , respectively. Let each user Ui ∈ U
−
correspond to a set βi consisting of all columns indexed by j where cij = 1, i.e.,
βi = {j : cij = 1}.
4. Randomly chooses v − 1 symmetric polynomials of degree t in x and y over Zq,
Y1(x, y), Y2(x, y), · · · , Yv−1(x, y), and calculates
Yv(x, y) = F (x, y)−
v−1∑
j=1
Yj(x, y) mod q . (6.2)
All polynomials in this step are kept secret.
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5. Associates column j of the cumulative array with the symmetric polynomial
Yj(x, y), for 1 ≤ j ≤ v. Observe that the set F of the cumulative array C(Γ
−) is
F = {Y1(x, y), Y2(x, y), · · · , Yv(x, y)}.
6. Gives elements of F to each user Ui ∈ U
− if and only if cij = 1 through a secure
unicast channel. Thus, the set αi = {Yj(x, y) : j ∈ βi}.
The secret information of the GC is F (x, y) and F . The secret information of
each user Ui ∈ U
− is K(Ui) = {Fi(x), αi} and that of each user Ui ∈ U0 \ U
− is
K(Ui) = {Fi(x)}. Observe that the set αi consists of at most v symmetric polynomials
of degree t.
Theorem 6.9 In the extended scheme, (i) storage of a group controller is (v+1) (t+1)(t+2)
2
log2 q bits (ii) storage of a user not in U
− is (t + 1) log2 q bits and (iii) storage of a
user in U− is at most (1 + v (t+2)
2
)(t+ 1) log2 q bits of secret information.
In assessing security, we assume that the collusion C, |C| ≤ t, does not contain a




K(Ui) = {Fi(x), αi : Ui ∈ C} and cannot gain additional information
about F (x, y) from K(C).
Theorem 6.10 Any collusion C, |C| ≤ t, can obtain the session secret F (0, 0) for
session Ss if and only if some t-arbitrary access set A of Γ
− is contained in C.
Proof: If there is a t-arbitrary access set A in C then the only unknown in equa-
tion (6.2) is F (x, y), which can be thus obtained.
Without loss of generality, we take the most powerful C not containing a t-arbitrary
access set to be of size t, and to hold all Yj(x, y), 1 ≤ j ≤ v − 1. Using the symmetry
property in F (x, y) and their key information, the colluders can calculate t points,
F (i, k), Ui ∈ C, in F (x, k),∀Uk /∈ C. Equation (6.2) gives them one equation for
F (k′, k), Uk′ /∈ C but with another unknown Yv(k
′, k) also. The colluders cannot solve
this, so cannot find F (0, 0) letting Uk′ = Uk = U0 /∈ N . 2
6.3.2 Subgroup Event
Subgroup protocol for the extended scheme is similar to the subgroup protocol in
Section 6.2.2. The difference is in this case, the formed subgroup Gs also has to satisfy
A 6⊆ Us \ Gs, for all A ∈ Γ
− in order to maintain subgroup secrecy.
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In the extended scheme a user Ui only uses Fi(x) to process the subgroup protocol.
Thus, Theorem 6.10 and the results in Section 6.2.2 guarantee security and efficiency
of the protocol.
6.3.3 Join Event
Join protocol for the extended scheme has the property that sponsorship of at least
t+ 1 users can join a new user. This follows from the join protocol in Section 6.2.3. In
this section, we show in particular how sponsors in a privileged set (t-arbitrary access
set) Ps ∈ Γ
− grant membership to new users.
The admission of new users in Js ⊆ N \ Us to the group Us is as follows, recalling
the identity set Ũs = {i : Ui ∈ Us}. Note that Ps ⊆ U
− ⊆ Us.
1. Self-refreshing: Same as step 1 of the join protocol in Section 6.2.3. The result is
the group key GKs, shared by users Ui ∈ Us, and the updated secret information
F ′i (x) of the users. In addition, users Ui ∈ U
− need to update secret information
α′i = {Y
′
j (x, y) = u+ Yj(x, y) mod q : j ∈ βi} ,
where u = GKs
v
mod q (assuming q > v). After this step, the secret information
of users Ui ∈ U









2. Transmission: Sponsors Uz ∈ Ps do the following.
(a) Same as step 2a of the join protocol in Section 6.2.3.




j (x, i), for
all j ∈ βz (note that Y
′
j (x, y) ∈ α
′
z) and individually send join messages
M = {Y ′j,i(x) ‖ j : j ∈ βz}
to each new user Ui ∈ Js over secure unicast channels. It is possible βz1 ∩
βz2 6= ∅, for some Uz1 , Uz2 ∈ Ps, Uz1 6= Uz2 . It is then enough for one sponsor
to send Y ′j,i(x), by convention the sponsor with the lowest z.
3. Calculation: Using the join messages M sent by all sponsors, each new user








Y ′j,i(x) mod q
}
.
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Table 6.5: The join protocol of extended scheme
Sponsors Uz ∈ Ps New users Ui ∈ Js
〈α′z〉 〈q〉
Y ′j,i(x) = Y
′







F ′i (x) =
∑
j∈βP
Y ′j,i(x) mod q
A summary of the extended scheme’s join protocol is shown in Table 6.5.
Theorem 6.11 In the extended scheme, users in a t-arbitrary access set may perform
join operations for a set Js of any number of new users, while any t or less users that do
not contain all users in a t-arbitrary access set cannot do so. It requires transmission
of v(t+ 2) log2 q bits over secure unicast channels to join a new user.
Proof: After the self-refreshing step, the system secret F (x, y) is F ′(x, y) = GKs +
F (x, y) mod q. To be in Us, a new user Ui ∈ Js has to have secret information
F ′(x, y)|y=i. By the property of cumulative array C(Γ
−), βP = {1, . . . , v} is guar-
anteed. Thus Ui obtains Y
′
j,i(x), for 1 ≤ j ≤ v, from the messages. He can then
compute K(Ui) as follows, (referring to equation (6.2))
∑
j∈βP
Y ′j,i(x) mod q =
∑
j∈βP













Yj(x, i) mod q
= GKs + F (x, i) mod q
= F ′(x, i) .
Clearly t users that do not contain all users in a t-arbitrary access set cannot admit
a new user Ui since the new user will not receive sufficient information to compute
F ′(x, i).
A new user needs v polynomials of degree t to compute F ′(x, y) requiring a total
communication cost of v(t+ 2) log2 q bits. 2
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Following a join event, session Ss+1 has a user group Us+1 = Us ∪ Js. Since new
users in Js only obtain secret information F
′
i (x), none of the new users are in U
−. In
other words, Js ⊆ Us+1 \ U
−. Using a similar argument in Theorem 6.5 we have the
following.
Theorem 6.12 The extended scheme satisfies Join Secrecy – For any session Ss where
S1 ≤ Ss ≤ SM , a collusion C ⊆
⋃
Ja, Sl ≤ Sa ≤ SM , Ea = Join, and |C| ≤ t cannot
find the group keys GKb, S1 ≤ Sb < Ss.
6.3.4 Adding New Access Sets
The access sets in Γ− are subsets of U0 and defined during the system initialisation.
In practice it will be desirable to have flexible and dynamic Γ−, in the sense that new
t-arbitrary access sets can be appended to Γ− during system lifetime.
Let Γ̈− be a collection of new access sets with cardinalities at most t defined over
new users in Js and existing users in Us. After adding Γ̈
− to Γ−, the new collection
will be Γ− ∪ Γ̈− and it is assumed to be minimal. Let Ü− =
⋃
A∈Γ̈− A and recall
U− =
⋃
A∈Γ− A. Note that U
− ⊆ U0 ⊆ Us. We need to give secret information αi to
users Ui ∈ Ü
− \ U−. More specifically, the users in (Ü− \ U−) ∩ Js are new users for
the group Us so they also need secret information Fi(x) as well as αi. The users in
(Ü− \ U−) \ Js are existing users in Us, so only require secret information αi.
We describe two methods for users in a t-arbitrary access set A ∈ Γ− to perform
the extension without the GC’s assistance, while maintaining security of the system.
Pre-Defined New Access Sets
Assume the new t-arbitrary access sets are known at the design time of the system.
The idea is to reserve some ghost users Û and ghost t-arbitrary access sets Γ̌− that will
be used during system lifetime. During the system initialisation (see Section 6.3.1) the
GC will do the following.
1. In step 2, also specify the set Û and the access structure Γ̌−, where the access
sets in Γ̌− are defined on U0 and Û . Without loss of generality, we assume that
Û = (
⋃
A∈Γ̌− A) \ U
−. We furthermore assume that the access structure Γ− ∪ Γ̌−
is minimal and identifiers of the ghost users in Û are unique in the system.
2. In step 3, construct and publish the cumulative array C(Γ− ∪ Γ̌−) instead of
C(Γ−).
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In this approach, the new t-arbitrary access sets are constrained to Γ̈− ⊆ Γ̌−, new
users are (Ü−\U−)∩Js ⊆ Û and existing users are (Ü
−\U−)\Js ⊆ U0. The privileged
set for this operation is an access set Ps ∈ Γ
−.
1. For Js 6= ∅, sponsors Uz ∈ Ps invoke the join protocol in Section 6.3.3 to give
secret information F ′i (x) to the new users Ui ∈ Js. Note that identifiers of the
new users in (Ü− \ U−) ∩ Js are chosen from the identifiers of the ghost users in
Û . All secret information is updated after this step.
2. Transmission: To give secret information α′i to each user Ui ∈ Ü
− \ U−, each
sponsor Uz ∈ Ps constructs the message
M = {Y ′j (x, y) ‖ j : j ∈ βz ∩ βi} ,
encrypts M with the key F ′z(i) using a symmetric key cipher and sends the
encrypted message to user Ui. Note that if more than one sponsor holds Y
′
j (x, y),
it is enough for one of them (for example, the sponsor with the lowest z) to send
a copy of Y ′j (x, y).
3. Calculation: Each user Ui ∈ Ü
− \ U− decrypts the encrypted messages using
keys F ′i (z), for all Uz ∈ Ps (note that the symmetric property of F
′(x, y) gives
F ′z(i) = F
′







j (x, y) : j ∈ βP ∩ βi} .
Since βP = {1, · · · , v}, we can assure that each user Ui ∈ Ü
− \ U− obtains correct
α′i = {Y
′
j (x, y) : j ∈ βi}.
Post-Defined New Access Sets
This method allows any new t-arbitrary access sets to be added during the system
lifetime and gives a flexible extension for the access structure. We use the idea of
redistribution schemes [25] to deliver secret information αi. With this method, αi is
delivered to users Ui ∈ Ü
− ∪ U− (not only users in Ü− \ U−). Adding Γ̈− to Γ− is
performed by an access set Ps ∈ Γ
−.
1. Same as step 1 of the pre-defined new access sets approach.
2. Sponsors Uz ∈ Ps construct and publish a new ẁ × v̀ cumulative array C(Γ
− ∪
Γ̈−) = [cie] where ẁ and v̀ are the cardinalities of the sets U
− ∪ Ü− and F̀ ,
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respectively. Each user Ui ∈ U
− ∪ Ü− corresponds to a set β̀i consisting of all
columns indexed by e where cie = 1, i.e., β̀i = {e : cie = 1}.
3. Each sponsor Uz ∈ Ps randomly generates v̀−1 symmetric polynomials of degree
t in x and y over Zq, Y
(j)
1 (x, y), Y
(j)
2 (x, y), · · · , Y
(j)
v̀−1(x, y), and calculates
Y
(j)





Y (j)e (x, y) mod q ,
for all j ∈ βz. Note that Y
′
j (x, y) ∈ α
′
z. If βz1 ∩ βz2 6= ∅, for any Uz1 , Uz2 ∈ Ps,
Uz1 6= Uz2 , there will be more than one version of Y
(j)
e (x, y) for all j ∈ βz1 ∩ βz2 .
It is required that there is only one version of Y
(j)
e (x, y). Again, this can be
achieved by a policy where the sponsor with the lowest z computes it.
4. Recall that βP =
⋃
Uz∈Ps
βz = {1, · · · , v}. Observe that the column e of the new




Y (j)e (x, y) mod q ,
for e = 1, 2, · · · , v̀. Thus, the set F̀ of the new cumulative array C(Γ− ∪ Γ̈−) is
F̀ = {W1(x, y),W2(x, y), · · · ,Wv̀(x, y)}. Each user Ui ∈ U
−∪ Ü− needs to obtain
secret information ὰi = {We(x, y) : e ∈ β̀i}.
5. Transmission: To give secret information ὰi to each user Ui ∈ Ü
− ∪ U−, each
sponsor Uz ∈ Ps constructs the message
M = {Y (j)e (x, y) ‖ j ‖ e : j ∈ βz, e ∈ β̀i} ,
encryptsM with key F ′z(i) using a symmetric key cipher, and sends the encrypted
message to user Ui. The message is constructed with respect to the policy in
step 3.
6. Calculation: Each user Ui ∈ Ü
−∪U− decrypts the encrypted messages using keys





Y (j)e (x, y) mod q : e ∈ β̀i
}
.
It is clear that each user Ui ∈ Ü
− ∪ U− obtains correct ὰi = {We(x, y) : e ∈ β̀i}.
6.4. A Variant of the Extended Scheme 124
6.4 A Variant of the Extended Scheme
We propose a variant of the extended scheme with less user storage and lower trans-
mission costs in user join. The costs are significantly reduced for large h, say h ≈ t,
where h = min{|A| : A ∈ Γ−}.
6.4.1 System Initialisation
In the join protocol in Section 6.2.3, collaborations of t+1 users admit new users using
their Fi(x). If the collaboration has less than t+ 1 users, no join can be performed. In
this variant we give extra information to members of the access structure, to reduce
the number of collaborators they need for user admission. Let Ũ0 = {i : Ui ∈ U0}. The
group controller (GC) distributes t+1−h polynomials F (x, d), d 6∈ Ũ0, among members
of Γ−, such that each t-arbitrary access set can construct the F (x, d). In detail,
1. Same as steps 1, 2, and 3 of the system initialisation in Section 6.3.1.
2. Chooses and publishes a set D of t + 1 − h distinct elements from Z∗q such that
D ∩ Ũ0 = ∅.





2 (x), · · · , Y
(d)
v−1(x), and calculates





j (x) mod q . (6.3)
Let Yj = {Y
(d)
j (x) : d ∈ D}, for all 1 ≤ j ≤ v. All polynomials here are secret.
4. Associates column j of the cumulative array with the set Yj, for 1 ≤ j ≤ v.
Observe that the set F of the cumulative array C(Γ−) is F = {Y1, · · · ,Yv}.
5. Gives elements of F to each user Ui ∈ U
− if and only if cij = 1 through a secure
unicast channel. Thus, the set αi = {Yj : j ∈ βi}.
Observe that the set αi consists of at most v(t+ 1− h) polynomials of degree t.
Theorem 6.13 In the variant scheme, (i) storage of a group controller is (v(t + 1 −
h) + (t+2)
2
)(t + 1) log2 q bits (ii) storage of a user not in U
− is (t + 1) log2 q bits and
(iii) storage of a user in U− is at most (1 + v(t + 1 − h))(t + 1) log2 q bits of secret
information. The security property in Theorem 6.10 and its proof apply to the variant
scheme also, using equation (6.3) rather than (6.2).
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6.4.2 Subgroup Event
The subgroup protocol here differs from the subgroup protocol in Section 6.3.2 only in
the chosen set Θ, which in this case also has to satisfy Θ ∩ D = ∅.
6.4.3 Join Event
While at least t + 1 users can admit a new user following the join protocol in Sec-
tion 6.2.3, we show here how sponsors in a privileged set (t-arbitrary access set) Ps ∈ Γ
−
admit a set Js ⊆ N \ Us of new users. Recall that the identity sets Ũs = {i : Ui ∈ Us}
and P̃s = {z : Uz ∈ Ps}, and Ps ⊆ U
− ⊆ Us.
1. Self-refreshing: Same as step 1 of the join protocol in Section 6.3.3. In this case,
users Ui ∈ U
− update their secret information α′i as follows.
α′i = {Y
′






(x) = u+ Y
(d)
j (x) mod q : d ∈ D}
and u = GKs
v






i} and users Ui ∈ Us \ U
− has K(Ui) = {F
′
i (x)} as their secret
information.
2. Transmission: Sponsors Uz ∈ Ps do the following.
(a) Same as step 2a of the join protocol in Section 6.3.3.




z} to do the following for
each new user Ui ∈ Js.
i. Compute f ′(z,i) = F
′
z(i).
ii. Choose a setDs of t+1−|Ps| elements from the setD,Ds ⊆ D (note that
|Ps| ≥ h so |Ds| ≤ |D|), and for all j ∈ βz, compute y
′
(j,i)
(d) = Y ′j
(d)(i),
for all d ∈ Ds. Note that Y
′
j
(d)(x) ∈ Y ′j ∈ α
′
z. All sponsors Uz ∈ Ps
choose the same Ds.
iii. Individually send join messages




‖ j ‖ d : j ∈ βz, d ∈ Ds}
to Ui over a secure unicast channel. When βz1 ∩ βz2 6= ∅, Uz1 , Uz2 ∈
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3. Calculation: Each new user Ui ∈ Js computes his secret information K(Ui) using





















A summary of the variant scheme’s join protocol is shown in Table 6.6.
Table 6.6: The join protocol of variant scheme








|Ds| = t + 1− |Ps|
y′(j,i)
(d) = Y ′j




















(d)Ψ(P̃s ∪ Ds, d) mod q
F ′i (x) = b1 + b2 mod q
Theorem 6.14 In the variant scheme, users in a t-arbitrary access set may perform
join events for a set Js of any number of new users, while any t or less users that
do not contain all users in a t-arbitrary access set cannot do so. Joining a new user
requires transmission of at most (2h + 3v(t + 1 − h)) log2 q bits over secure unicast
channels. Also, the argument in Theorem 6.5 guarantees join secrecy of the variant
scheme.
Proof: Observe that the system secret F (x, y) has been updated to F ′(x, y) = GKs+
F (x, y) mod q following the self-refreshing step. To be in Us, a new user Ui ∈ Js has to
obtain secret information which is the evaluation of the system secret F ′(x, y) at y = i.






for all z ∈ P̃s (in general |P̃s| ≤ t). From the property of cumulative array C(Γ
−),
βP = {1, · · · , v} holds and so Ui obtains y
′
(j,i)
(d), for 1 ≤ j ≤ v, for all d ∈ Ds. From
those, Ui may form |Ds| = t + 1 − |Ps| pieces of information, that is, F
′(i, d), for all
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j (i) mod q
= GKs + F (i, d) mod q
= F ′(i, d) .
Interpolation of all |P̃s| + |Ds| = |P̃s| + t + 1 − |Ps| = t + 1 pieces of information
(|P̃s| = |Ps|) gives K(Ui) = {F
′(x, i) = F ′i (x)}. It is obvious that t users that do not
contain all users in a t-arbitrary access set give insufficient information for a new user
Ui to compute F
′(x, i).
Observe that the sponsors transmit a total of (2|Ps| + 3v(t + 1 − |Ps|)) log2 q bits
and the worst case of transmission is when |Ps| = h. See Theorem 6.5 for the security
proof. 2
Discussion
We can add new t-arbitrary access sets into Γ− of the extended scheme by applying the
two methods described in Section 6.3.4. Note that (i) using the method of pre-defined
new access sets, we require the value h = min{|A| : A ∈ Γ− ∪ Γ̌−}, and (ii) using the
method of post-defined new access sets, we require |A| ≥ h, for all A ∈ Γ̈−, where
h is the minimum cardinality of access sets in Γ−. This is because if |A| < h, the
sponsors in Ps = A cannot give enough information for a new user to compute his
secret information.
6.5 Further Discussion and Conclusions
In many cases, there is a need to change a group key without revoking or adding users.
An obvious example is the self-refreshing step described earlier. It is also possible
that a group user accidentally loses the group key and wants to update the group key
without changing group memberships. To change the group key, the user can follow
the subgroup protocol with the set Gs = Us (since no one is being revoked), or use the
sponsorship protocol with the set Js = ∅ (since no one is being sponsored). However,
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the latter needs more computation for the group users to update their secret informa-
tion.
We have introduced a novel scenario for dynamic group key distribution schemes
whereby a sponsorship operation can be performed by any user, and a full user join
operation can be performed by users in an access set of an access structure. We have
given applications of such a decentralised system and presented two dynamic group key
distribution schemes for that system. One has an access structure consisting of any
combination of t+1 or more users, and the other extends the first to have some defined
access sets of size at most t. We have also given a variant of the extended scheme with
better efficiency. All schemes allow subgroup establishment of size at least |U| − t
users. Our constructions use symmetric polynomials and cumulative arrays, and they
are secure against a collusion of at most t users assuming any t-arbitrary access set
is not a subset of the collusion. We have shown that the schemes are consistent and
secure, and evaluated their efficiency. Moreover, we have shown that traitor tracing is
possible and further discussed several approaches for user eviction.
We note that sponsorship and full join are also useful in other applications such
as hierarchical-groups where users in different levels have different rights. Construct-
ing group key distribution schemes that allow an arbitrary structure of group users
to perform both user revocation and user join is an interesting problem for further
research.
Chapter 7
A Group Key Distribution Scheme with
Decentralised User Join – A KDP Approach
7.1 Introduction
We address the problems of enabling any group user to securely establish a session key
among users of a designated subgroup, and allowing several group users to securely
enroll a new user to the group. We present a construction that caters for the scenario
using key distribution patterns (KDP). The basic idea is to design the structure of keys
in such a way that each user holds a different subset of keys, such that each pair of
users share at least a key that is not known to any other users – a similar method has
been used in the single group controller scheme [48].
7.1.1 A Summary of Our Contribution
We give a dynamic group key distribution scheme containing two protocols to form
subgroups, called the OR protocol and the AND protocol, whereby a user chooses a
session key and broadcasts encrypted versions of the key which can only be decrypted
by members of the target subgroup (we assume a secure encryption tool is used).
Both protocols are efficient: they require storage of O(log n) keys for both the group
controller (GC) and the user, and both the OR protocol for large subgroups (i.e.,
small number of revoked users) and the AND protocol for small subgroups (i.e., large
number of revoked users) achieve the communication cost of O(log n) keys in a single
broadcast. Therefore, the key storages of the GC and the user, and the communication
costs of the scheme can simultaneously achieve O(log n) keys. Furthermore, because
of the identical key structure in both protocols and the property that they are most
efficient for different ranges of subgroup sizes, they can be seen as complementary to
each other. This provides high flexibility in practice. We also show how to improve the
communication efficiency of the OR protocol by using an erasure code. Our system is
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inspired by [48], where an erasure code is used to improve communication efficiency in
secure broadcast systems.
We also consider user join in this scheme. We show that decentralised user join
is possible and give an algorithm that allows a new user to obtain his private key
information from existing members of the group. Our user admission method can
also be applied to the KDP based revocation scheme proposed in [61]. The proposed
scheme provides security against collusion of up to t users and has stateless key storage
in subgroup and join operations.
The schemes proposed in this chapter and Chapter 6 use similar settings. In Ta-
ble 7.1 we compare the efficiency of the subgroup protocols and the join protocols
proposed in the two chapters. We use the key length as the unit to measure the user
storage and communication costs. The computation cost of user join is measured in
terms of the number of decryptions. The computation cost of user revocation is mea-
sured in terms of the number of decryptions for the scheme in this chapter, and in
terms of the number of exponentiations for the scheme in Chapter 6. This is because
the scheme in this chapter is symmetric-key based while the scheme in Chapter 6 is
public-key based. We recall that the OR and AND protocols in this chapter can be
used to revoke small number of users (β ≈ 0) and large number of users (β ≈ n), re-
spectively, and both protocols bound the number of new users to n (α+ γ ≤ n, where
γ is the number of existing users). The scheme in Chapter 6 can be used to revoke any
subset of users of size at most t (β ≤ t), and the system supports an arbitrary number
of new users.
The subgroup and join protocols of the proposed scheme are identical to those in
Table 5.2 (Chapter 5) and Table 6.1 (Chapter 6), respectively.
Organisation of this chapter. Section 7.2 gives a basic construction for the OR protocol
and the AND protocol using key distribution patterns. It also shows that the com-
munication cost of the OR scheme can be improved through the application of erasure
codes. It also describes a slight extension of the scheme to support user admission, and
demonstrates how a new joined user obtains his personal key set from some existing
users. Finally Section 7.3 concludes the chapter.
Parts of this chapter appeared in the Proceedings of The Fifth Australasian Con-
ference on Information Security and Privacy – ACISP 2000 [50].
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Table 7.1: Efficiency comparison of the subgroup protocols and the join protocols
proposed in this chapter and Chapter 6
This Chapter Chapter 6
OR AND
User Storage O(log n) O(log n) t + 1
Collusion Resilience t t t
Single User
Communication O(log n) n− 1 t + 1
User Computation 1 1 t + 1
Revoke Multiple (β) Users
Communication O(log n) n− β t + 1
Computation 1 1 t + 1
Single User
Communication O(log n) O(log n) t + 1
User Computation O(log n) O(log n) t + 1
Join Multiple (α) Users
Communication α O(log n) α O(log n) α(t + 1)
Computation O(log n) O(log n) t + 1
n is the maximum number of users supported by the scheme
7.2 A KDP Construction
The notion of key distribution pattern is central to the construction. The definition of
key distribution pattern is given in Chapter 1.
7.2.1 System Initialisation
The group controller (GC) does the following.
1. Designs a (X ,B) = (m,N, t)-KDP with N = |U0| and chooses a large number q.
1
The (m,N, t)-KDP is public.
2. Randomly generates a set of m keys K(X ) = {K1, K2, · · · , Km} ⊂ Zq, K(X ) 63 0,
corresponding to the set X = {x1, x2, · · · , xm}. All keys in K(X ) are kept secret.
3. Securely sends a subset K(Ui) = {Kj : xj ∈ Bi} ⊆ K(X ) to each user Ui ∈ U0
over a secure unicast channel. All keys in K(Ui) are secret information for user
Ui.
1The number q should be large enough such that the symmetric encryption algorithm E() used in
the next section is secure against brute force attack.
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It is obvious that the number of keys for the GC is |K(X )| = m and for each user is
|K(Ui)| < m. Therefore, the scheme requires a group controller to store m log2 q bits
and a user to store less than m log2 q bits of secret information.
7.2.2 Subgroup Event
We present two subgroup protocols, called the OR protocol and the AND protocol,
using key distribution patterns. (AND and OR protocols are also used in [55], however,
our application is different as we consider decentralised model of group communication.)
Both protocols allow any user in a group Us to form a subgroup Gs ⊆ Us and establish a
group key GKs for the subgroup. That is, the privileged set contains a group initiator
Uz, Ps = {Uz}, where Uz can be any user in Gs. Without loss of generality, we assume
that N = |Us|.
OR Protocol
This protocol can be used to form a subgroup with |Gs| ≥ |Us| − t.
1. Transmission: A group initiator Uz ∈ Gs does the following.
(a) Randomly chooses a group key GKs ∈ Zq, GKs 6= 0, and encrypts it with
all his keys except those keys incident to K(Ui), for all Ui ∈ Us \ Gs. That




(b) Broadcasts subgroup message




to all the users. EKj() is a symmetric key encryption algorithm with key
Kj.




Bi)), to decrypt EKj(GKs) using the corresponding decryption
algorithm DKj() and obtain the group key GKs.
A summary of the OR protocol is shown in Table 7.2.
Theorem 7.1 The OR protocol provides Subgroup Secrecy – For any session Ss where
S1 ≤ Ss ≤ SM and Es = Subgroup, a collusion C ⊆ Us \ Gs, |C| ≤ t cannot find the
group key GKs.
7.2. A KDP Construction 133
Table 7.2: The OR protocol
A group initiator Uz ∈ Gs Users Ui′ ∈ Gs
〈(X ,B),K(Uz)〉 〈(X ,B),K(Ui′)〉
GKs ∈R Zq, GKs 6= 0










choose a key Kj : xj ∈ θ
GKs = DKj (EKj (GKs))




It is clear that users in Us \ Gs, even if they collude, do not possess the keys used to
encrypt GKs in the broadcast messageM, and so they are unable to obtain the group
key. 2
Theorem 7.2 The OR protocol allows any group member to form a subgroup with at
least N − t users from a group of N users. It requires a broadcast message of less than
2m log2 q bits and requires an authorised user to compute a decryption operation.
Proof: From the definition of KDP, every user Ui′ ∈ Gs has at least one key Kj where
xj ∈ Bz \ (
⋃
Ui∈Us\Gs
Bi) so he can decrypt EKj(GKs) to obtain the group key. The
above property holds if |Us \ Gs| ≤ t requiring |Gs| ≥ |Us| − t users.
Since a group initiator Uz has less than m keys, the broadcast messageM contains
less than m encrypted group keys. Assuming xj is log2 q bits long and the output of
the symmetric encryption algorithm is also log2 q bits long, the size of M is less than
2m log2 q bits. A user in Gs only needs to decrypt an encrypted group key. 2
Example 7.1 Let X = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9} and B = {B1,B2,B3,B4,B5,B6,B7,B8,
B9,B10,B11,B12} defined as follows.
B1 = {4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9} B2 = {2, 3, 5, 6, 8, 9}
B3 = {2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8} B4 = {2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 9}
B5 = {1, 2, 3, 7, 8, 9} B6 = {1, 3, 4, 6, 7, 9}
B7 = {1, 3, 4, 5, 8, 9} B8 = {1, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8}
B9 = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6} B10 = {1, 2, 4, 5, 7, 8}
B11 = {1, 2, 5, 6, 7, 9} B12 = {1, 2, 4, 6, 8, 9} .
Then (X ,B) is a (9, 12, 1)-KDP.
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Assume that after initialisation, user (group initiator) U1 wants to establish a com-
mon key with the rest of users except U3. Since B1 \B3 = {5, 9}, using the OR protocol,
user U1 encrypts the key GKs using K5 and K9, and broadcasts subgroup message
M = {EK5(GKs), EK9(GKs)} to the group. It is easy to see that every user except
U3 can decrypt at least one encrypted GKs in the subgroup message using K5 or K9.
On the other hand, user U3 does not know K5 and K9, and so he can not decrypt the
encrypted group key.
AND Protocol
Observe that the OR protocol can only be efficiently used to form large subgroups. We
present a variant, called the AND protocol, which can be used to efficiently form small
subgroups, that is |Gs| ≈ 0.
1. Transmission: A group initiator Uz ∈ Gs does the following.
(a) Computes a key with each user Ui ∈ Gs as follows.
K(z,i) =
⊕
Kj : xj ∈ Bz ∩ Bi ,
where
⊕
denotes the Exclusive-OR operation (assuming that all the keys
are strings of the same length).
(b) Randomly chooses a group key GKs ∈ Zq, GKs 6= 0, and encrypts it with
key K(z,i), for all Ui ∈ Gs.
(c) Broadcasts subgroup message
M = {EK(z,i)(GKs) ‖ i : Ui ∈ Gs} ,
where EK(z,i)() is a symmetric key encryption algorithm with key K(z,i), to
all the users.
2. Calculation: Each user Ui ∈ Gs computes K(z,i) and decrypts EK(z,i)(GKs), using
the corresponding decryption algorithm DK(z,i)(), to obtain the group key GKs.
A summary of the AND protocol is shown in Table 7.3.
Theorem 7.3 The AND protocol provides Subgroup Secrecy – For any session Ss
where S1 ≤ Ss ≤ SM and Es = Subgroup, a collusion C ⊆ Us \ Gs, |C| ≤ t cannot
find the group key GKs.
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Table 7.3: The AND protocol
A group initiator Uz ∈ Gs Users Ui ∈ Gs
〈(X ,B),K(Uz)〉 〈(X ,B),K(Ui)〉
GKs ∈R Zq, GKs 6= 0
φ = {K(z,i) : Ui ∈ Gs}, where
K(z,i) =
⊕





Kj : xj ∈ Bi ∩ Bz
GKs = DK(z,i)(EK(z,i)(GKs))
Proof: The group key GKs is encrypted using keys K(z,i), for all Ui ∈ Gs. Let
C = {Uk1 , Uk2 , · · · , Ukt}. C succeed in obtaining the group key only if they can calculate
K(z,i) for some Ui ∈ Gs. This is not possible because indeed for each Ui ∈ Gs, there
exists at least an x ∈ Bz ∩Bi but x 6∈ Bk1 ∪Bk2 ∪ · · · ∪Bkt by referring to the definition
of KDP. It follows that K(z,i), for all Ui ∈ Gs, is unknown to C, and so they cannot
decrypt any encrypted group key in the broadcast messageM. 2
Theorem 7.4 The AND protocol allows any group member to form a subgroup with
d users, 1 ≤ d ≤ N − 1, from a group of N users. It requires a broadcast message of
2d log2 q bits and requires an authorised user to perform a decryption operation.
Proof: It is straightforward to show that each user Ui in subgroup Gs can compute
the key K(z,i) to retrieve the group key GKs. To prove that 1 ≤ |Gs| ≤ |Us| (Gs
can be any subset of Us), we need to show that indeed Bi ∩ Bj 6= Bi ∩ Bk1 for any
i, j, k1 ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N}. From the definition of KDP, there exists at least an x ∈ Bi∩Bj
but x 6∈ Bk1 ∪ Bk2 ∪ · · · ∪ Bkt for any i, j, k1, k2, · · · , kt ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N}. It follows that
x 6∈ Bk1 , x 6∈ Bi ∩ Bk1 and so Bi ∩ Bj 6= Bi ∩ Bk1 .
The number of encrypted group keys in the broadcast message M depends on
the subgroup size d. Assuming the identifier i is log2 q bits long and the output of
symmetric encryption algorithm is also log2 q bits long, the size ofM is 2d log2 q bits.
A user in Gs only decrypts an encrypted group key. 2
Example 7.2 Let (X ,B) be the (9, 12, 1)-KDP defined in example 7.1 for the OR
protocol. Suppose, after initialisation, user (group initiator) U1 wants to form a sub-
group with U11 and U12 only. Since B1 ∩ B11 = {5, 6, 7, 9} and B1 ∩ B12 = {4, 6, 8, 9},
using the AND protocol, user U1 computes keys K(1,11) = K5 ⊕ K6 ⊕ K7 ⊕ K9 and
K(1,12) = K4 ⊕ K6 ⊕ K8 ⊕ K9, encrypts the group key GKs using the computed keys,
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and broadcasts the subgroup message M = {EK(1,11)(GKs), EK(1,12)(GKs)}. Observe
that only user U11 can compute K(1,11) and only user U12 can compute K(1,12), and
they will be able to decrypt one encrypted GKs in the subgroup message. However, no
non-subgroup user has enough components to compute K(1,11) or K(1,12), and so cannot
decrypt the encrypted group key.
Efficiency of the System
Efficiency of the system is directly related to the parameters of the underlying key
distribution pattern. For given t and N , we expect m to be as small as possible.
Equivalently, for given m and t, we expect N to be as large as possible.
Constructing KDP with maximal N for a given m has been extensively studied in
literature [29, 36, 61, 67, 72, 83]. Mitchell and Piper [61], and Gong and Wheeler [36]
gave explicit constructions for (m,N, t)-KDP with m = O(N), which is more efficient
than the trivial construction that gives each pair of users an individual key requiring
m = O(N 2). Moreover, Dyer et al. [29] showed the existence of (m,N, t)-KDP with
m = O(logN). The above observation leads to the following corollary.
Corollary 7.1 Let Us be the user group in session Ss and Gs ⊆ Us be the subgroup to
be formed. We assume |Us| = N .
1. For |Gs| ≥ |Us| − t, there exists an OR protocol such that (i) the storage of
a group controller is O(logN) log2 q bits, (ii) the storage of each user is less
than O(logN) log2 q bits, and (iii) the broadcast (subgroup) message consists of
O(logN) log2 q bits.
2. For 1 ≤ |Gs| ≤ |Us| − 1, there exists an AND protocol such that (i) the storage
of a group controller is O(logN) log2 q bits, (ii) the storage of each user is less
than O(logN) log2 q bits, and (iii) the broadcast (subgroup) message consists of
|Gs| log2 q bits.
7.2.3 Improving Communication Efficiency
We show how to improve communication efficiency (broadcast size) of the basic OR
protocol using erasure codes. The basic idea is to first encode the group key with an
erasure code, then apply the basic OR protocol (slightly modified) to the codeword.
Kumar et al. [48] proposed a group key establishment method using the centralised
model (a fixed trusted authority is required to perform the membership event) that
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employs erasure codes and cover-free families (CFF). Our method is inspired by their
work but for a decentralised model and using KDP. See Chapter 1 for a brief description
of erasure codes.
In order to apply the erasure codes to improve the communication cost, we extend
the definition of KDP to α-KDP.
Definition 7.1 Let X = {x1, · · · , xm} be a set and B = {B1, · · · ,BN} be a fam-
ily of subsets of X . The pair (X ,B) is called an (m,N, t)-α-key distribution pattern
((m,N, t)-α-KDP) if




for any (t+ 2)-subset {i, j, k1, · · · , kt} of {1, 2, · · · , N}.
For α = 1, an (m,N, t)-α-KDP is the same as an (m,N, t)-KDP. It is easy to see
that α-KDP with α = 2 can be constructed by concatenating multiple KDPs. Also,
an (m,N, t)-α-KDP is an (m,N, t − 1)-α′-KDP with α′ ≥ α + 1. We note that most
techniques for constructing KDPs can be generalised to α-KDP in a straightforward
manner. It would be interesting to look for more sophisticated solutions.
Now the basic OR protocol can be modified as follows. Assume that keys of the
users are elements of a finite field Fq. Let (X ,B) be an (m,N, t)-α-KDP and let
the keys for users be allocated as in the system initialisation. Our aim is to modify
the broadcast (subgroup) message in the basic OR protocol using erasure codes. For
simplicity, we assume that |Bi| = ` (|K(Ui)| = `), for all Bi ∈ B, and the group key
GKs is an element in F
w
q .
1. Transmission: A group initiator Uz ∈ Gs does the following.
(a) Divides the group key GKs into w pieces GKs = (GKs1 , GKs2 , · · · , GKsw),
then encodes GKs using an [`, w, α]q erasure code (C,D) to obtain a code-
word C(GKs) = (c1, c2, · · · , c`).
(b) Uses all his keys, except those keys incident to K(Ui), for all Ui ∈ Us \ Gs,
to encrypt the corresponding components of C(GKs). That is, encrypts




(c) Broadcasts the subgroup message
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2. Calculation: Since each user in Gs has at least α keys that are incident with
the group initiator Uz, the user can decrypt α messages of EKj(cj) to obtain α
components of C(GKs). He then applies the erasure code to obtain the group
key GKs. All users that are not in Gs, as in the basic OR scheme, cannot find
the group key.
In an [n, k,m]q erasure code, the length of the codeword C(v) is n log2 q bits, whereas
the length of the source message v is k log2 q bits, and hence the ratio which indicates
the extra bandwidth is n
k
. We note that the basic OR scheme uses an [n, 1, 1]q erasure
code in the construction. In general, we expect k to be as large as possible to minimise
the extra bandwidth. We also note that to use this construction with k > 1, the
parameter α in the (m,N, t)-α-KDP must satisfy α ≥ k which requires larger m for
the same values of N and t, and so needs more keys. A detailed analysis for this
tradeoff is an interesting problem for further research.
7.2.4 Join Event
Joining new users can be achieved by designing the system such that there are some
pre-designed keys to be used by the new users. Let (X ,B) be an (m,N, t)-KDP and
Us = {Ui1 , · · · , Uins} be the set of users in session Ss. Each user Uie ∈ Us obtains a
subset of keys K(Uie) ⊆ K(X ) corresponding to the block Bie ∈ B. To allow for adding
new users, it is essential that the (X ,B) = (m,N, t)-KDP satisfies N > ns. This is
always true. Since the keys of the new users should come from users in Us, using the
properties of KDP, we may assume without loss of generality, that X =
⋃ns
e=1 Bie .
Suppose a set of new users Js ⊆ N \Us join the group Us. Assuming N ≥ |Us|+|Js|,
each new user Ui′ ∈ Js chooses a block Bi′ ∈ B, where i
′ 6∈ {i1, · · · , ins} (note that the






The new user Ui′ gets his keys from the sponsors as follows.
1. Transmission: Each sponsor Uze ∈ Ps〈i′〉 independently sends a join message
M〈ze〉, consisting of keys indexed by Bze ∩Bi′ , over a secure unicast channel, that
is
M〈ze〉 = {Kj : xj ∈ Bze ∩ Bi′} .
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2. Calculation: The new user Ui′ obtains his key set from the join messages,
K(Ui′) =
⋃
M〈ze〉 : Uze ∈ Ps〈i′〉
= {Kj : xj ∈ Bi′} .
A summary of the join protocol is shown in Table 7.4. After all new users obtain
their key set, a user in Us ∪Js performs the OR protocol in Section 7.2.2 with Gs = Us
to establish a group key for Us ∪ Js.
Table 7.4: The join protocol
Sponsors Uze ∈ Ps〈i′〉 New users Ui′ ∈ Js
〈(X ,B),K(Uze)〉 〈(X ,B)〉









Suppose UN is the user set where every user Ui in the set corresponds to a block
Bi ∈ B of an (X ,B) = (m,N, t)-KDP. For a session Ss, where Us ⊂ UN , the users in
UN \Us might be viewed as ghost users. It is worth pointing out that when running an
OR or AND protocol in a session Ss, the group initiator has to treat the ghost users
as unauthorised users who are not in the subgroup Gs (i.e., the non subgroup users are
UN \ Gs, instead of Us \ Gs). This is to preserve backward secrecy of the system. Note
that this requirement will affect the number of actual users that can be revoked in an
OR protocol, as the number of users outside the subgroup is limited to t.
Theorem 7.5 The join protocol provides Join Secrecy – For any session Ss where
S1 ≤ Ss ≤ SM , a collusion C ⊆
⋃
Ja, Ss ≤ Sa ≤ SM , Ea = Join, and |C| ≤ t cannot
find the group keys GKb, S1 ≤ Sb < Ss.
Proof: The new users in C are ghost users in sessions Sb, for S1 ≤ Sb < Ss, and they
are never in subgroup Gb, for S1 ≤ Sb < Ss. C cannot obtain the common keys of the
sessions. Observe that we may consider join secrecy as multiple instances of subgroup
secrecy, and so its proof is essentially identical to that of Theorem 7.1 or Theorem 7.3.
2
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Theorem 7.6 The join protocol allows subsets of group members to admit a set Js of
new users to a group Us when N ≥ |Us| + |Js|. It requires transmissions of less than
m log2 q bits over secure unicast channels to admit a new user.
Proof: The condition N ≥ |Us| + |Js| guarantees that each new user Ui′ ∈ Js corre-
sponds to a block Bi′ ∈ B. With the assumption X =
⋃
Ui∈Us
Bi, there clearly exists
a subset of group members in Us who can cover the Bi′ of the new user and give the
key set K(Ui′) to him. The key set K(Ui′) consists of less than m keys, so the required
bandwidth to transmit K(Ui′) is less than m log2 q bits. 2
Discussion on Privileged Sets
The user join protocol above raises the following questions.
1. What is the minimum value of r that satisfies equation (7.1)?
2. How can we find a set Ps of users in Us that satisfies equation (7.1)?
We show that the first question in general is equivalent to Set Cover problem and is
NP-complete. For the second question, we use the simple, greedy algorithm in [86] to
find the privileged set with a good approximation.
Set Cover Problem It is not difficult to see that our first question to find the
minimal r is equivalent to a set cover problem. (See Chapter 1 for a brief description




Bi. For each Bi′ ∈ B but Bi′ 6∈ B
′ we define B∗i′ = {Bi′∩B : B ∈ B
′}. Then,
it is straightforward to see that our first question is exactly finding the minimum-sized
of B∗i′ that covers Bi′ (the set cover problem for the set system (Bi′ ,B
∗
i′)). Since it is
a well-known fact [22] that the set cover problem is NP-complete, it follows that our
problem of finding the minimal number of privileged users in the user join protocol is
NP-complete as well.
An Approximation Algorithm The basic idea of the greedy algorithm is to cover
the block Bi′ corresponding to the new user Ui′ by choosing the block that covers the
largest number of “uncovered” elements at each stage. The algorithm to find the set
cover is as follows.
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Input: (X ,B), B′ = {Bi1 , · · · ,Bins} ⊂ B and
⋃ns




while (Y 6= ∅) {
choose Bi in B
′ that covers the most elements of Bi′
include Bi to C
Y = Y \ Bi
}
return C;
The set Ps consists of users Ui corresponding to blocks Bi ∈ C. The algorithm has
an approximation bound of ln `, where ` = max{|Bi| : Bi ∈ B} as the following shows.
2
Note the following inequality.










where e is the base of the natural logarithm.
Theorem 7.7 ([86]) The above greedy algorithm has the optimum ratio bound of at
most ln `.
Proof: Let D be the optimum set cover and let d denote the size of D. Recall that
C is the output of the greedy algorithm and let c denote the size of C minus 1. The
following shows that c
d
≤ ln `.
Without loss of generality, assume that |Bi′ | = ` where Bi′ is the block chosen by
the new join user. Initially there are `0 = ` elements needed to be covered. Note that
there exists an optimum set cover of size d and by the pigeonhole principle, there must
exist at least one block that covers at least `0
d
elements. This is because if every block
covers less than `0
d
elements, then no collection of d blocks could cover all `0 elements.
At each stage, the greedy algorithm chooses the largest block which means it chooses
a block that covers at least these many elements at the first stage. Therefore, there






) elements left to be covered after the first stage.
Using the same argument at the subsequent stage where these `1 elements could be
covered by an optimum set cover of size d, the greedy algorithm will choose a block
2Note that [22] gives a stronger result achieving the approximation factor of ln β, where β =
max{|Bi ∩ Bj | : Bi,Bj ∈ B}. However their algorithm is much more complicated.
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that covers at least `1
d
elements, leaving at most `2 = `1(1 −
1
d




for the next stage.
After using the same argument for c stages, each stage succeeds in covering at
least a fraction of (1 − 1
d
) of the remaining elements, the number of elements that





Considering the largest value of c where the greedy algorithm has covered all but
the last block of the greedy cover, there will be some elements left to be covered. The























Multiplying by ec/d and taking natural logs, the result is
c
d
≤ ln `0 .
The fact that `0 = ` completes the proof. 2
7.3 Conclusion
We have considered the problem of forming subgroups by dynamic group members,
and proposed two protocols based on key distribution patterns. One has the best
performance when the subgroup size is close to the total number of group members, and
the other when the subgroup size is very small. We have proven security and assessed
efficiency of both protocols, and improved communication efficiency of the first protocol
using erasure codes. The construction of efficient schemes when the subgroup size is
close to half of the full group is an interesting problem for further research. Moreover,
we have slightly extended the proposed scheme to have user admission capability and
also given the algorithm for a new joined user to discover his sponsors and obtain a
secret key set from them.
Chapter 8
Conclusion
A group key distribution system is designed to protect communication within an au-
thorised group by providing a group key for the authorised users. An authorised group
is a result of a membership event: subgroup, join, evict, or refresh. A group key distri-
bution system must guarantee that unauthorised users cannot discover the group key
shared by the authorised members even if they collude and know some portion of the
secret information, including some other group keys, and eavesdrop all transmissions
in the system.
A group key distribution scheme consists of an algorithm for initialising the system,
and an algorithm for establishing a new group key for each possible membership event
in the system. Group key distribution schemes are varied by (i) collusion size and
the underlying cryptographic problem, (ii) storage, communication and computation
overheads and (iii) authorised group size. Designing group key distribution schemes
that have superior performance has been a major research area [4, 5, 7, 8, 17, 18, 23,
48, 52, 55, 71, 76, 81, 84, 85, 87]. Another aspect of group key distribution scheme is
system model. Group key distribution schemes with new properties have also obtained
attention to accommodate for diverse group applications [2, 24, 42, 47, 49, 50, 51, 53,
75, 80, 81].
8.1 Fulfilment of Aims and Objectives
The aims and objectives of the thesis were outlined in the first chapter. The following
is the highlights of our major contributions.
Chapter 2 A general model for group key distribution schemes was given. The
model accommodates various settings and concerns in group communications.
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Chapter 3 A secure and efficient re-keying scheme for eviction and join of arbitrary
number of users was proposed. It outperforms the trivial method of repeating the
eviction or join procedure of a single user: a method that most previous schemes such
as [17, 18, 85, 87] adopted to evict or join multiple users. When evicting or joining a
single user, it also outperforms some previous schemes including [85, 87] with respect to
the communication and computation costs, while performing equally to other efficient
re-keying schemes such as [17, 18, 58]. The proposed scheme was proven to maintain
forward secrecy, backward secrecy and forward-backward secrecy with an arbitrary
number of colluders. A key recovery method complement to the proposed scheme in
providing reliable re-keying was also proposed.
Chapter 4 A secure and efficient re-keying scheme for collaborative setting was
proposed. The proposed scheme is scalable for large groups and has better re-keying
performance than previous collaborative schemes including [16, 40, 80, 81] with re-
spect to the communication and computation overheads, while retaining the number
of rounds feasible. Security arguments based on DL and CDH problems were also
given showing that the proposed scheme provides forward secrecy, backward secrecy
and forward-backward secrecy with an arbitrary number of colluders.
Chapter 5 A notion of dynamic setting, including its applications, was introduced
and a stateless revocation scheme for the setting was proposed. It gives flexibility in
forming subgroups where any group member can be the group initiator for the subgroup
of his choice. The proposed scheme is superior to [2, 75] in terms of communication cost
and collusion size, and a collusion of an arbitrary number of adversaries was proven
not to compromise the subgroup secrecy assuming the CDH problem is hard. The
techniques in the proposed scheme can be easily applied to other stateless revocation
schemes such as [37, 62] to have the dynamic property.
Chapter 6 A novel setting for dynamic group key distribution system, including
its applications, was presented and two schemes for the setting were proposed. In the
setting, (i) a subgroup operation and a sponsorship operation can be performed by any
group member, and (ii) a full join operation requires collaborations from members of
an access set of an access structure. The first proposed scheme considered an access
structure consisting of all α-subsets of users, α ≥ t + 1, while the second proposed
scheme extended the first one to have some β-subsets of users, β ≤ t, as the access
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sets. An improvement on the second scheme was also suggested. The security of both
proposed schemes is based on DDH assumption, and they were proven to be secure
against a collusion of at most t adversaries that does not contain an access set.
Chapter 7 A dynamic group key distribution scheme that allows several group
members to cooperatively admit a new user to the group was proposed. It has effi-
cient subgroup protocol where both storage and communication costs are equivalent to
O(log n) keys, where n is the group size.
8.2 Further Work
In addition to the open problems encountered in the previous chapters, further im-
provement to security and efficiency of existing group key distribution schemes is an
attractive research challenge. This issue has gained attention, particularly in the con-
text of broadcast encryption systems and stateless revocation systems. Further explor-
ing other settings and their applications in group communication is also a compelling
problem. Subsequently, the problem of constructing schemes for the new settings arises
which needs careful attention.
The proposed schemes in the thesis used (i) the key refreshing method and (ii) the
method of consistent revocation of ghost users to preserve backward secrecy of user
join event. User eviction also used similar methods where evicted users are consistently
revoked instead of ghost users to preserve forward secrecy. The question remains
whether there are other (efficient) methods of user join and user eviction that meet the
security requirement, and it is worthy of resolving.
The thesis considered the security requirement of subgroup secrecy, forward secrecy,
backward secrecy or forward-backward secrecy in the proposed group key distribution
schemes. It will be interesting to define new security classes that are applicable to
group communication, and to construct efficient schemes that satisfy the new security
requirements.
Appendix A
On the Security of Anzai et al. Scheme
(Asiacrypt ’99)
A.1 Introduction
We show that the group key distribution scheme proposed by Anzai et al. in [2] does
not provide backward security. We then suggest a way to repair the scheme, using the
idea of proactive secret sharing [38]. See Chapter 1 for the brief review of the scheme.
A.2 Security of Anzai et al. Scheme
It is easy to see that in the user revocation operation, an authorised user can use the
broadcast (t shares at the exponent form), together with his own share to compute the
group key through the variant of Lagrange interpolation (at exponent). Moreover, the
scheme can be applied to multiple revocation operations as long as the total number of
revoked users is not greater than t. It is shown that the security of revocation operation
in the scheme is based on Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) problem [2, 64].
We will show that the join operation in the scheme does not maintain system secrecy.
That is, the new joined users are able to discover the group keys for previous sessions
(and so learn past communication in the system) through the following simple attack.
Suppose in session ST a revocation operation has revoked {Ui1 , · · · , Uim}, m ≤ t, from
the group {U1, · · · , Un} resulting in the subgroup {U1, · · · , Un} \ {Ui1 , · · · , Uim} that
share a group key KT . Also assume that in the next session, ST+1, a new user Ud joins
the group {U1, · · · , Un}. Since Ud has access to the broadcast message 〈 G,Gj ‖ j : j ∈
V 〉 of the revocation operation (broadcast messages are publicly known and may be
stored by users), using his secret information (share) sd, he can calculate the group key
KT like any authorised user in {U1, · · · , Un} \ {Ui1 , · · · , Uim}. This is because Ud is not
treated as a revoked user in session ST and his secret information (Gd = y
r
d mod p) is
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not included in the broadcast message. Thus, he has enough information to calculate
the group key KT .
A.2.1 How to Repair Anzai et al. Scheme
In the scheme, users receive different points of a common polynomial, i.e., different
shares in a secret sharing scheme. New users also obtain shares from the same secret
sharing scheme and this leads to the security violation in user join. New users of a
session can be viewed as ghost users in the previous sessions and so can recover the
previous group keys if they can access and record the broadcast messages of those
sessions. To prevent this security breach, a different secret should be used for each
user join operation.
We modify user join in the scheme to become stateful by updating the secret and
shares of the underlying secret sharing scheme in each session of user join. (Updating
the secret and shares has been considered in proactive secret sharing schemes [38].) The
modified user join does not require any extra key storage for users, and no communi-
cation over secure channels is required to update the secret and shares. Each update
or refresh uses a common key known to all existing users but not to the new users, and
the secret and shares are self-refreshing after the common key is established.
Assume that each user Ui in the group {U1, · · · , Un} has a share F (i) of a polynomial
of degree at most t, F (x). Without loss of generality, let Un+1 and Un+2 be the new
users that join {U1, · · · , Un} and the new group will be {U1, · · · , Un+2}. The modified
user join in the scheme is as follows.
1. A group controller, or a user in the group {U1, · · · , Un}, establishes a common
key K for the group using user revocation protocol without revoking anyone
(K = grF (0) mod p).
2. The group controller updates the secret polynomial F (x) to F ′(x) = K+F (x) mod
q. Each user Ui in {U1, · · · , Un} updates his secret information s
′
i = K+si mod q
(= F ′(i)) as his new secret information.
3. The group controller distributes shares s′n+1 = F
′(n+1) and s′n+2 = F
′(n+2) to
new users Un+1 and Un+2, respectively, through secure channels, and publishes
the public keys y′n+1 = g
s′n+1 mod p and y′n+2 = g





n+2, respectively, as their secret information.
4. The group controller updates public keys y′i = g
K×yi mod p, for all i ∈ {1, · · · , n}.
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The modified user join requires extra communication and computation: (i) a broad-
cast message of (t + 1) log2 p + t log2 q bits and (ii) each group member to compute
t+ 1 modular exponentiations in order to add any number of new users.
Theorem A.1 A collusion of up to t new joined users in the modified join protocol
cannot discover the group keys for previous sessions.
Proof: The common keyK is established to update the secret and shares before joining
the new users (the collusion), and the colluders obtain shares (secret information)
of the updated secret polynomial F ′(x). Since the colluders do not know K, they
cannot convert their secret information to find the group keys established prior to
their admission. So the security is guaranteed by the difficulty of finding the common
key K, which is equal to the Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) problem. 2
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